Dear sir,
I believe the people of the United States are full in the opinion, that a free and mild
government can be preserved in their extensive territories, only under the substantial forms
of a federal republic.
As several of the ablest advocates for the system proposed, have acknowledged this (and
I hope the confessions they have published will be preserved and remembered) I shall
not take up time to establish this point.
A question then arises, how far that system partakes of a federal republic.
— I observed in a former letter, that it appears to be the first important step to
a consolidation of the states; that its strong tendency is to that point.
But what do we mean by a federal republic? and what by a consolidated government?
To erect a federal republic, we must first make a number of states on republican principles;
each state with a government organized for the internal management of its affairs: The
states, as such, must unite under a federal head, and delegate to it powers to make and
execute laws in certain enumerated cases, under certain restrictions; this head may
be a single assembly, like the present congress, or the Amphictionic council; or it may consist
of a legislature, with one or more branches; of an executive, and of a judiciary.
To form a consolidated, or one entire government, there must be no state, or local governments,
but all things, persons and property, must be subject to the laws of one legislature
alone; to one executive, and one judiciary.
Each state government, as the government of New Jersey, &c. is a consolidated, or one
entire government, as it respects the counties, towns, citizens and property within the limits
of the state.
— The state governments are the basis, the pillar on which the federal head is placed,
and the whole together, when formed on elective principles, constitute a federal republic.
A federal republic in itself supposes state or local governments to exist, as the body
or props, on which the federal head rests, and that it cannot remain a moment after they
cease.
In erecting the federal government, and always in its councils, each state must be known
as a sovereign body; but in erecting this government, I conceive, the legislature of
the state, by the expressed or implied assent of the people, or the people of the state,
under the direction of the government of it, may accede to the federal compact: Nor do
I conceive it to be necessarily a part of a confederacy of states, that each have an
equal voice in the general councils.
A confederated republic being organized, each state must retain powers for managing its
internal police, and all delegate to the union power to manage general concerns: The quantity
of power the union must possess is one thing, the mode of exercising the powers given, is
quite a different consideration; and it is the mode of exercising them, that makes one
of the essential distinctions between one entire or consolidated government, and a federal
republic; that is, however the government may be organized, if the laws of the union,
in most important concerns, as in levying and collecting taxes, raising troops, &c.
operate immediately upon the persons and property of individuals, and not on states, extend
to organizing the militia, &c. the government, as to its administration, as to making and
executing laws, is not federal, but consolidated.
To illustrate my idea — the union makes a requisition, and assigns to each state its
quota of men or monies wanted; each state, by its own laws and officers, in its own way,
furnishes its quota: here the state governments stand between the union and individuals; the
laws of the union operate only on states, as such, and federally: Here nothing can be
done without the meetings of the state legislatures — but in the other case the union, though
the state legislatures should not meet for years together, proceeds immediately, by its
own laws and officers, to levy and collect monies of individuals, to inlist men, form
armies, &c. here the laws of the union operate immediately on the body of the people, on
persons and property; in the same manner the laws of one entire consolidated government
operate.
— These two modes are very distinct, and in their operation and consequences have directly
opposite tendencies: The first makes the existence of the state governments indispensable, and
throws all the detail business of levying and collecting the taxes, &c. into the hands
of those governments, and into the hands, of course, of many thousand officers solely
created by, and dependent on the state.
The last entirely excludes the agency of the respective states, and throws the whole business
of levying and collecting taxes, &c. into the hands of many thousand officers solely
created by, and dependent upon the union, and makes the existence of the state government
of no consequence in the case.
It is true, congress in raising any given sum in direct taxes, must by the constitution,
raise so much of it in one state, and so much in another, by a fixed rule, which most of
the states some time since agreed to: But this does not effect the principle in question,
it only secures each state against any arbitrary proportions.
The federal mode is perfectly safe and eligible, founded in the true spirit of a confederated
republic there could be no possible exception to it, did we not find by experience, that
the states will sometimes neglect to comply with the reasonable requisitions of the union.
It being according to the fundamental principles of federal republics, to raise men and monies
by requisitions, and for the states individually to organize and train the militia, I conceive,
there can be no reason whatever for departing from them, except this, that the states sometimes
neglect to comply with reasonable requisitions, and that it is dangerous to attempt to compel
a delinquent state by force, as it may often produce a war.
We ought, therefore, to enquire attentively, how extensive the evils to be guarded against
are, and cautiously limit the remedies to the extent of the evils.
I am not about to defend the confederation, or to charge the proposed constitution with
imperfections not in it; but we ought to examine facts, and strip them of the false colourings
often given them by incautious observations, by unthinking or designing men.
We ought to premise, that laws for raising men and monies, even in consolidated governments,
are not often punctually complied with.
Historians, except in extraordinary cases, but very seldom take notice of the detail
collection of taxes; but these facts we have fully proved, and well attested; that the
most energetic governments have relinquished taxes frequently, which were of many years
standing.
These facts amply prove, that taxes assessed, have remained many years uncollected.
I agree there have been instances in the republics of Greece, Holland, &c. in the course of several
centuries, of states neglecting to pay their quotas of requisitions; but it is a circumstance
certainly deserving of attention, whether these nations which have depended on requisitions
principally for their defence, have not raised men and monies nearly as punctually as entire
governments, which have taxed directly; whether we have not found the latter as often distressed
for the want of troops and monies, as the former.
It has been said, that the Amphictionic council, and the Germanic head, have not possessed
sufficient powers to controul the members of the republic in a proper manner.
Is this, if true, to be imputed to requisitions?
Is it not principally to be imputed to the unequal powers of those members, connected
with this important circumstance, that each member possessed power to league itself with
foreign powers, and powerful neighbours, without the consent of the head.
After all, has not the Germanic body a government as good as its neighbours in general? and
did not the Grecian republic remain united several centuries, and form the theatre of
human greatness?
No government in Europe has commanded monies more plentifully than the government of Holland.
As to the United States, the separate states lay taxes directly, and the union calls for
taxes by way of requisitions; and is it a fact, that more monies are due in proportion
on requisitions in the United States, than on the state taxes directly laid?
— It is but about ten years since congress begun to make requisitions, and in that time,
the monies, &c. required, and the bounties given for men required of the states, have
amounted, specie value, to about 36 millions dollars, about 24 millions of dollars of which
have been actually paid; and a very considerable part of the 12 millions not paid, remains
so not so much from the neglect of the states, as from the sudden changes in paper money,
&c. which in a great measure rendered payments of no service, and which often induced the
union indirectly to relinquish one demand, by making another in a different form.
Before we totally condemn requisitions, we ought to consider what immense bounties the
states gave, and what prodigious exertions they made in the war, in order to comply with
the requisitions of congress; and if since the peace they have been delinquent, ought
we not carefully to enquire, whether that delinquency is to be imputed solely to the
nature of requisitions?
ought it not in part to be imputed to two other causes?
I mean first, an opinion, that has extensively prevailed, that the requisitions for domestic
interest have not been founded on just principles; and secondly, the circumstance, that the government
itself, by proposing imposts, &c. has departed virtually from the constitutional system;
which proposed changes, like all changes proposed in government, produce an inattention and
negligence in the execution of the government in being.
I am not for depending wholly on requisitions; but I mention these few facts to shew they
are not so totally futile as many pretend.
For the truth of many of these facts I appeal to the public records; and for the truth of
the others, I appeal to many republican characters, who are best informed in the affairs of the
United States.
Since the peace, and till the convention reported, the wisest men in the United States generally
supposed, that certain limited funds would answer the purposes of the union: and though
the states are by no means in so good a condition as I wish they were, yet, I think, I may very
safely affirm, they are in a better condition than they would be had congress always possessed
the powers of taxation now contended for.
The fact is admitted, that our federal government does not possess sufficient powers to give
life and vigor to the political system; and that we experience disappointments, and several
inconveniencies; but we ought carefully to distinguish those which are merely the consequences
of a severe and tedious war, from those which arise from defects in the federal system.
There has been an entire revolution in the United States within thirteen years, and the
least we can compute the waste of labour and property at, during that period, by the war,
is three hundred million of dollars.
Our people are like a man just recovering from a severe fit of sickness.
It was the war that disturbed the course of commerce, introduced floods of paper money,
the stagnation of credit, and threw many valuable men out of steady business.
From these sources our greatest evils arise; men of knowledge and reflection must perceive
it; — but then, have we not done more in three or four years past, in repairing the
injuries of the war, by repairing houses and estates, restoring industry, frugality, the
fisheries, manufactures, &c. and thereby laying the foundation of good government, and of
individual and political happiness, than any people ever did in a like time; we must judge
from a view of the country and facts, and not from foreign newspapers, or our own, which
are printed chiefly in the commercial towns, where imprudent living, imprudent importations,
and many unexpected disappointments, have produced a despondency, and a disposition
to view every thing on the dark side.
Some of the evils we feel, all will agree, ought to be imputed to the defective administration
of the governments.
From these and various considerations, I am very clearly of opinion, that the evils we
sustain, merely on account of the defects of the confederation, are but as a feather
in the balance against a mountain, compared with those which would, infallibly, be the
result of the loss of general liberty, and that happiness men enjoy under a frugal, free,
and mild government.
Heretofore we do not seem to have seen danger any where, but in giving power to congress,
and now no where but in congress wanting powers; and, without examining the extent of the evils
to be remedied, by one step, we are for giving up to congress almost all powers of any importance
without limitation.
The defects of the confederation are extravagantly magnified, and every species of pain we feel
imputed to them: and hence it is inferred, there must be a total change of the principles,
as well as forms of government: and in the main point, touching the federal powers, we
rest all on a logical inference, totally inconsistent with experience and sound political reasoning.
It is said, that as the federal head must make peace and war, and provide for the common
defence, it ought to possess all powers necessary to that end: that powers unlimited, as to
the purse and sword, to raise men and monies, and form the militia, are necessary to that
end; and, therefore, the federal head ought to possess them.
This reasoning is far more specious than solid: it is necessary that these powers so exist
in the body politic, as to be called into exercise whenever necessary for the public
safety; but it is by no means true, that the man, or congress of men, whose duty it more
immediately is to provide for the common defence, ought to possess them without limitation.
But clear it is, that if such men, or congress, be not in a situation to hold them without
danger to liberty, he or they ought not to possess them.
It has long been thought to be a well founded position, that the purse and sword ought not
to be placed in the same hands in a free government.
Our wise ancestors have carefully separated them — placed the sword in the hands of
their king, even under considerable limitations, and the purse in the hands of the commons
alone: yet the king makes peace and war, and it is his duty to provide for the common defence
of the nation.
This authority at least goes thus far — that a nation, well versed in the science of government,
does not conceive it to be necessary or expedient for the man entrusted with the common defence
and general tranquility, to possess unlimitedly the powers in question, or even in any considerable
degree.
Could he, whose duty it is to defend the public, possess in himself independently, all the
means of doing it consistent with the public good, it might be convenient: but the people
of England know that their liberties and happiness would be in infinitely greater danger from
the king's unlimited possession of these powers, than from all external enemies and
internal commotions to which they might be exposed: therefore, though they have made
it his duty to guard the empire, yet they have wisely placed in other hands, the hands
of their representatives, the power to deal out and controul the means.
In Holland their high mightinesses must provide for the common defence, but for the means
they depend, in a considerable degree, upon requisitions made on the state or local assemblies.
Reason and facts evince, that however convenient it might be for an executive magistrate, or
federal head, more immediately charged with the national defence and safety, solely, directly,
and independently to possess all the means; yet such magistrate, or head, never ought
to possess them, if thereby the public liberties shall be endangered.
The powers in question never have been, by nations wise and free, deposited, nor can
they ever be, with safety, any where, but in the principal members of the national system:
— where these form one entire government, as in Great-Britain, they are separated and
lodged in the principal members of it.
But in a federal republic, there is quite a different organization; the people form
this kind of government, generally, because their territories are too extensive to admit
of their assembling in one legislature, or of executing the laws on free principles under
one entire government.
They convene in their local assemblies, for local purposes, and for managing their internal
concerns, and unite their states under a federal head for general purposes.
It is the essential characteristic of a confederated republic, that this head be dependant on,
and kept within limited bounds by, the local governments; and it is because, in these alone,
in fact, the people can be substantially assembled or represented.
It is, therefore, we very universally see, in this kind of government, the congressional
powers placed in a few hands, and accordingly limited, and specifically enumerated: and
the local assemblies strong and well guarded, and composed of numerous members.
Wise men will always place the controuling power where the people are substantially collected
by their representatives.
By the proposed system, the federal head will possess, without limitation, almost every
species of power that can, in its exercise, tend to change the government, or to endanger
liberty; while in it, I think it has been fully shewn, the people will have but the
shadow of representation, and but the shadow of security for their rights and liberties.
In a confederated republic, the division of representation, &c. in its nature, requires
a correspondent division and deposit of powers, relative to taxes and military concerns: and
I think the plan offered stands quite alone, in confounding the principles of governments
in themselves totally distinct.
I wish not to exculpate the states for their improper neglects in not paying their quotas
of requisitions; but, in applying the remedy, we must be governed by reason and facts.
It will not be denied, that the people have a right to change the government when the
majority chuse it, if not restrained by some existing compact — that they have a right
to displace their rulers, and consequently to determine when their measures are reasonable
or not — and that they have a right, at any time, to put a stop to those measures
they may deem prejudicial to them, by such forms and negatives as they may see fit to
provide.
From all these, and many other well founded considerations, I need not mention, a question
arises, what powers shall there be delegated to the federal head, to insure safety, as
well as energy, in the government?
I think there is a safe and proper medium pointed out by experience, by reason, and
facts.
When we have organized the government, we ought to give power to the union, so far only
as experience and present circumstances shall direct, with a reasonable regard to time to
come.
Should future circumstances, contrary to our expectations, require that further powers
be transferred to the union, we can do it far more easily, than get back those we may
now imprudently give.
The system proposed is untried: candid advocates and opposers admit, that it is, in a degree,
a mere experiment, and that its organization is weak and imperfect; surely then, the safe
ground is cautiously to vest power in it, and when we are sure we have given enough
for ordinary exigencies, to be extremely careful how we delegate powers, which, in common cases,
must necessarily be useless or abused, and of very uncertain effect in uncommon ones.
By giving the union power to regulate commerce, and to levy and collect taxes by imposts,
we give it an extensive authority, and permanent productive funds, I believe quite as adequate
to the present demands of the union, as excises and direct taxes can be made to the present
demands of the separate states.
The state governments are now about four times as expensive as that of the union; and their
several state debts added together, are nearly as large as that of the union — Our impost
duties since the peace have been almost as productive as the other sources of taxation,
and when under one general system of regulations, the probability is, that those duties will
be very considerably increased: Indeed the representation proposed will hardly justify
giving to congress unlimited powers to raise taxes by imposts, in addition to the other
powers the union must necessarily have.
It is said, that if congress possess only authority to raise taxes by imposts, trade
probably will be overburdened with taxes, and the taxes of the union be found inadequate
to any uncommon exigencies: To this we may observe, that trade generally finds its own
level, and will naturally and necessarily heave off any undue burdens laid upon it:
further, if congress alone possess the impost, and also unlimited power to raise monies by
excises and direct taxes, there must be much more danger that two taxing powers, the union
and states, will carry excises and direct taxes to an unreasonable extent, especially
as these have not the natural boundaries taxes on trade have.
However, it is not my object to propose to exclude congress from raising monies by internal
taxes, as by duties, excises, and direct taxes; but my opinion is, that congress, especially
in its proposed organization, ought not to raise monies by internal taxes, except in
strict conformity to the federal plan; that is, by the agency of the state governments
in all cases, except where a state shall neglect, for an unreasonable time, to pay its quota
of a requisition; and never where so many of the state legislatures as represent a majority
of the people, shall formally determine an excise law or requisition is improper, in
their next session after the same be laid before them.
We ought always to recollect that the evil to be guarded against is found by our own
experience, and the experience of others, to be mere neglect in the states to pay their
quotas; and power in the union to levy and collect the neglecting states' quotas with
interest, is fully adequate to the evil.
By this federal plan, with this exception mentioned, we secure the means of collecting
the taxes by the usual process of law, and avoid the evil of attempting to compel or
coerce a state; and we avoid also a circumstance, which never yet could be, and I am fully confident
never can be, admitted in a free federal republic; I mean a permanent and continued system of
tax laws of the union, executed in the bowels of the states by many thousand officers, dependent
as to the assessing and collecting federal taxes, solely upon the union.
On every principle then, we ought to provide, that the union render an exact account of
all monies raised by imposts and other taxes; and that whenever monies shall be wanted for
the purposes of the union, beyond the proceeds of the impost duties, requisitions shall be
made on the states for the monies so wanted; and that the power of laying and collecting
shall never be exercised, except in cases where a state shall neglect, a given time,
to pay its quota.
This mode seems to be strongly pointed out by the reason of the case, and spirit of the
government; and I believe, there is no instance to be found in a federal republic, where the
congressional powers ever extended generally to collecting monies by direct taxes or excises.
Creating all these restrictions, still the powers of the union in matters of taxation,
will be too unlimited; further checks, in my mind, are indispensably necessary.
Nor do I conceive, that as full a representation as is practicable in the federal government,
will afford sufficient security: the strength of the government, and the confidence of the
people, must be collected principally in the local assemblies; every part or branch of
the federal head must be feeble, and unsafely trusted with large powers.
A government possessed of more power than its constituent parts will justify, will not
only probably abuse it, but be unequal to bear its own burden; it may as soon be destroyed
by the pressure of power, as languish and perish for want of it.
There are two ways further of raising checks, and guarding against undue combinations and
influence in a federal system.
The first is, in levying taxes, raising and keeping up armies, in building navies, in
forming plans for the militia, and in appropriating monies for the support of the military, to
require the attendance of a large proportion of the federal representatives, as two-thirds
or three-fourths of them; and in passing laws, in these important cases, to require the consent
of two-thirds or three-fourths of the members present.
The second is, by requiring that certain important laws of the federal head, as a requisition
or a law for raising monies by excise shall be laid before the state legislatures, and
if disapproved of by a given number of them, say by as many of them as represent a majority
of the people, the law shall have no effect.
Whether it would be adviseable to adopt both, or either of these checks, I will not undertake
to determine.
We have seen them both exist in confederated republics.
The first exists substantially in the confederation, and will exist in some measure in the plan
proposed, as in chusing a president by the house, in expelling members; in the senate,
in making treaties, and in deciding on impeachments, and in the whole in altering the constitution.
The last exists in the United Netherlands, but in a much greater extent.
The first is founded on this principle, that these important measures may, sometimes, be
adopted by a bare quorum of members, perhaps, from a few states, and that a bare majority
of the federal representatives may frequently be of the aristocracy, or some particular
interests, connections, or parties in the community, and governed by motives, views,
and inclinations not compatible with the general interest.
— The last is founded on this principle, that the people will be substantially represented,
only in their state or local assemblies; that their principal security must be found in
them; and that, therefore, they ought to have ultimately a constitutional controul over
such interesting measures.
I have often heard it observed, that our people are well informed, and will not submit to
oppressive governments; that the state governments will be their ready advocates, and possess
their confidence, mix with them, and enter into all their wants and feelings.
This is all true; but of what avail will these circumstances be, if the state governments,
thus allowed to be the guardians of the people, possess no kind of power by the forms of the
social compact, to stop, in their passage, the laws of congress injurious to the people.
State governments must stand and see the law take place; they may complain and petition
— so may individuals; the members of them, in extreme cases, may resist, on the principles
of self-defence — so may the people and individuals.
It has been observed, that the people, in extensive territories, have more power, compared
with that of their rulers, than in small states.
Is not directly the opposite true?
The people in a small state can unite and act in concert, and with vigour; but in large
territories, the men who govern find it more easy to unite, while people cannot; while
they cannot collect the opinions of each part, while they move to different points, and one
part is often played off against the other.
It has been asserted, that the confederate head of a republic at best, is in general
weak and dependent; — that the people will attach themselves to, and support their local
governments, in all disputes with the union.
Admit the fact: is it any way to remove the inconvenience by accumulating powers upon
a weak organization?
The fact is, that the detail administration of affairs, in this mixed republic, depends
principally on the local governments; and the people would be wretched without them:
and a great proportion of social happiness depends on the internal administration of
justice, and on internal police.
The splendor of the monarch, and the power of the government are one thing.
The happiness of the subject depends on very different causes: but it is to the latter,
that the best men, the greatest ornaments of human nature, have most carefully attended:
it is to the former tyrants and oppressors have always aimed.
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