Leon: Welcome everybody.
Before we proceed, I would like to thank three people who are very instrumental in arranging
this event.
Katie Earl, Lindsay Wise, and Wesley Fox.
Thank you very much, guys, for all your help.
But mostly, thanks to our guest Vladimir Kara-Murza.
Well, let me start with congratulations, Volodya, on being the very first
recipient of the Sergei Magnitsky Human Rights prize, I believe in London a couple of weeks
ago.
What was it like?
Vladimir: Well, first of all, thank you so much for the invitation.
It's always an honor and a pleasure to be here at the American Enterprise Institute,
and to do events with Leon.
It's becoming a tradition now.
And so, it was indeed on the 16th of November, the day that Sergei Magnitsky was killed in
Matrosskaya Tishina prison back in 2009, and they had the annual Magnitsky Human Rights
awards in London.
This is a bi-annual ceremony, and I was indeed honored and very humbled to receive one this
year.
I don't suddenly think that I'm worthy of any kind of award but I know I will cherish
this for the rest of my life.
It's a great honor but more than that, I'm very proud to have played a small part in
this process of convincing members of the U.S. Congress, five years ago now...in fact,
exactly five years in December 2012 this happened, to pass a law which was named in memory and
in honor of Sergei Magnitsky, and which introduced what should really be a simple and straightforward
principle but was, in fact, a groundbreaking principle in international practice.
It was the principle that responsibility for human rights abuse should be assigned to where
it actually belongs.
Not into an entire country and to all the citizens of that country as general sanctions
do, but to the actual people who perpetrate human rights abuses and corruption.
So what the Magnitsky Act did is it laid down the principle that those people, those Russian
officials and those oligarchs in and around the Putin regime, who are responsible for
human rights abuse and corruption will no longer be able to receive visas to the U.S.
and use the U.S. financial and banking system for their personal gain.
And the reason this is so important is because of the nature of the Putin regime, the way
it is structured, and the fundamental hypocrisy and a double standard that is right at the
heart of the Putin regime.
And that is that the people who are in charge of the Russian government today, they want
to steal in Russia but spend in the west.
And this is the way they have done things for years.
The same people who undermine and violate and abuse the most basic norms of democratic
society at home want to use the privileges and opportunities of democratic society in
Western countries for themselves and for their families.
You know, they want to educate their children in Western schools, they want to keep their
money in western banks.
When I say their money, that's the money they've actually stolen from the Russian people.
They want to buy high-class real estate and yachts and luxury cars and whatever else in
western countries.
And we think that this hypocrisy and this double standard has to stop, and this was
the premise behind the Magnitsky Act.
And I'm proud to have played my small part in helping pass this measure into law.
And when the Magnitsky Act was passed, exactly five years ago, at the end of 2012, Boris
Nemtsov and I was sitting on that day in the visitor's gallery of the U.S. House of Representatives
chamber watching as they were voting on this bill and as this bill was becoming law in
front of our eyes.
And I remember Boris said on that day that, "This is the most pro-Russian law ever passed
in any foreign country because it holds to account those who violate the rights of Russian
citizens and those who steal the money of Russian taxpayers."
And I'm happy to say that since then, since the Magnitsky Act was passed here in the U.S.
five years ago, three more countries have followed this example: Canada, Estonia, and
Lithuania.
Lithuania just last week, the president of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė just signed
this bill into law.
And I'll be in Vilnus next week to meet with members of Lithuanian parliament, and to thank
them for doing this.
And we hope that other countries, other western democracies, also take a lead on this issue
and send a message to those crooks and those human rights abusers in the Putin regime that
they will no longer will be welcome in western democratic countries.
And there's one other thing that Boris Nemtsov said back five years ago when the Magnitsky
law was being passed here.
He said that when Russia becomes a democratic country with the rule of law, he wanted to
be the first one to go back to the U.S. and other western countries and advocate for a
repeal of the Magnitsky Act.
Because it will no longer be needed, because we will have a real justice system and a real
rule of law system that will be able to take care of the crooks and the abusers and the
corrupt officials.
Now of course we know that he will not be doing that.
And, you know, the last two years have taught me to be very careful about making predictions
but I certainly help to be able to one day go back here and to Ottawa and to Vilnus and
Talin and hopefully London and other capitals of democratic countries to say that this law
is no longer needed because we have a system of government, a real system of government
and justice and the rule of law that is able to protect those principles.
Leon: Well, thank you very much, Valudia.
You know, it's always...I mean, there are multiple pleasures in chatting with you in
public, but one of them is that you're such an unusual combination of, you know, of an
Oxford educated.
Vladimir: Cambridge.
Leon: Cambridge, sorry.
Vladimir: Never confuse the two.
Leon: Right.
I thought I'll test it.
Vladimir: It's like if you say that I'm from Saint Petersburg.
Leon: Yeah.
All right, Cambridge-educated historian and opposition activist.
So let me...you know, I mean it's the same half, they're just maybe different halves
or different colors.
But...all right, let's stress the analyst part of your hat.
Looks like Russia is emerging from a recession.
I mean, there are various reasons why, primarily it's not because of investment.
It's primarily because people borrow and spend.
And...but whatever the reason, the consensus is about 1.7% GDP growth.
At the same time, paradoxically, this is the fourth year in a row where the real incomes
are falling.
And Alexei Kudrin, to whom we'll return--probably known to everybody, I don't need to introduce
him here--said that poverty is a real problem in Russia.
And the so-called social protests are up this year, 56% over the last year.
And people protest, you know, the higher...the rising utility costs, healthcare, transportation,
housing, layoffs.
And I thought I would never hear it from...since the post-revolutionary impoverished 1990s
when the oil was $18 a barrel, wage arrears.
I said so-called social protests because both the regime and the opposition seem to distinguish
rather sharply between what's going in those protests and what they call political protests.
Where they are...they could be called political, they're strictly localized.
Or at least that seems to me.
I mean, people protest against a particular mayor, a particular governor, a particular
police force, particular municipality.
But we have not seen the repeat of the March 26th National Anti-Corruption Demonstration
in, I believe, 84 Russian cities.
Now, the...I wonder though.
In an economy where 70% of the GDP is either owned or controlled by the government, or
a subsidized by the government in the public sector, there's always a tinge of politics
in every social protest, is that right?
Vladimir: Well, absolutely.
There's always a fine line between social and political protest, and it's not always
clear where you draw it.
I mean, for example, a couple of years ago we had those protest by long haul truck drivers
around the country against this new road tarrif system that was introduced.
And on the one hand you can say that, well, that's a social protest because they're just
protesting against those new tarrifs that they have to pay.
But of course, we know that that entire system was introduced for the personal gain of the
Rotenberg Brothers who are, you know, one of the closest oligarchs, politically and
financially, to Putin and his regime.
So, I mean it's debatable whether that was social or political.
But I think what's interesting about it, we always had this notion for years in Russia,
maybe for decades, and you've written a lot about it too that, you know, at some point,
it's those economic and social protests that could become the drivers of political change.
But I think actually if you look at the, you know, the last 18 years now already of the
Putin regime, the biggest political, the biggest protest, the biggest street protest that happened
under the Putin regime happened actually when the economy was doing very well in December
2011-January 2012.
It had in fact nothing to do with social or economic grievances.
In fact, the people who came out on Bolotnaya and Sakharov Avenue back
in December 2011, six years ago now, they didn't come for money or for wages or for
any social and economic demands.
They came for their dignity.
They came because they felt insulted at such a blatant stealing of their votes.
You know, "We Are Not Cattle" was one of the most popular slogans on Bolotnaya
on December the 10th, 2011.
And in fact, a lot of the people who came out to protest were representative of the
relatively affluent urban middle classes.
And again, it was not about the social or the economic issues.
It was about dignity.
It was about people wanting to be citizens in their own country, as opposed to voiceless
subjects who could be told, you know, that I'll be president, he'll be prime minister
for the next 12 years, goodbye.
You know, that was the driving issue.
And of course, those protests that you just referred to that we saw all across the country
in the last few months, in March and then again in June and then again in the last few
weeks with the so-called presidential election campaign beginning and going underway, of
course at the March protest, as you pointed out exactly took place in more than 80 towns
and cities across Russia.
In June, it was already almost 200.
It was a much bigger wave on June the 12th, Russian national day.
Symbolically the day when the Russian parliament back in 1990 doctored the declaration
of sovereignty from the Soviet central government.
And I think the most striking feature of those protests...I mean obstentiably, they were
about corruption and against corruption, the pervasive government corruption, the immediate
trigger was that investigation done by Navalny's anti-corruption foundation into the secret
financial empire of current prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev.
You know, his yachts, his villas, his vineyards in Tuscany, and all the other stuff.
But it was, of course, about much more than that.
He was not just against the corruption itself, it was also against the reasons, the underlying
reasons that allow for this corruption, the lack of transparency, the lack of accountability,
the lack of the rule of law.
And at the end of the day, the fact that one person has now been in power in our country
for 18 years, let's just pause and think about it.
Putin has now, if you count by the number of days, Putin has now been in power longer
than Leonid Brezhnev, the symbol of Soviet totallitarian stagnation.
You know, the generation that...the generation of our parents grew up knowing nobody but
Brezhnev will now [crosstalk 00:12:12].
Leon: Careful there on the generation of our parents.
Vladimir: Well, it's back for Oxford, Leon.
We now have an entire generation in Russia who grew up not knowing anything except the
Putin regime.
When I go around the country to different regions as part of my work with the Open Russian
Movement and speak to this young activists in different places, you know, someone who's
18, 20, 22, I have to remind myself that I'm speaking to someone who does not know anything
except Putin.
You know, I'm old enough to remember what real elections are like in Russia.
I'm old enough to remember the government and the president harshly criticized on national
TV.
The people who are now coming out to protest all across the country, for them it's something
out, you know, out of fantasy books.
They don't know this.
But they instinctively understand increasingly that it's not okay, in a European country,
in the 21st century, to have 1 man staying in power for 18 years without regards for
such nice things as free elections and term limits.
And they increasingly understand that the fact that the government is unchangeable,
and that it's not possible to change it, that elections are not real, that there are no
checks and balances, there are no real institutions, that all that is the cause of the pervasive
corruption of the abuses of basic principles of rule of law and human rights.
And there is this growing awareness of the link between the socio-economic problems that
exist, and the political situation that have caused them.
And I think also, and this is what I just saw from, you know, again, going all across
Russia in the last three years and speaking to these people, to these activists in different
regions, we are seeing increasingly with many of these young people their sense of dignity
and their self awareness as citizens of their country gradually becoming stronger than the
sense of fear of political repression.
I think that is a very important turning point.
It's not gonna happen overnight, it's not gonna be a momentous event.
But it's gonna be...it's a gradual process but it's already happening.
And I think we saw this very clearly with the protest waves in March and in June.
Many of the people who came out to protest in March, of course this was the first time
ever that they came out to take part in a political protest.
And many of them, as you know, more than a thousand people on a single day were arrested.
Many of them were jailed, given 10, 5, 10, 15 days of administrative jail terms for,
quote-unquote, mass disturbances.
This is what, this is what Kremlin speak for taking part of peaceful demonstrations.
And when they were coming out from those jails after those administrative terms, you know,
they'll be approached by journalist or by, you know, just friends and supporters and
asked, "Well, presumably now, you're not gonna go to protest again after this?"
They said, "No, no, no, we're definitely coming out again after this."
And in June, there were more people in more places, more cities and towns participating
in the protest than in March.
So I think this a very hopeful trend for Russia, but a very worrying one for the Putin regime.
Leon: Volodya, to watch Russian TV, to certainly to listen to the
Duma deputies, and to see some of the most popular talk shows, you would think that Russia
is at a state of war, and Vladimir Putin is a wartime president.
Just the other week, he held a marathon four-day, nonstop session with the top Russian military
commanders.
And as part of finalizing yet another state armament program, this one is over $300 billion
continuation from the first program inaugurated in 2008, in much higher rubles--at that time
it was $700 billion, but by now it's probably the same--bottom line is Russia is committed,
this one is to run to 2027, in the past...less than 20 years, spent over 2/3 of a trillion
dollars, one armament.
At the signing of the program, according to the Russian media, Putin directed all major
enterprises, irrespective of ownership, to be prepared to expend defense-related production,
as he put it, in the time of need.
I can't recall anything like this from before peristroika.
What is going on here?
Vladimir: Yeah, he also said that every type of production Russia must be prepared to switch
to voyennoye [foreign language 00:16:42], military reign of course.
All these jokes on social media about what's the right caliber of the pasta that will need
to be produced.
But you're right.
We have...I mean, we heard it for a long time but we had heard that before.
And if you look at Russian state TV, you know, so called talk shows--you know, the hour of
hate, again, to use the old Soviet term--if you watch...
Leon: It's actually an Orwellian term, actually.
Vladimir: Yes.
But we use that a lot, of course.
So if you watch those--which I advice you, by the way, not to do if you value your nervous
system but I sometimes have to just to know what they're thinking and what they doing--you
would hear this constant...well, warmongering is probably the best way to describe it.
And the propaganda, and just the intensification of hate, and of to turning the U.S. into radioactive
ash and talk about the west now as enemies.
And of course, this constant search for traitors and national traitors and fifth columnists
and foreign agents inside of Russia.
And this has been going on for years now at an increasing phase because...well frankly,
that's the only thing this regime has to stand on.
They have to kind of ratchet up this rhetoric because they have not much to, you know, to
point to in terms of their economic success because there is none or there are very few.
You know, they like to pretend this, of course, as you know, this catchphrase that Putin propaganda
often uses to describe what his regime has supposedly done, is that they raised Russia
from its knees.
That's the phrase that has been used for years.
But, you know, if you actually look at what they have done in terms of, okay, let's accept
their terms and let's look at what have they done in, what have they done in terms of foreign
policy, and geopolitics, you know, under president Boris Yeltsin, who is now a demonized figure
in Putin state TV, Russia became a member of the G8, for example, the most respected
club of world powers.
Under Mr. Putin, we were expelled from the G8.
I mean, what's more...where is that rising from the knees?
Because of the Putin regime's behavior, we now have very harsh, very biting general economic
sanctions introduced against our country by the leading economic powers of the world.
For me, that's not really something in line with Russian national interests.
So they have nothing to stand on in terms of real achievements, so they have to build
up this wall of pretense and propaganda that everybody...you know, we are a beseeched fortress,
everybody is against us.
And of course, the enemies themselves change from year to year.
One year it's Estonia, the other year is Georgia.
And now, of course, it has been...that place has been firmly taken by the United States
for many years now.
Because that's the only thing they have to go on.
I mean, we can discuss of what's actually real in this, and I know some people are seriously
raising the prospect, "Oh, does that mean there'll be war at some point," or something
like that but I think this is mostly just a propaganda image that they need to present
something in the public sphere because they have nothing real to present and to show.
Leon: All right, we'll come back to Putin as a wartime president.
Oh, a footnote is that one of the products, probably, a more conspicuous product of that
state arming program is what, in the NATO designation, a beret A-class nuclear submarine,
outfitted with 20 intercontinental ballistic missile tubes, launching tubes, each capable
of carrying 6 independently targeted nuclear warheads.
And the name of that submarine is Prince Vladimir.
Vladimir: We have one standing by the Kremlin now, as you know as well, on the [crosstalk
00:20:21].
Leon: No, I didn't know that.
Vladimir: Oh, there's a new monument put up last year, just on the side of the Borovitsky Gate,
to Prince Vladimir.
Leon: Yes.
Well, the fascinating issue is also, I think, I believe the eighth monument to Alexander
III, which is probably, in modern times, the most reactionary Russian leader.
If we have time, we'll touch on this.
Volodya a little bit about the state of opposition.
Ksenia Sobchak presumably wanted to run from PARNAS, the party of Boris Nemtsov,
I believe your party at some point as well.
But PARNAS demurred, specifically Mikhail Kasyanov, citing the lack of agreement with
Yavlinsky and Navalny.
And so Sobchak is now running from a fairly obscure party, Civic Initiative, assuming,
of course, she collects 100,000 signatures.
Her program strikes me as quite liberal, especially, you know, concerning Crimea, Ukraine, relation
to...with the west.
What is going on here?
Could you tell us?
It's a little bit complex for me.
Vladimir: Well, I think what's going on is the same that has been happening in the last
few election cycles, national election cycles in Russia.
So as you recall, beginning from at least 2008, genuine opponents of Mr. Putin have
been blocked from participating elections, have been blocked from the ballot.
In 2008, this was Mikhail Kasyanov the former prime minister and Vladimir Bukovsky, the
famous Soviet-era dissident.
In 2012, at the height of the protests, it was Grigory Yavlinsky who was blocked from
the ballot.
And according to serious analysis from the time, he could've got quite a lot of votes
because that was the height of the protest movement.
And he's not really a polarizing figure.
I mean a lot of people could've supported him just because that's the way of protesting
against the regime.
They removed him, and instead of him, back in 2012, as you remember well, the Kremlin
put up the billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov to imitate an opposition presence on the ballot.
And in fact, Prokhorov actually missed the deadline for submitting his nomination papers
to the central electoral commission.
So the central electoral commission waited until 3 AM for Prokhorov's representatives
to come in.
I think that's an unprecedented event in Russian electoral practice, and it's clear why.
So when you say that... when you say diplomatically that provided Ksenia Sobchak collects the
required signatures, I don't think that's any kind of a problem.
There were two genuine opposition leaders who were planning to challenge Vladimir Putin
in the 2018 presidential election.
One was Boris Nemtsov, and he will not be challenging Putin because in February of 2012,
he was killed on the bridge in front of the Kremlin.
And the second is Alexei Navalny, who unless something astonishing happens--which I don't
think it will--will not be on the ballot in March because he was deliberately disenfranchised
by the Russian authorities through a politically motivated cooked up court conviction.
Which was, by the way, overturned earlier this year by the European Court of Human Rights
but was then repeated, word for word, comma for comma, in a repeat conviction which was
exactly the same as the one overturned by the ECHR earlier this year.
So in the absence of genuine opponents on the ballot, I think the Kremlin still cares
about the international legitimacy, or at least the veneer of international legitimacy
of the so-called electoral process.
And we can talk about more of this later because I think that's a very important point, the
international aspect of this.
So I think what they're doing with Ksenia Sobchak is trying to create that veneer of
international legitimacy, that look, we have an opponent on the ballot.
Of course, she's someone who's been, well I think we can say a family friend of Vladimir
Putin for years.
She's the daughter of his former boss, former St. Petersburg mayor Natoly Sobchak, who brought
Putin into politics, who brought him basically where he is today.
And she said himself several times that she's very grateful to Mr. Putin personally for
what she considers saving her father's life back in 1997 when there was a prosecution
being prepared against him, and Putin took him outside of Russia to Paris in late '90s,
if you recall.
So I think...let's not talk about Ksenia Sobchak as a serious opposition contender.
I think this is all a part of the Kremlin's effort to build up a facade of a legitimate
electoral process.
Whereas in fact, as everybody knows well, we have not had a real competitive democratic
election in Russia for years.
And this is not me who is saying this.
If you look at every single report by observers from the OSCE and the council of Europe, in
every national election in Russia after the year 2000, they have concluded that every
one of them failed to meet basic democratic standards.
It was not free, not fair, and not competitive.
I do not think we can expect any surprises in this regard on March the 18th.
And since we are on this point, I do want to talk about the international aspect of
this.
Since we are meeting in Washington, the capital of our fellow member state in the OSCE, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, one of the main mandates of which
is actually election observation.
So every time, after the year 2000, observers from OSCE and also from the Council of Europe
assessed that elections in Russia do not meet the basic standards of democracy.
They are not free, not fair, and not democratic.
Yet every single time, the leaders of those saying countries, of the OSCE and the Council
of Europe, the leaders of western democracies, recognized the results of those so-called
elections and called Putin to congratulate.
Now, I'm puzzled as to how those two things make sense at the same time.
I'll never forget March the 5th of 2012.
This was the day after Putin's so-called election victory in 2012.
We had a big opposition rally on Pushkinskaya Square, right in downtown Moscow, a couple
of miles down from the Kremlin.
And I remember there were tens of thousands of people, and we're standing on a stage,
all the main opposition leaders in Russia were on that stage.
Boris Nemtsov was there, Grigory Yavlinsky was there, Alexei Navalny was there, Garry
Kasparov was there.
And there were tens of thousands of people just a sea of faces and flags.
People, Russian citizens who came to express their anger at their votes being stolen in
such a blatant fashion.
And as we were standing there...so there's an eight hour difference, as you know, between
Moscow and Washington.
So it was about 7 PM in Moscow, so it must be have been 11 AM here.
And as we were standing there, we got news that the U.S. administration issued a statement
of congratulations.
Not only to Putin, which would've been half of the problem, but to the people of Russia
for having held these presidential elections.
And I have to tell you, this felt like an insult.
And it wasn't just the U.S.
That same day, on the 5th of March, David Cameron, the then prime minister of the United
Kingdom became the first western leader to call Putin and congratulate him on the election
victory.
And he did so on the same day, and alongside Hugo Chavez and Bashar al-Assad.
So we really hope, and I know I speak on behalf of many colleagues when I say this, we really
hope, first of all, that there'll be vigorous international observation of the so-called
presidential election in Russia on the 18th of March.
We hope that observers from our fellow OSCE member states, including the U.S. make their
conclusions and hold the Kremlin authorities to account with regard to the international
obligations that the Russian federation has undertaken in election standards, under such
documents as the OSCE Charter of Paris, the OSCE Copenhagen Document, and protocol number
one to the European Convention of Human RIghts.
And if these conclusions and these reports are similar to the ones we have seen every
time for the last 17 years, I really hope that the leaders of western democracies do
not legitimize the results of the so-called election and do not congratulate Mr. Putin
on yet another successful theft.
Because in effect, that is what they're congratulating him on.
And I think frankly, this is the least we can expect of the leaders of countries that
pride themselves in having democratic governance and the rule of law.
Leon: Volodya, maybe I should combine...there was a part of my question
essentially hinting at the perennial inability of the Russian opposition to unite.
When I said that, you know, PARNAS cited inability to...the inability to create a united front
with Navalny and Yavlinsky, why don't we combine that also with the so-called systemic opposition?
I promise to return to Alexei Kudrin, I'm returning to him.
He chaired the congress just the other week of the Civic Forum, which is his presumably,
you know, loyal but nevertheless opposition.
And there was even a debate between him and the mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin.
So what is going on there?
Vladimir: Well I remember, as you pointed out right at the beginning, I'm also a historian
as one of the hats.
And I remember reading so much about the debates that were going on in the west among western
criminologists about the so-called doves and hawks in the Politbureau.
That there was supposed to be different camps and these were really good ones.
And, you know, wink-wink, they're really fighting for something good within the system.
And then in 1991-92 when Yelsin opened the archives, especially during the process, the
judicial process against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the constitutional
court in 1992 when many of the former central committee archives were open, all these documents
came out.
And we saw that in fact, all of those so-called doves and so-called hawks in the Politbureau
voted exactly the same way on all the major issues.
War in Afghanistan and, you know, the exile of Sakharov to Gorky, everything.
They were all in complete agreement.
So it was just all a big hoax.
So I wouldn't, to be honest, pay as much attention to those different, you know, call it variations
within the system, within the regime.
Because although, you know, some of them are supposedly more reactionary, some are supposedly
more liberal, some of them are certainly much more, you know, pleasant on the personal level.
I mean, Alexei Kudrin is a very nice man.
I see him from time to time in Moscow.
It's always pleasant and interesting to have conversations with him.
If you compare him with somebody like Rogozin, who is supposedly on the other spectrum of
this regime, there's no comparison.
But that's the personal level.
Leon: First deputy prime minister.
Vladimir: Yes, absolutely.
The guy who said once that he'd gladly exchange his current position for sitting in the trenches
in the Donetsk People's Republic.
And of course, people have then remarked that he probably wouldn't fit any trenches in there
[crosstalk 00:31:51] if you saw what he looks like.
But again, I think we can discuss the differences on the personal level.
But I think fundamentally, all of these people, they're all part of this regime and they all
work for its preservation.
And it's...maybe in a little bit changed form but still for its preservation.
And you mentioned that term, of course, systemic and non-systemic opposition.
I think that is a key term.
You know, I would just call it...you know, non-systemic opposition is a real opposition.
The so-called systemic opposition is not.
And I always compare it to how the East German parliament--well, by the way, of course, Mr.
Putin spent many years in East Germany--I remember when he was coming to power 18 years
ago, people who wanted to see something good in everything, they said, "Oh, well he spent
time in Germany.
He must been influenced by it."
Well, he wasn't, although it was the wrong Germany, of course.
That's the point.
And the East German parliament, as you remember, also had a multi-party system, on the face
of it.
It was not a one party state like the Soviet Union.
They actually had the Christian Democrat Union, they had the Liberal Democrat Party, they
had a Peasant's Party, I think something else.
But of course, that was all a big hoax.
Also, they all voted together with Mr. Honrecke all the time.
And so it is for the current so-called [inaudible 00:33:01] party official system in the Duma
and what exists in our country.
All of these so-called Duma opposition leaders are completely unanimous when it comes to
all the major points for the regime.
In fact, we have...
I was speaking at a conference recently.
There was a representatives of the opposition from Papua and New Guinea.
And he said he cannot speak.
And he said, "Well, the situation in our country is so bad, we only have one real opposition
member in Parliament."
And when the break began, I came up to him and I said, "Well you know, you're really
lucky because that's one more than we have.
We have zero."
There's not a single genuine opposition member of the current Russian Duma.
Leon: With Gudkov expelled and...or leaving, yeah.
Vladimir: Yes.
Well, basically expelled, yeah.
Until last year, there was one, Dmitri Gudkov.
And of course, again, Boris Nemtsov was planning to run for the Russian parliament last year
in 2016.
In fact, as you know...
Leon: From Yaroslavl.
Vladimir: Absolutely.
In fact, he was, again, to go back to your term, non-systemic opposition.
Of course, the way we use those terms, the non-systemic opposition is supposed to signify
genuine, real opposition, as opposed to the systemic one which is the people who pretend
to be opposition who sit on legislative bodies.
And those two things are incompatible.
Either you're real opposition or you sit in a legislative body.
Boris Nemtsov became the first and so far the only leader of the non-systemic opposition
to actually win an election as he did in Yaroslavl four years ago in 2013.
Despite all the odds, despite all the obstacles, he won election to the regional legislature
there.
And he was planning to run for the Russian parliament in 2016 from Yaroslavl, from the
single member district.
Now remember, when...at the late 2014, beginning 2015, his campaign was already kind of beginning
to be underway.
He had a campaign staff formed, newspaper registered, and they were taking the first
initial surveys, polling in the district.
And I remember that this will only, they only have time to do one.
But that first initial poll showed his starting position at 25%, which people who knew which
more about, you know, election campaign technologies than I do told me, it's an amazingly
high number, for the start, before anything was even done in terms of real campaigning.
So, there was a good chance that he was going to win a seat in the current Russian parliament.
And then of course he was preparing to challenge Putin in 2018.
Leon: Well, Volodya, it's such a rare treat to have you, well, to snatch
you between your various trips.
I'm sure a lot of people would wanna ask you questions, so let me ask you one last one.
So returning to Putin as the war-time president, you know, war-time presidents generally are
not supposed to be changed unless the war ends, preferably in victory.
And there has been kind of a swirl of rumors in the Russian media about proposed changes
in the constitution.
Among other things, you know, nullifying the ban on more than two consecutive terms, or
creating a parliamentary republic so Putin become the prime minister, executive prime
minister from whatever party he would like.
So what do you think of all of this?
And beyond that, probably anticipating the question, what will happen in 2024?
Putin is going to be only 72.
I mean, look at Mugabe.
He's finally out of power, but that's a very young age.
So what do you think?
I've recently read a paper where the assumption was, "Well, you know, Putin will spend his
term thinking of a successor because, you know, he can't run anymore."
Will he be thinking of a successor?
I'm not sure.
Vladimir: I think I would...there are two very important questions in there.
I start with the one, kind of the one connected to the regime, your last point.
I think it was Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, who once said a week is a
long time in politics.
So I think it's...you know, to talk about what's gonna happen in Russia in seven years,
that's in the realm of fantasy.
What I would say is that it was if...first of all, I do think Putin wants to stay in
power forever.
I do think that.
I think he made that decision...
Leon: I happen to agree.
Vladimir: ...pretty early on around 2003, which was in many ways, a turning point in
his regime.
That was the year, just in one year, three major things happened.
He shut down the last independent nationwide television channel, TVS.
He jailed Khodorkovsky, which was an unmistakable message to the Russia's business community
that it was best to stay out of politics, and basically it was an attack on any kind
of independent activity by the big business.
And it was, of course, the year of the first rigged national election in December 2003,
the election which saw genuine democratic opposition ejected from the state Duma, both
[inaudible 00:38:06] and Yabloko, both pro-democracy liberal parties.
So I think it was back then that he made the decision that he wants to stay in power forever.
And everything that he's done since has, I think, corroborated that.
But on the other hand, if it was up to...if it was only up to the dictators and their
wishes to stay in power forever, then every dictator would stay in power forever everywhere
in the history of the world.
And of course, as we know, that's not what happens.
And Russian history has a funny way of having major, you know, shifting massive political
change start like this.
And this is a good year to discuss it.
It's the Jubilee year in 2017.
I'm old enough to remember August 1991.
And, you know, this was in many ways, a formative experience for me and for people in my generation.
And, you know, if someone said at the beginning of August of 1991 that by the end of August
1991 there would not be a Soviet regime, I think not many people would have believed
it.
But that is what happened.
And much more recently, again, if in September 2011 at the time of the casting--that's the
term, right, the [foreign language 00:39:17], when Putin and Medvedev announced a job swap--if
somebody said to me or to many of my colleagues back then that three months from now, there'll
be a hundred thousand people standing across the road from the Kremlin demanding Putin's
resignation, you know, we would've thought that person is living in cloud cuckoo land.
But that is what happened.
So Russian history has this funny way of showing dictators and dictatorial regimes and authoritarian
regimes that it's not always up to them what's gonna happen.
And this is where I wanna come to the first part of your question.
You mentioned constitutional changes.
I think...and you mentioned in terms of what the regime might want to do, changing the
system for them to stay in power forever.
But I wanna turn this around a little bit and talk about the actual importance of having
a constitutional change in Russia.
This is what we want to do.
And one of the major policy positions and positions of principle for our movement, for
the Open Russia Movement, is to change Russia from a presidential to a parliamentary republic.
A genuine parliamentary republic, not a fake one as the one you referred to of a way for
Putin to stay in power forever.
But actually a real parliamentary republic because, you know, when people ask us, "So,
okay you don't want Putin to be in power but who do you want to replace him with?"
And we say, "We don't want to replace him with a who, we'll replace him with a what."
It's not a question of changing the person at the top, it's a question of changing the
system.
It hasn't worked out well in Russian history, I think we can say this certainly by now,
when one person had all the tools and the...all instruments of power in his or her hands,
mostly his.
So I think the question is, as Andrei Piontkovsky, who's in the audience here today once wrote,
"We don't wanna change a bad czar for a good czar.
We want to have no czar at all in Russia."
And that is a very important point.
There is no such thing as a good czar.
And so what we wanna to see in Russia after Vladimir Putin is a much more balanced system.
Much more parliament...if not a pure parliamentary system, then at least a much more balanced
mixed presidential-parliamentary system.
Something they have in France, for example.
We think we should get away from that paradigm when everything depends on one person.
So the goal of our movement, as well as I know many other political parties and movements
in the Russia opposition, is to move to a different system after Vladimir Putin, in
one way or another, voluntarily or not very voluntarily, leaves power.
Because, again, since Russian history shows us that political change, big political change
happens quickly, and usually begins unexpectedly, we need to be preparing for it ahead of time.
Because one of the things that happened, both in 1991 and in a way in 2011, is at many of
the democrats were not ready for what was going to come.
And we can discuss the many mistakes that were committed by the democratic government
in the early '90s, and we can discuss the many mistakes committed by the opposition
leadership at the height of the protests in 2011-2012.
I think many of those mistakes were fundamentally caused by the fact that things happened so
quickly and unexpectedly.
We never know when next big political change happens in Russia.
It may be well before 2024.
So I think our task, as a responsible opposition movement, is to be preparing for that change
now.
And this is what we are trying to do because when things start happening, it's too late
to sit down and try to figure out what to do now.
Leon: Well, excellent.
So we have about 15 minutes for questions.
So please ask them, you know, in a abbreviated form.
Please.
Man 1: Hi.
David Colbin [SP].
Could I just follow up on your last...
Leon: There's a microphone there.
Man 1: Okay.
By the way, congratulations to the beautiful new facilities here for AEI, doctor.
To your point about replacing who and what, after the coordinating committee period and
Bolotnaya, it seemed that the Kremlin had identified Udaltsov as probably
the most dangerous figure of the opposition.
After all, he was the one they actually jailed.
And it seemed that the other ones, they slow-rolled.
Now, putting his personal qualities aside, one could say demographically, maybe that's
because of who his base was.
If you think that goal is to replace what instead of who, what Navalny and Volkov and
the others are doing now and the dignity that you identified among the youth, what is it
that you think... the opposition that you'd like to see is poised outside of Moscow and
Peter to take advantage of this change, as opposed to an Udaltsov or an Udaltsov-like
figure speaking to that base, again, outside of Moscow and Peter?
Vladimir: Okay.
Thank you for the question.
Well, first of all, let's say that the most dangerous opposition figure for the Kremlin
was Boris Nemtsov.
They did something much worse to him that they did to Udaltsov.
Udaltsov, thankfully, is out of prison now, a couple of months.
He was in prison, if you count home arrest, for more than four years.
And just as a footnote, we have more than a hundred political prisoners in Russia today,
still.
Some of the prominent ones were released.
Udaltsov was released, Darya Polyudova was released.
The remaining Bolotnaya prisoners were released, I think all of them
now.
Literally in the last few months.
But let's not forget there are more than a hundred political prisoners in Russia.
Sorry, 117 by the latest count, by the Memorial Human Rights Center, itself, of course now
designated as a foreign agent, the Human Rights Organizations once founded by Andrei Sakharov.
And they use very conservative, and even I'll say restrictive criteria to designate somebody
as a political prisoner.
And even by that criteria, it's a criteria based on resolution 1900 of the parliamentary
assembly of the Council of Europe.
And even according to those criteria, we have 117 political prisoners in Russia.
Just to put it in context, in 1975 once Sakharov wrote his Nobel Prize lecture, he listed 126
prisoners of conscience.
And that was of course USSR, which was twice as big as Russia.
So we're back to the same kind of figures.
I think...the most important point, I think, that you refer to is the need to go outside
Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
Those has been...well, I think for centuries, you could say the traditional hotbeds of political
activity.
Everything in Russia always happened in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.
And with the big protests that we saw in these last few months, we saw this paradigm at least
beginning to be broken.
Especially with the June wave, when almost 200,000 cities, literally from Leningrad to
Vladivostok, took part of these protests.
And some of these places have not seen any political protest...well at least since '91,
maybe since 1917, some of them.
And now as we see Navalny, for example, go around the country in his unofficial presidential
campaign which he's conducting, he's gathering, you know, thousands of people in the squares
and places where nobody thought any political activity could exist.
[foreign language 00:46:39], I mean, people... not the places you automatically think of
when you think about opposition activity in Russia.
So I agree completely with your point.
I think it's very important to go beyond Moscow and Saint Petersburg and to go outside...to
go to the country, to different parts of the country.
We try to do this as Open Russia as well.
We now have 28 regional branches, as of this week.
The last one was opened three days ago in [foreign language 00:47:03].
And we feel it's important also to break this paradigm of everything happening just in Moscow
and Saint Petersburg.
And, you know, in the last three years since we've relaunched Open Russia, I've seen more
of Russia than in my whole previous life.
I mean, because we try to spread our work and do a lot of work in the regions.
Udaltsov, of course, is somebody who represents a very much left wing political tradition.
And of course, since he was jailed, he's also just like Navalny.
He's not allowed to contest in the elections now.
They just...they made up this law a few years ago, which by the way, there's nothing in
the Russian constitution about any such limitations on taking part in elections.
The only limitations the Russian constitution mentions is that if you're actually in prison,
according to a court sentence, then you cannot take part in elections.
Or if you are insane or if you are below the age of 35 if you're talking about presidential
elections.
No other limitations.
But Putin and his matte printer, the state Duma, have rubber stamped all these additional
restrictions in the last few years now.
If you have dual citizenship, you cannot run in elections.
Even if you have residency permanently abroad, you cannot run in elections.
If you have even a suspended court sentence, which is what Navalny have, you cannot run.
Even if you are released for prison, like Udaltsov, like Khodorkovsky, for example,
you cannot run any kind of election.
So they put up all these additional barriers.
We think, of course, needless to say, that, you know, every Russian citizen who's eligible
according to the constitution, including Udaltsov, should have the right to run in elections.
And we also think that it's important that the opposition--and this is go back to the
what and not the who--that the Russian opposition has many strong political figures within it
of different political persuasion.
People like Udaltsov on the left, people like Navalny.
People like Dmitry Gudkov, who was already mentioned, the former member of
state Duma.
People like Lef Schlossberg, a very prominent figure in the Russian opposition, one of the
leaders of the Yabloko Party.
He was the person who, three years ago now, provided the first documented, definitive
proof of the presence of regular Russian troops in Ukraine.
Which was, of course, something the Kremlin lied about and denied.
And when he did this--this was in Pskov, he's a member of the regional parliament in Pskov--and
it was a Pskov paratrooper division that was sent into Ukraine.
Members of it were killed there and then they were brought back in body bags and buried
like dogs in unmarked graves with numbers instead of names because the Russian defense
ministry did not want to admit that they were there.
And Schlossberg found them, he took pictures of them, and he published it in his newspaper.
He was beaten up, he was in a coma in hospital, he was stripped off his parliamentary seat.
And then last year, he was elected back to the regional parliament by the people of Pskov.
He's a member of parliament now again.
People like him, people like Yevgeny Roizman, who is the current mayor of Yekaterinburg,
the fourth largest city in Russia, one of the most prominent figures in the opposition
today.
He wanted to run for regional governor from Yabloko earlier this year.
He was again blocked from the ballot, not allowed to run.
So we think there should be many strong political figures in the Russian opposition.
And although I disagree with probably most of what Sergei Udaltsov stands for politically.
I certainly think that he should have an absolute right to run in elections.
And I think when we have a freely elected parliament in Russia one day, he'll most likely
to be a member of it
Leon: Anders.
Anders: Anders Aslund, Atlantic Council.
Thank you very much for an excellent analysis.
And as always, I have a standard question.
What can we do?
And I'm thinking particular of two issues.
One is this sanction law now, the section 241 of pointing out people closer to the Kremlin.
Do you think that this can be effective?
And the other question is Putin got obviously furious over the release of the Panama Papers
in April 2016 and all that it exposed about him.
Do you think it would be effective if the U.S. really reveals the riches of the Putin
crowd that obviously exist in this country?
Vladimir: Thank you, Anders.
And it's always great to see you, and thank you for the questions.
When we were discussing this issue, Boris Nemtsov came up with this formula back a few
years ago.
When people ask him, what should the west do with regard to what's happening in Russia?
He would always say, "Don't punish the country.
Go after the scroundels." [foreign language 00:51:30].
And this is, of course, what section 241 does.
And you had an excellent panel up on Capitol Hill a couple of weeks ago, along was Andre
and other colleagues.
And I think this is...in this whole law that was passed last summer, this probably the
most important provision.
Section 241 is a provision that tasks the department of the Treasury, the State department
in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to publish a report by the deadline
of February 2nd of next year, 2018, detailing the people and naming them by names, the people
who have political proximity to Putin and his regime, the oligarchs, the politically
powerful officials, to detail their involvement in corruption, to detail the non-Russian business
associations, so the foreign business association they have.
And I know for a fact that in the last few weeks, many of these people have sent emissaries
to this city, to try to approach, you know, lobbyists and people on the hill to see if
it will be possible for them not to be named in this report.
And I think, yet again, the Kremlin shows what is the most sensitive point for them.
And the most sensitive point for them is when you go after their personal financial interests.
And this is what we always say.
Again, as Boris said, "Don't punish the country, go after the scroundels."
We do not think it is right to punish an entire country for the actions of a small, unelected
clique sitting in the Kremlin.
And this is why the Magnitsky Act was so brilliant in the principle that it introduced, that
you should actually assign responsibility for corruption and for human rights abuse
where is it due, to the people who perpetrated it.
And so I would say this would be the most important thing that western countries can
do.
And if you listen to Kremlin propaganda, they will tell you that, you know, we members of
the Russian opposition go to the west and we ask for money and for political support.
Or we ask you to effect regime change in Russia, whatever other nonsense they come up with.
Of course, none of that is true.
We're not asking for support for us.
The only thing we ask our friends and counterparts in western democracies is that you stop, in
effect, supporting the Putin regime.
First of all, by treating him as respectable and worthy partner on the international stage,
which amazingly, after everything that's happened, some western leaders are still are trying
to do.
But also, and perhaps more importantly, stop supporting the Putin regime by allowing his
cronies to use western countries as havens for their looted wealth.
You know, as havens to store the money they have stolen from the Russian people.
Because again, those people want to steal in Russia but spend in the west.
And by allowing them and their dirty money into the western countries and the western
financial systems, western democracies have, in effect, been enabling--I have no other
word--enabling this corruption and this human rights abuse.
And so it's very heartening to see that four countries already, the U.S., Canada, Estonia,
and Lithuania have passed full blown Magnitsky Acts that introduce this principle that if
you engage in corruption and human right abuse, you will no longer be entitled to a visa and
to using the financial and banking system of western countries.
We hope more countries do that.
And this section 241 is, of course, very, very important.
And although it does not entail sanctions, per se--it's just report, it's just publication--I
think given their nervous reaction, it's a safe bet to say that those types of things
are the most effective ones.
And I'd also mention another thing that I think is important.
And I know some people dismiss this as small and symbolic, what I'm gonna say now.
And although it is symbolic, it's certainly not small, Russia is a country of symbols,
as you know.
I always remind people of this, when after the victory in...over the coup leaders in
August 1991, Moscovites went to the Lubyanka Square to take down the statue of Dzerzhinsky
because that was a symbol.
One of the first things that Putin did when he came to power was to return the Soviet-era
Stalinist national anthem.
Again, a symbol of what was to come and that was a very powerful message for those who
were willing to listen.
So what I'm gonna say now, that's a symbol but that's a very important one.
Tomorrow, on December the 6th--and this is actually the reason I'm in Washington this
week--there will be a hearing at the Washington D.C. city council on the bill that would designate
the block in front of the Russian Embassy here in Washington on Wisconsin Avenue Northwest,
as Boris Nemtsov plaza, in memory and in honor of the late Russian opposition leader, Boris
Nemtsov.
We tried to move this initiative initially through congress, where it was blocked by
Senator Bob Corker, chairman of the foreign relations committee as was reported last week
in the "Washington Post".
And as Alexei Venediktov, the editor in chief of Ekho Moskvy radio
station said publicly this week, he told the story of how in July, during the G20 summit,
there was a meeting, that was the first meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin.
But before it, there was a meeting between Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister,
and Rex Tillerson, the U.S. secretary of state.
And apparently, this is according to what Benedictov said, three days ago literally,
apparently at that meeting in July, they recited...they went through different issues that need to
be addressed and resolved for the bilateral relationship to get, quote, back on track.
They talked about Crimea and sanctions and Ukraine and Syria.
And apparently according to Benedictov, foreign minister Sergei Lavrov specifically asked
Tillerson not to rename that block in front of the Russian Embassy after Boris Nemtsov.
So again, anybody who tells you that symbolic things are not important, I think that's the
best answer.
So from what we understand, Mr. Corker, because of this request from the administration, blocked
it.
But thankfully there is also jurisdiction of the D.C. city council over D.C., not just
congress.
So the D.C. city council has taken up this initiative, and they're moving ahead with
it.
Tomorrow is gonna be the first and the only public hearing on the bill.
I will be testifying in favor of this measure, as will Zhanna Nemtsova, Boris Nemtsov's daughter,
who is flying in today.
She'll be testifying tomorrow.
And the reason this is so important for us, what I'm gonna say at that hearing tomorrow,
it's seems we're not allowed to honor the memory of a Russian statesman in Russia.
The astonishing thing is that the Kremlin and the Putin regime are still fighting Boris
Nemtsov today even after he's dead.
They have rejected every initiative, every public petition for any kind of commemoration
in Moscow.
Forget about a street name, not even a small sign, nothing.
And you know the reason they gave for this, they said there's a lack of consensus.
Now we have streets in Moscow named after Hugo Chavez, the late Valenzuela dictator.
We have a street in Moscow, in the south of Moscow, in Butovo, named
after Akhmad Kadyrov, the former Chechen strongman.
This is the guy who once declared a Jihad against Russia, and once called on his followers
to, quote, kill as many Russians as possible, end of quote.
There was no problem with consensus for naming a street in Moscow after that guy.
But the former deputy prime minister of the Russian federation, there seems to be a big
problem with it.
And there were signs that were put up by the residents of the apartment building where
Boris lived in Moscow, in Yuroslavl.
They were taken down within days.
More than that, almost every night, the Moscow municipal authorities and the Moscow police
come in to the bridge to the unofficial memorial on the spot where he was killed--because more
than 2 1/2 years on, people still bring flowers and light candles and put pictures, kind of
an unofficial makeshift memorial--and they take those flowers away and they pillage it
and they destroy it.
And you should see the videos.
There are videos of this on YouTube and Facebook filmed by the volunteers.
You have grown man, in police uniforms, stealing flowers in the middle of the night.
So they're still fighting him, they're still fighting his memory.
And so what we're gonna say tomorrow at that council hearing is that apparently we're not
allowed to honor a Russian statesman in Russia.
So we're very grateful to citizens and to elective representatives of free countries
who are stepping in to do what we cannot do.
And there was, of course, a precedent for this, also set in this town and also connected
with Russia.
In 1984, the U.S. congress designated a small stretch of 16th Street Northwest, in front
of the old Soviet embassy, it's now the Russian Ambassador's residence, in honor of Andrei
Sakharov, who was then in internal exile in Gorky.
This was 1984.
And of course, as you can imagine, the Politbureau and the soviet foreign ministry were furious
when this happened.
But I always remind people, only seven years after that--and this goes back to the question
you're saying, you know, when can we expect change in Russia--only seven years after 1984,
in 1991, the Russian Ambassador installed, proudly installed a bust of Andrei Sakaharov
inside the embassy itself.
And it was still, by the way, standing there the last time I was there.
I was declared non-grata in Russian embassy in 2012.
So the last time I was been there, that was five years ago, but it was still standing
there.
And this is how things change in Russia.
So I have absolutely no doubt that there will come a day when the Russian state is proud
to have its embassy Washington standing on Boris Nemtsov Plaza.
And I know that they will all be very grateful for our friends in western democracies, including
here in the U.S. who made this statement and made this point.
It's very symbolic but it's certainly not small.
Leon: Well.
I'm afraid we don't have time for any more questions.
But Volodya, it was brilliant as always.
Thank you so much
Vladimir: Thank you very much.
Pleasure to be here.
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