The result of our reasoning in the two preceeding numbers is this, that in a confederated government,
where the powers are divided between the general and the state government, it is essential
to its existence, that the revenues of the country, without which no government can exist,
should be divided between them, and so apportioned to each, as to answer their respective exigencies,
as far as human wisdom can effect such a division and apportionment.
It has been shewn, that no such allotment is made in this constitution, but that every
source of revenue is under the controul of the Congress; it therefore follows, that if
this system is intended to be a complex and not a simple, a confederate and not an entire
consolidated government, it contains in it the sure seeds of its own dissolution.
— One of two things must happen — Either the new constitution will become a mere nudum
pactum, and all the authority of the rulers under it be cried down, as has happened to
the present confederation — Or the authority of the individual states will be totally supplanted,
and they will retain the mere form without any of the powers of government.
— To one or the other of these issues, I think, this new government, if it is adopted,
will advance with great celerity.
It is said, I know, that such a separation of the sources of revenue, cannot be made
without endangering the public safety — "unless (says a writer) it can be shewn that the circumstances
which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless
the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed; it must be admitted
as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which is
to provide for the defence and protection of the community, &c."1
The pretended demonstration of this writer will instantly vanish, when it is considered,
that the protection and defence of the community is not intended to be entrusted solely into
the hands of the general government, and by his own confession it ought not to be.
It is true this system commits to the general government the protection and defence of the
community against foreign force and invasion, against piracies and felonies on the high
seas, and against insurrections among ourselves.
They are also authorised to provide for the administration of justice in certain matters
of a general concern, and in some that I think are not so.
But it ought to be left to the state governments to provide for the protection and defence
of the citizen against the hand of private violence, and the wrongs done or attempted
by individuals to each other — Protection and defence against the murderer, the robber,
the thief, the cheat, and the unjust person, is to be derived from the respective state
governments.
— The just way of reasoning therefore on this subject is this, the general government
is to provide for the protection and defence of the community against foreign attacks,
&c., they therefore ought to have authority sufficient to effect this, so far as is consistent
with the providing for our internal protection and defence.
The state governments are entrusted with the care of administring justice among its citizens,
and the management of other internal concerns, they ought therefore to retain power adequate
to the end.
The preservation of internal peace and good order, and the due administration of law and
justice, ought to be the first care of every government.
— The happiness of a people depends infinitely more on this than it does upon all that glory
and respect which nations acquire by the most brilliant martial achievements — and I believe
history will furnish but few examples of nations who have duly attended to these, who have
been subdued by foreign invaders.
If a proper respect and submission to the laws prevailed over all orders of men in our
country; and if a spirit of public and private justice, oeconomy and industry influenced
the people, we need not be under any apprehensions but what they would be ready to repel any
invasion that might be made on the country.
And more than this, I would not wish from them — A defensive war is the only one I
think justifiable — I do not make these observations to prove, that a government ought
not to be authorised to provide for the protection and defence of a country against external
enemies, but to shew that this is not the most important, much less the only object
of their care.
The European governments are almost all of them framed, and administered with a view
to arms, and war, as that in which their chief glory consists; they mistake the end of government
— it was designed to save men[']s lives, not to destroy them.
We ought to furnish the world with an example of a great people, who in their civil institutions
hold chiefly in view, the attainment of virtue, and happiness among ourselves.
Let the monarchs, in Europe, share among them the glory of depopulating countries, and butchering
thousands of their innocent citizens, to revenge private quarrels, or to punish an insult offered
to a wife, a mistress, or a favorite: I envy them not the honor, and I pray heaven this
country may never be ambitious of it.
The czar Peter the great, acquired great glory by his arms; but all this was nothing, compared
with the true glory which he obtained, by civilizing his rude and barbarous subjects,
diffusing among them knowledge, and establishing, and cultivating the arts of life: by the former
he desolated countries, and drenched the earth with human blood: by the latter he softened
the ferocious nature of his people, and pointed them to the means of human happiness.
The most important end of government then, is the proper direction of its internal policy,
and oeconomy; this is the province of the state governments, and it is evident, and
is indeed admitted, that these ought to be under their controul.
Is it not then preposterous, and in the highest degree absurd, when the state governments
are vested with powers so essential to the peace and good order of society, to take from
them the means of their own preservation?
The idea, that the powers of congress in respect to revenue ought to be unlimited, "because
the circumstances which may affect the public safety are not reducible to certain determinate
limits," is novel, as it relates to the government of the united states.
The inconveniencies which resulted from the feebleness of the present confederation was
discerned, and felt soon after its adoption.
It was soon discovered, that a power to require money, without either the authority or means
to enforce a collection of it, could not be relied upon either to provide for the common
defence, the discharge of the national debt, or for support of government.
Congress therefore, so early as February 1781, recommended to the states to invest them with
a power to levy an impost of five per cent ad valorem, on all imported goods, as a fund
to be appropriated to discharge the debts already contracted, or which should hereafter
be contracted for the support of the war, to be continued until the debts should be
fully and finally discharged.
There is not the most distant idea held out in this act, that an unlimited power to collect
taxes, duties and excises was necessary to be vested in the united states, and yet this
was a time of the most pressing danger and distress.
The idea then was, that if certain definite funds were assigned to the union, which were
certain in their natures, productive, and easy of collection, it would enable them to
answer their engagements, and provide for their defence, and the impost of five per
cent was fixed upon for the purpose.
This same subject was revived in the winter and spring of 1783, and after a long consideration
of the subject, and many schemes were proposed; the result was, a recommendation of the revenue
system of April 1783; this system does not suggest an idea that it was necessary to grant
the United States unlimited authority in matters of revenue.
A variety of amendments were proposed to this system, some of which are upon the journals
of Congress, but it does not appear that any of them proposed to invest the general government
with discretionary power to raise money.
On the contrary, all of them limit them to certain definite objects, and fix the bounds
over which they could not pass.
This recommendation was passed at the conclusion of the war, and was founded on an estimate
of the whole national debt.
It was computed, that one million and an half of dollars, in addition to the impost, was
a sufficient sum to pay the annual interest of the debt, and gradually to abolish the
principal.
— Events have proved that their estimate was sufficiently liberal, as the domestic
debt appears upon its being adjusted to be less than it was computed, and since this
period a considerable portion of the principal of the domestic debt has been discharged by
the sale of the western lands.
It has been constantly urged by Congress, and by individuals, ever since, until lately,
that had this revenue been appropriated by the states, as it was recommended, it would
have been adequate to every exigency of the union.
Now indeed it is insisted, that all the treasures of the country are to be under the controul
of that body, whom we are to appoint to provide for our protection and defence against foreign
enemies.
The debts of the several states, and the support of the governments of them are to trust to
fortune and accident.
If the union should not have occasion for all the money they can raise, they will leave
a portion for the state, but this must be a matter of mere grace and favor.
Doctrines like these would not have been listened to by any state in the union, at a time when
we were pressed on every side by a powerful enemy, and were called upon to make greater
exertions than we have any reason to expect we shall ever be again.
The ability and character of the convention, who framed the preferred constitution, is
sounded forth and reiterated by every declaimer and writer in its favor, as a powerful argument
to induce its adoption.
But are not the patriots who guided our councils in the perilous times of the war, entitled
to equal respect.
How has it happened, that none of these perceived a truth, which it is pretended is capable
of such clear demonstration, that the power to raise a revenue should be deposited in
the general government without limitation?
Were the men so dull of apprehension, so incapable of reasoning as not to be able to draw the
inference?
The truth is, no such necessity exists.
It is a thing practicable, and by no means so difficult as is pretended, to limit the
powers of the general government in respect to revenue, while yet they may retain reasonable
means to provide for the common defence.
It is admitted, that human wisdom cannot foresee all the variety of circumstances that may
arise to endanger the safety of nations — and it may with equal truth be added, that the
power of a nation, exerted with its utmost vigour, may not be equal to repel a force
with which it may be assailed, much less may it be able, with its ordinary resources and
power, to oppose an extraordinary and unexpected attack; — but yet every nation may form
a rational judgment, what force will be competent to protect and defend it, against any enemy
with which it is probable it may have to contend.
In extraordinary attacks, every country must rely upon the spirit and special exertions
of its inhabitants — and these extraordinary efforts will always very much depend upon
the happiness and good order the people experience from a wise and prudent administration of
their internal government.
The states are as capable of making a just estimate on this head, as perhaps any nation
in the world.
— We have no powerful nation in our neighbourhood; if we are to go to war, it must either be
with the Aboriginal natives, or with European nations.
The first are so unequal to a contest with this whole continent, that they are rather
to be dreaded for the depredations they may make on our frontiers, than for any impression
they will ever be able to make on the body of the country.
Some of the European nations, it is true, have provinces bordering upon us, but from
these, unsupported by their European forces, we have nothing to apprehend; if any of them
should attack us, they will have to transport their armies across the atlantic, at immense
expence, while we should defend ourselves in our own country, which abounds with every
necessary of life.
For defence against any assault, which there is any probability will be made upon us, we
may easily form an estimate.
I may be asked to point out the sources, from which the general government could derive
a sufficient revenue, to answer the demands of the union.
Many might be suggested, and for my part, I am not disposed to be tenacious of my own
opinion on the subject.
If the object be defined with precision, and will operate to make the burden fall any thing
nearly equal on the different parts of the union, I shall be satisfied.
There is one source of revenue, which it is agreed, the general government ought to have
the sole controul of.
This is an impost upon all goods imported from foreign countries.
This would, of itself, be very productive, and would be collected with ease and certainty.
— It will be a fund too, constantly encreasing — for our commerce will grow, with the productions
of the country; and these, together with our consumption of foreign goods, will encrease
with our population.
It is said, that the impost will not produce a sufficient sum to satisfy the demands of
the general government; perhaps it would not.
Let some other then, equally well defined, be assigned them: — that this is practicable
is certain, because such particular objects were proposed by some members of Congress
when the revenue system of April 1783, was agitated in that body.
It was then moved, that a tax at the rate of _____ ninetieths of a dollar on surveyed
land, and a house tax of half a dollar on a house, should be granted to the United States.
I do not mention this, because I approve of raising a revenue in this mode.
I believe such a tax would be difficult in its collection, and inconvenient in its operation.
But it shews, that it has heretofore been the sense of some of those, who now contend,
that the general government should have unlimited authority in matters of revenue, that their
authority should be definite and limitted on that head.
— My own opinion is, that the objects from which the general government should have authority
to raise a revenue, should be of such a nature, that the tax should be raised by simple laws,
with few officers, with certainty and expedition, and with the least interference with the internal
police of the states.
— Of this nature is the impost on imported goods — and it appears to me that a duty
on exports, would also be of this nature — and therefore, for ought I can discover, this
would be the best source of revenue to grant the general government.
I know neither the Congress nor the state legislatures will have authority under the
new constitution to raise a revenue in this way.
But I cannot perceive the reason of the restriction.
It appears to me evident, that a tax on articles exported, would be as nearly equal as any
that we can expect to lay, and it certainly would be collected with more ease and less
expence than any direct tax.
I do not however, contend for this mode, it may be liable to well founded objections that
have not occurred to me.
But this I do contend for, that some mode is practicable, and that limits must be marked
between the general government, and the states on this head, or if they be not, either the
Congress in the exercise of this power, will deprive the state legislatures of the means
of their existence, or the states by resisting the constitutional authority of the general
government, will render it nugatory.
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