Waching daily Nov 3 2018

Hi it's Rosefix.

This is my recent favorites video.

I have many products to show you including skincare and makeup items.

I hope you enjoy it. Let's jump right in.

The first item is Round Lab 1025 toner.

This was highly recommended at the 'affordable toners' video.

I know someone who has similar skin type as mine and she recommended this toner.

So I ordered one to give it a go. I quite like it.

It's a watery toner which is perfect for wiping your skin off.

It's hydrating while not being sticky.

I wipe off my skin first, the put some more to pat in and hydrate my skin

I used this for toner mask two days ago

It's perfect for toner mask too.

It's made of gentle ingredients. It's a nice light hydrating toner for those who are suffering from dry skin

Please try this toner if you have dry skin

The second item is Missha Bee Pollen Renew Ampouler.

I highly recommend this ample.

It rejuvenates and hydrates dry skin at the same time.

It comes with a dropper.

As you can see, it's little bit thick.

It feels like honey. You know when you take a spoonful of honey and it starts to stretch out?

But it doesn't feel sticky on the skin

It absorbs in to the skin really nicely.

Can you see this glow? It adds glow while nourishes and hydrates the skin

Also, it's hypoallergenic. I highly recommend it to sensitive skin

Apparently Bee Pollen is already popular in England as it's the secret for Victoria Beckam's healthy skin.

Whenever I use this ampoule, my makeup goes on better and my skin looks more luminous.

It really changes the skin texture. I highly recommend this ample.

The third item is Healing Bird Botanical Shampoo.

It's been over 2 weeks since I dyed my hair at home.

The color doesn't look patchy

But it caused serious scalp pain.

Also, my hair feels so rough whenever I wash my hair.

Luckily, I found this Healing Bird shampoo. It washes my hair really smoothly.

I struggle to lather the shampoo and slide it on to the hair.

But it's goes on so smoothly. It feels like my hair is actually healthy.

If you don't wash off the shampoo properly, your scalp can get itchy.

I could only wash my hair once in two days as my scalp was in serious pain.

So whenever I wash my hair, I shampooed it twice.

I had to be very gentle when rubbing the shampoo on to my scalp.

The scalp pain was gone in about a week.

My hair has recovered from the damage a lot

It's not targeted for damaged scalp/hair but this has help me a lot.

I tested out their treatment and essence too. I'll tell you about them later.

The price isn't expensive either.

I'm totally willing to repurchase it.

I kinda want to stock up this shampoo. It's one of my HG.

I heard their treatment is very famous too but I recommend the shampoo first.

Make sure you try it!

The fourth item is this Aritaum All Day Filter Toner Base.

This is pink base which brightens up the skin tone.

I found this product while looking for hydrating base for winter. It's so amazing.

Aritaum products are such good value for money.

It looks like whipped cream.

I wasn't sure whether it's going to absorb in to the skin nicely or not, but can you see?

You only need a tiny bit to brighten up the whole face.

It fits on the skin really nicely. Can you see how brightening it is?

I like to brighten up my skin tone with a makeup base first.

Then layer a foundation and cushion on top.

It makes the skin look brighter, and prolongs the wear time as well.

If a foundation looks too dull on your skin, make sure you use a brightening base.

I think this was less than 10,000won.

I think it was little bit over 10,000won… or maybe less than 10,000won

It becomes even cheaper during Aritaum sale.

It sinks in to the skin quickly and leaves nice matte finish. It's not sticky at all.

I recommended this in my recent live too.

Though it looks small, you only need a tiny bit anyway.

Make sure you go to Aritaum and test this out.

The last item is Holika Holika sparkly Smoky shadow.

People ask me what I'm wearing on my eyes whenever I use this.

I used this during my Europe trip too.

I did a light makeup for the gym the other day and used this all over the lid for something new.

Even my Pilates instructor asked me what eye shadow I'm wearing

I already raved about this to my friends

#2 and #4 are my recent go-to shadows.

This one is purple and this #4 is gold brown.

They are highly pigmented, doesn't have fallout, and fixes on to the lid perfectly.

It's so opaque.

It's less than 10,000won. It was around 9000won.

As you can see, it has nice shine to it.

It looks like you have Vaseline on your lids. You only need to layer it twice to get this glow.

Go and test it out at the store. You will want to get it right away

You can't resist it. even though you are not fan of shimmer,

it's not too strong. You can easily achieve beautiful makeup

Make sure you try this Sparkly Smoky Shadow at Holika Holika.

That's it for today's video.

Let me know which one of these items you want to try the most in the comments.

Thanks for watching my video till the end.

Don't forget to like comment and subscribe.

See you next time. Bye~

For more infomation >> [CC]구매각!✨피부가 좋아진 최애템! 가성비갑 제품들로만 가져왔어요/Rosefix 로즈픽스 - Duration: 7:07.

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[CS198.2x Week 5] Fair Exchange Mixers - Duration: 3:18.

Fair exchange mixers are a different category of mixer.

They build upon the traditional fair exchange protocol to no longer require a trusted third

party to participate as part of the protocol.

Instead, some party A pays another party B through an untrusted intermediary T.

Suppose you have two parties, Alice and Bob, who wish to trade (cryptographic) "items"

somehow.

However, you run into a problem: suppose Alice sends her item to Bob, but Bob then refuses

to send his item to Alice.

In that case, it is not a fair exchange: Bob got Alice's item, but Alice got nothing in

return, the poor thing.

Fair exchange protocols seek to ensure that scenario never happens---either they both

get each other's "item" or they both get nothing.

If the "item" being exchanged fits certain criteria, then fair exchange protocols can

be improved upon to have other nice properties, like no longer requiring a trusted third party

or being able to detect a dishonest third party.

In this scenario, what's being traded is coins for a voucher.

Alice can deposit her coins and receive a voucher to redeem a comparable amount of coin

later.

She can then redeem clean coins at her discretion, cleaning her assets.

However, this style of mixer assumes that enough transactions are passing through the

mixer at the same time such that distinguishing which inputs match to which outputs is incredibly

difficult.

CoinSwap uses hash-locked 2-of-2 multisignature transactions to do exactly this.

It allows you to securely swap your coins with someone else without linking your transactions.

The benefits are that it's trustless, since no party can steal your funds, and has decent

plausible deniability.

However, it also comes with the drawback that it's not secure against a mix-passive intermediary.

Though, this intermediary can also be the person you're swapping with.

Additionally, it's expensive, as it requires 4 transactions per swap.

The way it looks on the blockchain is like Alice is paying some address, and Bob is paying

some other address, but there is no direct connection between the original coins and

the new ones.

XIM, a protocol similar to CoinSwap, also uses an untrusted intermediary to create a

fair-exchange mixer.

This builds on earlier work on fair exchange and uses fees to prevent DoS and Sybil attacks.

XIM creates a secure group-forming protocol for finding parties to participate in a mix.

The issue with XIM is that it takes several hours to run because of the group-forming

protocol.

Blindly Signed Contracts build further off XIM to prevent the group forming process,

instead using anonymous fee vouchers to deter DoS and Sybil attacks.

The issue is that implementing BSC would require scripting functionality not currently provided

by Bitcoin.

The idea behind TumbleBit specifically is to improve on BSC so that the mixer is in

fact Bitcoin-compatible.

This makes it state of the art in fair-exchange mixers as of 2016.

It implements an "RSA evaluation as a service" protocol to make Blindly Signed Contracts

Bitcoin-compatible.

It is fairly feasible for real-world use, given that enough liquidity exists to power

the process.

The general benefits with fair exchange mixers is they're trustless, placing no trust in

an intermediary.

Additionally, some are even DoS and Sybil attack resistant.

The drawbacks, however, are that they're difficult to build.

TumbleBit only works with sufficient liquidity, XIM requires a few hours of computation, and

BSC requires advances to Bitcoin Script.

For more infomation >> [CS198.2x Week 5] Fair Exchange Mixers - Duration: 3:18.

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[CS198.2x Week 5] Anonymity Basics - Duration: 9:56.

When thinking of anonymity, your mind might jump to secret organizations, such as the

hacker group Anonymous or the inventor of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto.

You might ask, "Is anonymity only reserved for criminals and rebels?

Might anyone else want anonymity?

Is anonymity in Bitcoin – or in cryptocurrencies and blockchain in general – only good for

buying drugs?

If I have nothing to hide, why go out of my way to stay anonymous?"

Anonymity is not about hiding illicit information as much as it is about protection, which,

as most don't realize, applies to anyone and everyone.

We'll go ahead and show some examples of how anonymity can apply to even the average

person.

Imagine it's just any other day.

You're with your friend at McDonald's ordering food, and it's time to pay.

McDonald's refuses to split the bill, and you forgot to order separately, so you volunteer

to pay for the both of you.

Your friend sends you some cryptocurrency later on to pay you back.

Some time passes, and you decide to go to Bob's Burgers to make a purchase with your

friend's cryptocurrency.

However, Bob's Burgers doesn't accept your payment because your money is associated

with drug dealers.

Turns out your friend has been making some shady purchases, and the cryptocurrency associated

with these transactions made its way to your wallet.

Not only is this bad because now you'd have to question your friend, but this also affects

the cryptocurrency's fungibility.

Fungibility is the idea that every unit of currency must be equal in value to every other

unit.

Like in dealing in cash for example, a dollar is a dollar.

Fungibility is a crucial property of currency, and to see it impacted this much in such a

scenario shows that we probably want to enable anonymity.

When vendors refuse to accept one unit of cryptocurrency over another, it reduces the

fungibility of the currency and makes life harder for you too.

Now let's consider a more drastic example.

Say you're super wealthy, and the same McDonald's store cashier now sees that you're sitting

on a stash of $60 million in Bitcoin.

When they kidnap your mom next week, they know exactly how much money to blackmail you

for.

Pretty scary huh?

Even though you did nothing wrong, the exposure of the information about your transaction

history and financial standing put you in danger.

Taking a step back, we can look at the origin of Bitcoin and blockchain to gain some perspective.

We know that cypherpunks were individuals who advocated for privacy using cryptography,

and that Satoshi Nakamoto appealed to this mentality with the publishing of the Bitcoin

whitepaper in 2008 and subsequent release in 2009.

Bitcoin was designed as the first ever decentralized, pseudonymous, and trustless system for transactions,

and the way it achieved that was with a blockchain.

Initially, in designing Bitcoin, its creators wanted to get as far as possible from having

any central entity, so they intended for every entity in Bitcoin to have the ability to be

just as powerful as anyone else.

They allowed anyone to

store the blockchain.

What this means though is that everyone has everyone's data.

Users can see which addresses interact with each other, how much cryptocurrency each address

has, and the like.

Considering the normal user which may not go out of their way to obfuscate their digital

identity and activities with additional protection, it's easy to see how their transaction history

and balance can be exposed to their detriment.

It's clear that blockchains are not anonymous by default.

Fundamentally, blockchains take a central database and distribute it.

However, this now means that you no longer have strong access control over your own data.

All of the data stored in the blockchain is public by default, so everyone sees everything

– there's no sense of guaranteed privacy.

One note is that private or permissioned blockchains are slightly more anonymous since read access

to the database can be restricted.

The focus of this week's material is on public blockchains, since the challenges of

privacy in publicly readable databases are much more difficult and novel.

As mentioned earlier with the creation of Bitcoin and addresses, now in terms of anonymity:

Most blockchains are not anonymous.

Instead, most blockchains are pseudonymous.

In most blockchains, we use a publicly viewable but arbitrary identifier, such as your Bitcoin

address.

However, keeping your real name out of your identifier does not guarantee anonymity.

These identifiers, like your Bitcoin address, are called pseudonyms.

A pseudonym only implies that a user is not using their real identity, such as their name,

email, or other personally identifying information.

As such, it is very well possible to have this pseudonym linked to some real world identity.

For example, because all transactions are public on the blockchain, if even a single

transaction by some Bitcoin address is linked to an actual identity, all other transactions

conducted under that pseudonym are now connected to the real identity as well.

All histories of transactions and any other activity that has been recorded on the blockchain

all originally had no connection to a real person and only to a pseudonym.

However, with one single connection between a pseudonym and a real life identity, everything

in their history can now be linked to the person that that identity belongs to.

Therefore, most blockchains, including Bitcoin, are pseudonymous.

In Bitcoin, and some other blockchain platforms, it's generally best practice not to reuse

pseudonyms.

You could generate a new address every time you receive Bitcoin without much cost.

With a different address for each transaction, there will be no way to link each of these

Bitcoin addresses together.

This separates the activity of each pseudonym.

Hence, for someone to figure out all your Bitcoin activity, they'd have to connect

you to each of your pseudonyms, not just an individual one.

This would be like creating a new reddit account every time you leave a comment.

Although it is more inconvenient to do so, it increases the difficulty of linking your

accounts together, making it much harder for others to track your activity.

This does introduce the slight hitch that one would have to keep track of each of these

identities, but that can be easily resolved using wallet software, which often performs

this by default.

Just generate a new address every time you receive any cryptocurrency, or each time you

use any sort of blockchain application!

While this technique might be possible in Bitcoin and some other blockchain applications,

it's not possible in Ethereum.

And that's because Ethereum is account based, not UTXO based.

In Bitcoin, you could just generate a new address per UTXO every time you receive Bitcoin.

It's much harder to do that in Ethereum and other account based blockchains.

And also, unfortunately, it turns out that basic analysis renders this technique of regenerating

pseudonyms ineffective.

Similar to a lock on a front door, generating new pseudonyms for every transaction does

keep away naive attackers, but a determined opponent can probably find a way to link your

activity together.

The term "linking" in the context of anonymity is the act of associating a real world identity

to a pseudonym.

Linking is also sometimes called deanonymization.

In Bitcoin, advanced linking can associate a real world identity to an address.

And same goes in Ethereum, where a real world identity could be linked to an externally

owned account.

And the list goes on…

Most of these blockchain technologies are fairly secure though for the most part, since

linking as we'll see takes a nontrivial amount of effort.

So as long as a user isn't reckless with how they manage their online identities, they

can assume that most people aren't going to try to deanonymize them.

But see, that's the catch.

The underlying technology might be anonymous or pseudonymous, but

we still have to consider human factors.

People make mistakes – especially your every day normal person, who isn't going out of

their way to do all they can to possibly ensure their privacy.

So what we like to say is that anonymity is not absolute – not a clear yes or no.

Instead, it's on a spectrum.

We refer to an entity's degree – or level – of anonymity as the difficulty of associating

that entity's pseudonym with their real world identity.

A high degree of anonymity allows one to reasonably expect having achieved privacy.

But again, why do we care about having a higher degree of anonymity?

To deal with the question again of how anonymous cryptocurrencies can indeed be used for money

laundering and online drug purchases: we can consider the following points.

We could have a partial solution, where the interfaces between cryptocurrencies and fiat

currencies are highly regulated.

Recall the AML and KYC from the enterprise blockchain lecture.

For example, we might want to be able to trade cryptocurrencies almost anonymously, but not

be able to touch fiat currency without a picture of your passport.

Also, it's worth mentioning that it's immensely hard – if not impossible – to

implement a sense of "morality" at a technological level.

Moral and immoral use cases look identical from a technological standpoint.

And more fundamentally, who gets to decide what's moral and immoral?

At the end of the day, one might want to also consider whether the positive benefits of

anonymity to society might outweigh the costs.

For example, consider Tor.

Tor was created by the U.S. government, but now is used by many to make it difficult for

government officials to monitor their web traffic – though there are still some ways

to deanonymize even this.

And some users of Tor might be drug dealers or operating black markets.

On the other hand, Tor has enabled free speech, for example for reporters in oppressive regimes.

We leave further contemplation for you to do yourself.

To round out our brief introduction as to why we might want anonymity in cryptocurrencies,

we contrast our goals of anonymity, privacy, and security with that of decentralization.

If we design our blockchain system to be decentralized, then what that means is that more of your

data is in the network, for people to publicly access.

Like we saw earlier, decentralization implies everyone has equal control of everything.

So, more people will see your pseudonym.

The more of your data that is on the network though, the more data that's available to

possibly deanonymize you.

This seems to show a slight paradox, where security and anonymity and privacy are harder

and harder to ensure, if we really want to be decentralized.

And once again, we can tie this back to the fundamental trilemma we saw in earlier lectures.

For more infomation >> [CS198.2x Week 5] Anonymity Basics - Duration: 9:56.

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[CS198.2x Week 5] Decentralized Mixing - Duration: 11:14.

Thus far, our proposed solutions have leveraged either a single centralized entity or several

at a time. Is there a decentralized solution that will allow us to remove counterparty

risk and avoid fees?

One idea is to create a network of peers outside the Bitcoin network who can cooperate to make

transactions which mix their coins without the need for any trusted third party. How

could we go about doing this?

Before we start diving deeper into the details of mixing protocols, let's take a step back

to understand what we're working with and how to recognize a good decentralized mixing

protocol.

First, let's pinpoint exactly what a mix is: it's a set of inputs and outputs each

of equal size. The goal of mixing is to hide the mapping from each input to its respective

output.

To define correctness of a mixing protocol, let's place the following intuitive requirements.

First, coins must not be lost, stolen, or double spent, naturally. Second, the mixing

must be truly random and must eventually succeed in mixing. If unsuccessful, the coins should

be sent back to the honest users, making the protocol resistant to DoS attacks.

To better understand the threats the protocol is up against, let's clearly categorize

the possible types of adversarial models we're facing as well. These adversarial models pop

up all the time when talking about computer security.

The first type is a passive adversary. This actor is not part of the mix and may seek

to use surface-level information as accessible to any other user to learn about the mapping.

In this scenario, ideally, basic anonymity will prevent passive adversaries from connecting

the inputs to outputs.

The second type is a semi-honest adversary. This type of adversary is part of the mix.

Though they correctly follow the protocol, they may use information gained during the

process to attempt to deanonymize their peers.

Finally, the last kind is a malicious actor, also part of the mix. As you might expect,

they're able to deviate from the protocol specifications and may also attempt to steal

funds from their peers in the mix. They may send false messages or withhold messages entirely

in order to achieve some goal.

This may remind you of fail-stop faults versus byzantine faults. As with distributed systems,

this adversarial model system lies on a spectrum. We'll make another reference to some old

concepts by introducing the old concept of Sybil resistance.

Because decentralized mixing is another distributed protocol, it's also susceptible to Sybil

attacks. Hence, we need to ensure Sybil resistance, which has a two part definition in the context

of decentralized mixing.

First, there needs to be a resistance to stealing funds. This means that we're not able to

rely on partial threshold cryptography, such as m-of-n multisignature transactions.

Additionally, we need to maintain a resistance to deanonymization. A weak definition of this

resistance is that participants outside the mix are not able to determine the mapping

of inputs to outputs, but participants within still are. A strong definition of this is

that even participants within the mix are not able to determine the mapping of inputs

to outputs. However, we still need to acknowledge that a high proportion of Sybil peers will

greatly reduce the anonymity set, as there are fewer unique entities within the mix.

Finally, there are a few additional caveats to consider in the context of mixing protocols.

First, there are side channel attacks. For this reason, we'd want to user Tor for everything.

As mentioned before, Tor is a protocol developed by the US government to anonymize your internet

activity by restricting the knowledge of traffic to first-hop routers. Assuming that the Tor

exit nodes you're using aren't adversary controlled, this will allow you to securely

send messages to peers without detection.

Second, we want to make sure that it's not obvious given the transaction amounts which

input corresponds to which output. Else, our scheme would be trivially breakable. The solution

is to use uniform transaction amounts across the board to ensure all inputs resemble each

other, and all outputs are indistinguishable from each other.

Finally, we want to ensure that transaction propagation does not unintentionally reveal

our identities. This is known as network-level deanonymization. The first node to inform

the network of a transaction is likely the source of it in almost all instances. Hence,

we need a way to get around this problem as well.

The first popularized decentralized mixing scheme was known as CoinJoin back in 2011.

In this, coins are mixed together in what's known as an n-of-n multisig transaction. Each

entity is required to sign off on the transaction input for the transaction to go through.

One of the big benefits here that we achieve over other protocols is that it's trustless:

funds cannot be stolen, since all users are signing off on the CoinJoin transaction. However,

it does come with quite a few cons.

First, anonymity is not secure against even a passive adversary, such as a mix facilitator.

Since the best way to implement this protocol is through a centralized server, it assumes

that private and anonymous communication exists for submitting output addresses. This makes

it vulnerable to traffic analysis, where attackers can record and analyze network traffic.

Additionally, participating in this mixing procedure is not plausibly deniable. It's

very easy to spot on the blockchain since it's an n-of-n multisig transaction, which

is unusually large. Though this can be fixed with Schnorr signatures, which combine several

signatures into one piece of data, this currently does not exist on Bitcoin.

Finally, it is not DoS resistant. Since it requires an n-of-n transaction sign-off, even

one node disconnecting or intentionally disrupting the process can cause the entire mix to fail.

Your next question hopefully is, "Can we do better?" Thankfully, the answer is yes.

CoinShuffle is the sequel to CoinJoin, using a decryption mixnet to jointly compute the

input/output shuffling, where a mixnet is a routing protocol using cryptography to obfuscate

the information trail.

One of the benefits to this protocol is that it uses an "Accountable Anonymous Group

Messaging" protocol known as Dissent to resolve any traffic analysis issues.

Additionally, it achieves anonymity against the mix facilitator because communications

are now decentralized.

Finally, with this decryption mixnet, it provides strong Sybil resistance against deanonymization.

However, it still suffers from the drawbacks of CoinJoin. Though Sybil resistance is stronger,

it is not absolute. It's still possible to deanonymize someone via a Sybil attack.

Additionally, like CoinJoin, CoinShuffle is vulnerable to DoS attacks as well.

A drawback new to CoinShuffle is the ability of the last peer in the decryption mixnet

to determine the outcome of the input/output shuffling, possibly giving this person the

ability to manipulate the ordering in their favor.

To get a better understanding of the significance of CoinShuffle's decryption mixnet, let's

dive into an overview. The purpose of the mixnet is to prevent anyone from knowing which

message was sent by which individual except for the individuals themselves.

The first step in this process is to encrypt the messages, in our case the output addresses

of the transaction, with the public keys of each of the participating peers.

From here, each of the messages has been decrypted in the same order. Say Red is the first to

unravel a layer of decryption from each of the messages. Red, after decrypting the layer

of encryption generated via Red's own public key, will randomly scramble the message order.

Red cannot tell which input positions will correspond to which final output positions,

and no one knows what Red did with the messages assuming Red does not disclose that information.

Red will then pass it onto Blue, and so on, until all the layers are peeled off.

The issue with this protocol is that the final decision for ordering the output addresses

with full knowledge of the final result lies with whichever peer is at the end of the process,

allowing them to determine the final shuffle permutation.

As mentioned briefly earlier, there is a liquidity problem with each of these solutions: they

all are likely only to be used by others with dirty coins. What's the point in mixing

coins if all you get back are dirty coins?

Well, why not provide clean coins for mixing for a small fee? Due to the small risk, these

market makers can charge a small fee for their services.

However, there are still some issues. One is that the anonymity set is fairly small

if using known liquidity providers. Another is that, according to a research paper published

in June 2016, an attack with a recoverable investment of only $32,000 USD (at the time)

would succeed with 90% likelihood to deanonymize the entire system.

Another pending issue is that of plausible deniability. Currently, it's difficult to

justify mixing without giving away that you may be concerned about hiding suspicious behavior

as one of your motives. Is there a way to make transactions in a mixing protocol look

the same as normal Bitcoin transactions to passive observers?

Coinparty is a protocol designed to do exactly that, at the cost of some protocol security.

The CoinParty protocol has three stages: commitment, shuffling, and the final transaction. During

the commitment step, peers will generate an escrow address each. These escrow addresses

require ⅔ consensus in order to spend. During the shuffling step, the peers perform a secure

multi-party shuffle to scramble the output address ordering. Finally, during the transaction

step, the peers will agree to transfer out of the escrow addresses to their designated

outputs.

Let's take a closer look at each of the steps.

For the commitment scheme, how do we generate the escrow addresses? Each mixing peer uses

what's known as Pseudorandom Secret Sharing, in which each peer obtains a portion of the

private key. Via this portion of the private key, each peer can construct their portion

of the public key. Then, by combining their portions of the public key with their peers,

they can broadcast their shares to jointly reconstruct the escrow address. This process

is then repeated for every peer to generate an escrow address.

The rest of the steps are relatively straightforward. Address shuffling is similar to CoinJoin and

CoinShuffle, through secure multiparty computation. The transaction is signed using threshold

signatures via the previously generated secrets. Finally, if anyone was detected trying to

cheat the protocol, they can be punished.

The main benefit of CoinParty is high plausible deniability, since CoinParty transactions

on the blockchain look just like "normal" Bitcoin transactions. Additionally, CoinParty

has a larger anonymity set, as a large number of normal Bitcoin transactions with the same

amount is orders of magnitudes more anonymous. Additionally, the protocol has decent efficiency

– it requires 2 transactions on the blockchain per input peer, which is reasonable.

Some drawbacks however include reduced protocol security. By introducing threshold signatures,

the escrow funds are now entirely controlled by these threshold signatures. This makes

the protocol vulnerable to a sybil attack: a malicious peer spawning several fake peers

can join a mix group pretending to be friendly, achieve over ⅔ of the threshold, and steal

all the escrow funds.

To conclude, let's compare the overarching benefits and costs.

Some benefits include not having a central point of failure, such as with CoinShuffle,

and maintaining anonymity against a mix facilitator. However, the drawbacks across all include

deanonymization via Sybil attacks, facing a tradeoff between centralized servers such

as in CoinJoin and anonymity such as in CoinShuffle, and the tradeoff between plausible deniability

and security.

For more infomation >> [CS198.2x Week 5] Decentralized Mixing - Duration: 11:14.

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[CS198.2x Week 5] Privacy Focused Altcoins - Duration: 15:48.

DASH, formerly known as DarkCoin, is a privacy focused cryptocurrency that uses a mixer called

CoinJoin, which we talked about in the previous section.

In Dash, in addition to traditional Proof-of-Work rewards, there's a secondary network layer

of what are known as masternodes.

Users who run master nodes are tasked with performing privileged actions such as voting

on proposals for network governance, instantly confirming transactions, and mixing coins.

The idea here is that we have better plausible deniability because everyone is forced to

go through CoinJoin for mixing.

So, this makes for a much larger anonymity set.

The way it works is as follows:

By default on most dash clients, users have mixing enabled.

Dash calls this PrivateSend, but it's essentially the processes of executing CoinJoin, plus

some Dash platform specific formalities.

When a user has PrivateSend enabled, meaning that they want to obscure the origins of their

funds, their client will first prepare a transaction.

The transaction inputs are broken down into standard denominations of 0.01 dash, 0.1 dash,

1 dash, and 10 dash.

Then, a request is made to the masternode network, indicating that you're trying to

obscure the origin of your funds.

When other users send similar requests indicating that they too are trying to make private transactions,

a master node mixes all the transaction inputs of all the users, and instructs all users

to pay their now-transformed inputs back to themselves.

So now, all users who participated in this round of mixing now has the same amount of

dash back in their possession, minus some transaction fees.

In order to fully obscure their funds of course, users need to repeat mixing with masternodes

multiple times – usually between 2 to 8 rounds.

Users of Dash wallets have the whole mixing process happen in the background without any

intervention of the user themselves, so when it's time to make a transaction, their funds

are already fully anonymized.

After all, this whole process of mixing does take some time, so it should be done in advance.

Also, since coins are mixed in set denominations, transactions using mixing may need to spend

from more transaction outputs than those that don't use mixing.

And spending from more transaction outputs at at time leads to larger transaction sizes,

so users would have to spend more on transaction fees than usual.

Some pros about Dash are that firstly, it solves the main issue with plausible deniability

we saw earlier.

Everyone takes part in the CoinJoin mixing process.

Also, since Dash uses decentralized mixing with CoinJoin, it's trustless on that end.

However, there is the main con though that users have to trust both the main Dash network

and also its network of masternodes.

In order to become a masternode initially, users post 1000 Dash bond.

And after that, masternodes also earn interest and standard income through a proportion of

the block reward.

If there's an entity with enough capital, they could purchase enough masternodes to

subvert the Dash masternode network and potentially deanonymize the network.

Unlike a lot of other altcoins, especially earlier privacy focused altcoins, that were

forks of Bitcoin, Monero was a fork of another privacy focused altcoin called Bytecoin – which

in turn was based off of CryptoNote anonymous technology.

Monero provides guarantees on transaction untraceability and unlinkability – guarantees

on sending and receiving monero.

Untraceability means that for each incoming transaction, all possible senders are equiprobable

– thereby hiding the identity of the sender.

Unlinkability means that for any two outgoing transactions, it is impossible to prove that

they went to the same person – thereby hiding the identity of the receiver.

At a slightly deeper level, Monero's functionality hinges on the use of an advanced topic in

cryptography, called ring signatures.

When a user wants to make a transaction in Monero, they choose some set of previous transaction

outputs to mix with.

These are then bound with the user's transaction output they're spending from in a cryptographic

ring signature.

In this context, ring signatures allow the user to prove that they own one of the outputs

without revealing exactly specifically which output.

The anonymity set in Monero is the set of outputs you're signing from, and since mixing

is enabled by default, like in Dash, Monero has better plausible deniability than other

non-privacy focused altcoins.

The main distinction between a ring signature with an ordinary digital signature is that

with a ring signature, any verifier of the signature cannot establish the exact identity

of the signer.

In this diagram, say Alice constructs a transaction from herself to another user, Romulus.

She constructs a ring signature with her public key, as well as that of Bob and Carol.

Now, Romulus won't know exactly from whom this transaction was sent – only the fact

that it could either be from Alice, Bob, or Carol.

And at the bottom here, the same situation.

Bob wants to send a transaction to Remus, so he makes a ring signature with Dave's

public key.

So in these two scenarios, both Romulus and Remus have no idea where these transactions

originated from, and can only guess from their respective anonymity sets – those whose

identities were involved in constructing their respective ring signatures.

As a quick aside, the reason why it's called a ring signature is the ring-like structure

of the signature algorithm.

Each of the incoming arrows being data encrypted by various users' public keys.

So while ring signatures give us the wonderful property of not being able to figure out where

transactions come from, it's still possible to see whom transactions are directed to.

And that in turn might be able to provide some insight into where transactions are coming

from in the first place.

So we need the property of unlinkability, and that's implemented in Monero as well.

For each payment, Monero clients will automatically create a unique one-time key, each derived

from a user's public key – and this ensures unlinkability.

So in the diagram here, two one-time addresses are paying to Bob's public address.

Now, when Bob wants to spend from this, he can redeem it using another one-time address.

We could somewhat do this in Bitcoin, where the best practice is to generate a new address

for each transaction conducted.

However, users' money would be all over the place and they would have to keep track

of each and every address generated, or have a way of deterministically generating these

addresses themselves – perhaps through a hierarchical deterministic wallet.

What Monero does is similar in that one time addresses are generated deterministically.

It also allows for easy retrieval since everything is linked with the user's public key.

So for some conclusions, let's look again at some pros and cons.

Few coins have formally proven the anonymity behind their product.

Monero is one of the few, as is Zcash – which we'll talk about in the coming slides.

Also, transaction values are obscured with cryptography as well; though it has been a

bumpy road in the past, due to bugs in implementation of ring signatures and other security vulnerabilities,

but it seems like all is well at the moment on that end.

Also, Monero has some good scalability choices.

It has a fast block time and allows for variable block sizes, making it flexible during high

and low traffic times of network operation.

As for cons, due to all the cryptography that is performed to ensure privacy, transaction

sizes can be quite large.

For example, the size of the ring signatures is linear in the number of public keys in

your anonymity set.

However, works in the recent years have shown that it is possible to achieve the same functionality

with sublinear space.

Also, Monero has a pretty decent anonymity set – the number of identities involved

in a ring signature – but we can do better.

Zcash is an altcoin where transactions reveal nothing about input and output addresses and

also the input and output values of transactions as well – allowing for fully anonymous payments.

And the way it does this is by using zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge

– zk-SNARKs for short.

We talked about this briefly in the last lecture on scalability, but in a nutshell, zk-SNARKs

are a way of proving that you know something without revealing what you actually know.

One side note is that UC Berkeley's own Professor Alessandro Chiesa is co-founder

of Zcash, and co-inventor of its underlying protocol, ZeroCash.

Both of these technologies rely on zk-SNARKs as we mentioned before, and Professor Chiesa

is also the author of libsnark, the C++ implementation of zk-SNARKs.

We'll go into this in more detail later, but what you can do with zk-SNARKs implemented

at the protocol layer is that you can first have a normal publically viewable base coin,

such as Bitcoin.

You can then mint it into some black box coin, which you can then – in total anonymity

– make a series of transactions.

There's no way to correlate or distinguish coins and values while in this black box.

Then, to get your base coin back, there's a procedure called pour.

So let's take a closer look at this.

If you recall in Bitcoin, or any payment network, you need to prove three things in order to

conduct a valid transaction.

Firstly, you have to prove that the input you're spending from hasn't previously

been spent – or more generally, that you have sufficient funds for the payment.

Secondly, you have to prove ownership of the coins you're spending from.

And thirdly, you have to prove that the sum of your transaction inputs is equal to the

sum of your transaction outputs.

In Bitcoin, proof that coins haven't been spent previously is information obtained from

the ledger itself, and requires no effort by the transaction sender.

The sender proves ownership of the coins they want to send by digitally signing the transaction

using their private key.

To allow this signature to be publically verified, the sending address must be disclosed.

The recipient address also has to be disclosed, in order for the recipient to then be able

to spend the coins that they have received.

In Bitcoin, it's easy to see that the verification of transaction inputs and outputs is trivial,

since so much information is disclosed and publicly available.

On the other hand, Zcash uses zk-SNARKs to prove the same three facts – that inputs

haven't been spent, that coins are being spent by their correct owners, and that the

sum of inputs is equal to the sum of transaction outputs.

And this is all done with zero knowledge – without revealing any information about the sender,

recipient, or the assets that are being transferred.

Each valid transaction is sent with an accompanying zk-SNARK, which prove the three facts we previously

stated.

Transaction inputs are proofs of validity for the transaction, and outputs are the details

required to construct a zero knowledge proof, encrypted of course with the recipient's

public key.

The information required to spend the transaction outputs is also attached to the transaction

– again encrypted – and details how to construct a new zk-SNARK that enables spending.

Zcash has two layers, a transparent layer and a zero-knowledge security layer.

And users transfer their assets between these two layers using the mint and pour transactions,

as we mentioned before.

The reason for having these two separate layers is because at its core, the fundamental innovation

of Zcash was its implementation of the zero knowledge security layer; its transparent

layer started simply as a fork of the Bitcoin codebase.

Users are generally more likely to be comfortable with transparent cryptocurrencies they've

seen or used in the past – like Bitcoin – so if users like that, then Zcash shouldn't

take that away.

Also, enabling Bitcoin-style transparent transactions also make it simple to integrate with Zcash

using existing tools and infrastructure that were originally built to support Bitcoin.

So now, a fun technical aside; zk-SNARKs are built on top of homomorphic encryption functions.

They have the following properties:

The first two are pretty standard, and if you've been around since our first course,

or have experience in elementary cryptography, then this should be very familiar.

Firstly, given an output, it's hard to find the input.

Also, different inputs should lead to different outputs.

Where this starts to get interesting though, is that now, rather than wanting homomorphic

functions to be random, we want to be able to perform operations on outputs of homomorphic

functions.

For example, if we know the outputs of a homomorphic encryption function on two different input

values, we can find the output of the function on some arithmetic combination of the two

inputs – all without knowing the input values themselves.

In other words, we want to allow computation on ciphertext, generating an encrypted result

which, when itself decrypted, matches the result of the computations as if they had

been performed on the plaintext itself.

Here's a simple way to grasp this idea of homomorphic encryption.

Say Alice has two numbers x and y such that x + y = 7.

Alice doesn't want Bob to know x and y, but she wants to prove to Bob that x + y = 7.

Alice sends F(x) and F(y) to Bob, where F is a homomorphic function.

Bob can then find F(x+y) from F(x) and F(y), since F is homomorphic.

Then, Bob can check if F(x+y) = F(7), verifying the fact that x + y is indeed equal to 7.

And that's at a very, very high level how some of the math works behind Zcash.

Alice in this case doesn't reveal the values x and y to Bob.

Those can be transaction inputs.

However, Bob can verify that those two values combined equals some output value.

So some final thoughts on Zcash.

One pro is that Zcash is fully anonymous.

Assuming the underlying cryptography is secure, transactions conducted in Zcash's blackbox

zero-knowledge security layer are fully anonymous.

Their anonymity set is the entire blackbox history.

Also, another pro is that of modularity.

Zcash was originally implemented on top of a fork of Bitcoin for convenience and also

integration with existing tools.

However, it can also be integrated with any other consensus mechanism.

On the other hand, Zcash is very resource intensive.

And that's due to the fact that zk-SNARK proof systems in use require about 4 GB of

RAM and 40 seconds of computation on modern CPUs in order to generate proofs for pour

transactions.

Also, proofs require a semi-trusted one-time setup.

Adversaries with malicious setup parameters can mint coins without spending base coins.

This can be somewhat mitigated with a secure multiparty computation setup, but that's

out of scope for this course.

It is an interesting challenge in integrating such technologies into blockchain though,

so it's definitely worth checking out.

For more infomation >> [CS198.2x Week 5] Privacy Focused Altcoins - Duration: 15:48.

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[CS198.2x Week 5] Mixing Basics - Duration: 7:04.

First, a couple disclaimers need to be made.

First and foremost, we are not recommending nor condoning any of these activities.

Second, for large institutions in traditional financial systems, some of these mixing practices

may even be illegal.

This is simply an intellectual exercise to understand how it may be possible to anonymize

your funds to make it more difficult for someone else to track your activity.

To better understand mixing's mechanics, we're going to examine a traditional scenario

where money's origins are obfuscated: money laundering.

The reason why money laundering serves as a good base is because their goals are the

same.

As discussed before when talking about regulations, money laundering is the very illegal activity

of moving large amounts of undetected money between countries or between the underground

and legitimate economy.

Traditional money laundering uses hundreds of fake "shell" companies, called shells

because they don't do anything or own any assets.

However, they appear to in order to successfully serve as money laundering devices for tax

purposes.

The first step to money laundering is placement.

Over time, the "dirty" funds, or funds obtained through illicit means, are placed

into these shell companies.

The shell corporations write off the deposits as purchases, investments, services provided,

et cetera, in order to make the appearance of legitimate money entering the business

through legitimate means.

The next step is Layering.

This is the step where shell companies further pass their money through other shell companies

in order to further complicate the financial supply chain to hide the true origin of the

money.

This step of the process is what mixing will simulate.

The final step of the process is Integration.

This refers to when the clean money is reintroduced into the legitimate economy through the purchase

of luxury goods, the end goal of all this money laundering.

Mixing will attempt to simulate this process of money obfuscation by sending coins through

several complicated processes.

To better understand what it means to be anonymous in our context, let's formally define something

known as an anonymity set.

This will be defined as the set of pseudonyms between which an entity cannot be distinguished

from their counterparts.

In other words, it is impossible to do anything better than guess when trying to choose an

address within an anonymity set to associate with some given entity.

The goal of mixing, then, is to maximize this anonymity set with our resources.

Let's say that mixing when done correctly now makes your entity indistinguishable within

a set of N peers.

This means that the anonymity set's size after one round is N. Done again with another

unique N peers for each address, the anonymity size is now N squared after the second round.

It becomes N cubed after three rounds and so on.

However, we do have to keep real world constraints in mind, such as however many resources are

available along with the implications of mixing.

Matters such as plausible deniability and trustlessness of mixing also come into play

since mixing alone isn't enough to absolve someone of suspicion.

First off, trustlessness is desirable.

Clearly, given the nature of the blockchain space, we want to ensure that there's no

counterparty risk.

If someone else participates in a coin mixing process, they shouldn't be able to deny

our services.

Additionally, we want to avoid our funds from being stolen.

Second, we want to maintain plausible deniability.

It shouldn't stand out from one's transaction history or any other data sources that you're

mixing.

If that's the case, then your activities will fall under much more scrutiny, even if

you've done nothing wrong.

These are properties we'll seek after building up some basic examples of mixing.

To make clear, there's a fundamental idea behind mixing: the larger the anonymity set,

the harder it is to link pseudonyms to real identities.

There are several different types of mixers.

These include centralized mixers, altcoin exchanges, decentralized mixing protocols,

and privacy-focused altcoins.

We'll take a look at mixers in that order.

The most simple kind of mixer, the easiest to design, is a centralized one, particularly

a protocol known as Third Party Protocol, or TPP.

By understanding a central solution first, we can then explore how other protocols may

build off of this main design.

With TPP, a centralized mixing service will have a set of UTXOs, referred to here as a

slush fund.

Whenever someone sends an input to this mixer, the mixing service operator will choose a

set of UTXOs to return back to a new address also controlled by Alice.

At the end, Alice now has her "cleaned" funds minus the fee the mixing service kept.

It's not hard to see some of the issues with this centralized service.

One of these issues comes down to counterparty risk: in this case, you have to trust the

central service providing coin mixing services for you.

There's hardly anything stopping them beyond reputation from withholding tokens from you.

Additionally, you have to trust that the mixer is not keeping logs on your information.

It's possible that the central party, in order to blackmail certain users or for some

other purpose, is keeping a list of users who provided dirty inputs as well as the eventual

cleaned funds they claimed.

Finally, a centralization risk exists as well.

Because of a single point of failure, which can be brought down by hacking or by a government

institution demanding the shutdown of the service, it's not guaranteed that the mixer

will operate as expected.

Additionally, a small note to make: if the only UTXOs being sent to the centralized mixer

are dirty coins, those dirty coins will end up becoming the new outputs for later users.

Without enough clean coins being cycled into the slush fund, it could cause the mixing

to do little for cleaning your coins.

A couple examples of centralized mixing services include Mixcoin, which came out of Princeton

research, and Blindcoin, which came out of UMD and UPenn.

This is an example of how theory meets practical applications.

The next category of mixing to examine is altcoin exchange mixing.

Rather than relying on a specific central service to perform the exclusive act of centrally

mixing your coins, one can use a series of exchanges to bring money from Bitcoin to several

other cryptocurrencies, such as Ether and Zcash, before finally coming back to Bitcoin.

In this case, the cost of mixing coins is not a central mixing fee, but rather the exchange

fees between each cryptocurrency used.

The benefits of this approach is that the attacker now has to trace the transaction

chain through several disparate blockchains and exchanges rather than simply examining

a single blockchain.

Additionally, this process provides better plausible deniability, since the activity

looks like normal currency exchanging.

However, you need to rely on exchanges not to reveal the links between your inputs and

the outputs you receive on the other end.

Additionally, there still remains counterparty risk: if the exchange happens to get hacked

or otherwise freezes services during your mixing process, you'll lose whatever money

you had in transit.

Finally, most exchanges in the US are required to keep personally identifiable information

and follow KYC/AML laws as mentioned before, meaning that such activity may appear suspicious

to exchanges, especially if done repeatedly.

For more infomation >> [CS198.2x Week 5] Mixing Basics - Duration: 7:04.

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Video- From Morning Rain To Strong Afternoon Wind - Duration: 3:41.

For more infomation >> Video- From Morning Rain To Strong Afternoon Wind - Duration: 3:41.

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Preserve Harvest | Feijoas, Olives | Los Angeles - Duration: 15:08.

(Music)

If you've been watching my channel for the last couple of weeks, you know I've

had a huge pineapple guava harvest. Everything you just saw on that table we

harvested in the last couple of days. So, today we're going to talk about

preserving some of that harvest and we're gonna make pineapple guava juice.

Dinora is back after a two-week absence and we're gonna have a lot of fun so

stay with me. First things first, tea. I keep lemon verbena leaves in my freezer

and I'm just gonna put them in the pot with my English breakfast. This is

already hot. Dinora and I both love tea so this teapot gets a lot of workout on

Fridays. Eric and I pretty much picked those two

olive trees clean and there are just a few, but I'm going to brine them anyway.

So, first thing I'm gonna do is get my brine started.

(sound of water)

Just gonna warm the water a little bit. When I was at Doug and Stacy's, Stacy

uses Redmond Real Salt. Well, it's ancient sea salt, but it comes

from Utah. I'm gonna get that ready. Because brining takes less time for smaller

olives, I'm going to keep them separate. So this bowl, oh that's kind of big, this

bowl all came off of my big tree. Oh, and here she is. She's back!

Come over here and say hi. Hi! So,

she was so popular on my passion fruit juice video that we're gonna make some

pineapple guava juice today, right? Yes. Okay. Yes.

My only regret is that I did

not film her watching that video this morning. Ha, ha, ha.

You have never seen such a

reaction. She almost wiggled off of her stool.

(sound of water)

Houston, we have a floating egg in the brine. It took like half of that. Dinora

Dinora is washing up the olives.

What I realized is the, the maggots have a certain sort

of due date that they get out of the olive and they get into the ground to

start metamorphosing. These olives and my last batch of olives didn't have any

maggots, so interesting, so these little olives will be mushy but maggot-less.

So, what I did was take out all the hard green ones out of the smaller olives. And

I'm hoping that this fits. I did see a worm, but nothing like the invasion of the

first brining. I'm putting the larger hard ones in with the bigger ones

because size matters when it comes to brining. Which is why I'm trying to keep

the small ones separate from the big ones. Now, I learned my lesson about over

packing the last time, so I'm not going to over tighten these.

Great. I'm going to sit them up in a tray so they don't explode and drip

everywhere.

(Dinora) It's a waste of time.

Ha, ha. You may be right, you may be right. Yeah.

But, just imagine how many I had compared to how many I have now. You

know, hardly any compared. The really hard ones we're just putting a little cut in. Um-hm, they are smaller.

But, hard. Um-hm.

Not quite full, so we're gonna have to put some, oh there's a worm, ha, ha,

and it's wiggling.

Oh, that's not gonna work either. Wow, I misjudged that. Okay. never mind.

I'm just gonna have to figure out a way to keep them floating.

That's kind of weird, but...

maybe it's good enough.

Okay, moving on to pineapple guava juice.

When pineapple guavas fall off the tree

they're still a little bit hard and you need to let them sit on the counter for

a couple of days to soften up before you do this. But I'm just going to pick out.. I

think all these are pretty much okay. And the aroma coming off of this is

incredible. It is so, it's like perfume, it's incredible.

I'm just keeping the hard ones back.

Similar to the passion fruit juice?

To the Passion fruit? Except you don't have to take out the seeds because

they're aren't any. No. Which saves a lot of time.

It's nice and thick and it would be great in smoothies

just like it is, but if you want to drink it like juice you

need to thin it down.

So, I haven't eaten breakfast yet and I'm starving.

And Dinora has this much pineapple guava scooped out, and so I'm gonna make myself

a smoothie. Okay, so this is what's going in my smoothie. And I'm gonna put in a

banana, because it's always great to get a little potassium, and they're sitting

here and they'll go bad if I don't eat them. So, put that in. I'm gonna put in the

pineapple guava. Fortunately, I'm able to get farm-fresh eggs and I'm gonna put

two of these in there, so I have some protein.

Also I'm fortunate, because I have...

(clang, clang, clang)

I have goat milk yogurt made for me. There we go.

Putting in a pint of goat milk yogurt. This is gonna be a big smoothie.

I can keep it in the refrigerator or Dinora can drink it if she's interested.

I like to use a little local raw honey.

And I'm going to put in some organic cinnamon.

I'm going to put in just a little bit of my edible minerals which

is a great detoxifier.

(sound of motor)

Um! Smells wonderful! (bang, bang, bang)

(sound of motor)

Breakfast!

Umm! Wow!

See if you like it.

Oh my god, it's really good.

Do you think so, really? So good.

Oh, good!

Um, it's good. Okay. Wow.

(sound of water splashing)

Careful. I washed some more.

But that's only one container.

You know, this looking very, very healthy.

Yes, I know. So good.

So this is what it looks like when it's ready to eat.

The center starts looking a little bit pinkish. It'll just

be a really light color when it's too hard. But you see it has a little bit of

softness and then it's easy to scoop out. And it does have seeds. All guavas have

seeds, but these seeds are tiny and you don't even notice them. That's what I

like about this guava over the Mexican pink guava. It's much better. Yeah.

Plus, it's sweeter. Um-hm. Um-hm.

(Music)

Prescott is part of Phoenix, you know, area, um-hm, and there's so many people in

Phoenix that are growing their own food and that have their chickens. Um-hm.

I'm going to go dump these. I'll go this way.

So, can we do more or do you want to stop? It's up to you. Okay.

Let's do a few more and that way I'll have

a few bags to put in the freezer. Okay.

So we have a bowl of pineapple guava ready to

go into the freezer, and I don't have proper freezer bags. I prefer to use

these bags, which don't have any bad chemicals in them. I'm just gonna put

about that much in a bag, and then flatten it.

And that way when I want a smoothie, I can just open the end and

break off a piece. Very easy. Yeah, so easy.

(Music)

Now, we're going to make the juice, which is even easier to make than passionfruit

juice, because you don't have to strain out the seeds. So. I have about that much

pineapple guava. And Dinora just added a little bit of water.

And I'm just gonna put...

a little bit of honey.

(loud motor)

Let's see. Just so you can see it, I'm going to use a glass like this.

Should I replay that? Did you see it's pretty thick.

So, obviously you can control that by adding more water.

Oh boy.

Thanks so much for watching this channel. I really appreciate your support,

and don't forget to like the videos and follow Late Bloomer Show on Instagram,

Twitter and Facebook, and I'll see you in the next video.

(Music to end)

For more infomation >> Preserve Harvest | Feijoas, Olives | Los Angeles - Duration: 15:08.

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[CS198.2x Week 5] Advanced Anonymity & Generalizations - Duration: 6:26.

In traditional cypherpunk fashion, there was a proposal published in July of 2016.

It simply read: "hi, i have an idea for improving privacy in bitcoin.

My friend who knows technology says this channel would have interest…" followed by a txt

file proposal.

The proposal was written by a user with the pseudonym Tom Elvis Jedusor, Voldemort's

French name in the Harry Potter series.

The proposal was called Mimblewimble, which was also a Harry Potter reference – specifically

a curse that was used to keep people from talking about a specific subject.

So on the screen here, you can see the opening lines of the very mysterious MimbleWimble

proposal.

The MimbleWimble proposal posed a design for a blockchain-based ledger system that used

a cryptographic protocol more scalable and private than that of Bitcoin.

By modifying transaction types in Bitcoin, Mimblewimble aims to be as low-functionality

as possible, while maintaining high-privacy and high-scalability.

Because of this drastic change from normal Bitcoin, it aims to be implemented as an alternate

blockchain (a side chain or altcoin perhaps) that supports a different type of transaction

than what Bitcoin uses currently.

On the privacy size, Mimblewimble builds upon Confidential Transactions, an earlier proposal

by Greg Maxell, by implementing range proofs, homomorphic commitments, Pedersen commitments,

and other cryptographic primitives.

Also, all values in a transaction are encrypted with so called "blinding factors", secondary

elliptic curves used solely for privacy's sake.

Also it bundles many transactions into larger transactions in order to scramble inputs and

outputs – to obfuscate the origin and destination of Bitcoins – and also for scalability reasons

as well.

With Mimblewimble, you can treat each block as one large transaction.

And you can also merge transactions across blocks.

Joining transactions across blocks could extend all the way from the genesis block to the

latest block.

So, Mimblewimble can thus reduce the need to maintain entire blockchain history since

the genesis block.

The original proposal pointed out that to get to the current version of the blockchain,

one must start from the genesis block and start block verification from there.

And as of July 2016, the time of publication, 150 million transactions must be replayed

to produce a set of only 4 million unspent transaction outputs.

Mimblewimble promises to half the size of the blockchain: while still maintaining confidential

transactions and obscured transaction graphs.

Also, Mimblewimble simplifies the current Bitcoin model to transactions that don't

need extra functionality other than simply transferring value from sender to recipient.

It does this by eliminating Bitcoin script.

And that's the price one must pay to enable such privacy that Mimblewimble promises to

provide.

Currently, Mimblewimble is under active development, and it's most popular implementation is

called Grin.

Now, it's important for us to reflect, to see how far we've come with privacy and

anonymity.

As an exercise in reflection, here are some recent quotes from influential people in the

whole space of crypto for privacy.

Here's a quote from Timothy May, the author of The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto.

"I think Satoshi would barf.

Or at least work on a replacement for Bitcoin as he first described it in 2008 - 2009."

That's a pretty pessimistic outlook, but that's from the perspective of crypto anarchists.

And while that cause was the motivating factor for creating Bitcoin in the first place, the

average user probably doesn't strongly align that ideology.

Next, here's a quote from Riccardo Spagni, the main maintainer of the Monero project.

"Privacy isn't a thing you achieve, it's a constant cat-and-mouse battle."

This is true in that you just don't simply achieve privacy – or it's not that likely

that you can just achieve privacy.

Fundamentally, it's easy to see why.

With privacy, you could have the most secure system in the world, but the moment one part

fails, or it's shown that a part of your system can possibly be broken or exploited,

then you've lost.

Nicolas Christin from Carnegie Mellon was part of a team that found a major vulnerability

in Monero early 2018, and he summarizes the previous point pretty concisely in relation

to immutable, public ledgers.

"You have a permanent record of everything taking place.

If, down the road, someone finds a vulnerability that you can reveal what happened in the past,

you may still be at risk."

So it's clear that privacy is a major challenge.

But in general, it's actually more of a matter of security than of privacy.

Privacy can be seen as a subset of security; privacy is the act of protecting confidential

information, where security is the protecting.

And tying back to security, we can again look at the scalability trilemma from the past

weeks.

By now, it should be very clear that there indeed are tradeoffs between security, decentralization,

and scalability – if it wasn't clear before.

Clearly, centralized mixers and master node mixer networks sacrifice decentralization

for privacy and security.

On the other hand, multi layer blockchain protocols such as Dash's master node network

and Zcash's zero-knowledge security layer have associated overhead that may hinder performance

– not to mention other protocol specific scalability hits.

Also, often times, in regards to mixing, it's said that mixing should be done in advance

so as to spread out mixing overhead.

This unfortunately is not possible if a user is sending many small transactions, where

each incurs a non-negligible mixing fee.

And if they run out of pre-mixed funds, that incurs mixing overhead.

Really, there is no perfect all around blockchain system.

Instead, each is designed for its specific goal and use case.

For more infomation >> [CS198.2x Week 5] Advanced Anonymity & Generalizations - Duration: 6:26.

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Globalization in Japan - Documentary | Subtitles | (EN | 1080p) - Duration: 6:42.

Japan

The land of the rising sun

But what's about the globalization in Japan?

Globalization has had a significant impact in Japans economy.

It has affected every part of the economy,

even its culture.

This year I was in Japan and I wanted to investigate

the situation.

What are the positive and negative impacts of globalization in Japan?

Positive impact of globalization in Japan

includes the rise of economy.

This due to advancement in technology.

The advance in technology has allow Japan

to develop and manufacture modern equipment's

like cars (Toyota /Nissan),

household products like Toshiba

and Video / Arcade Games (SEGA)

which are in high demand these days.

This has enable many technologies to take place in Japan

and Japanese factories are set up across the world,

because of its sustainable growth

in making new products and technology

which then increases the growth in economy in Japan.

Advancement in modern transportation systems and Internet

had also enabled the world to visit Japan

because of their inspiring sceneries

which then led increases the income through tourism.

It also has an impact on the culture

where the different aspects of culture in Japan

has spread across the world making them well known.

For example: Traditional culture of food like sushi

and kimono has spread to other parts of the world

and no longer just only exist in Japan.

Hence, making the world becoming closer and smaller

because people can experience Japans culture

even if they are not in japan.

Anime

and J-Pop

which are part of japans modern culture

has reached to different parts of the world

where people from other countries draw and watch manga,

anime and do cosplay.

However, it has also forced changes, which are arguably negative on the Japanese life and economy.

And I was thinking

What are the negative impacts of the globalization in Japan?

Although the advancement in technology in Japan has benefited the economy,

however

it also does some harm to the people living in Japan

as this technological advanced equipment's

like robots

will make people lazy and dependent on these equipment's to survive.

As a matter of economics,

as worldwide demand increases,

it requires more production and export.

As the linked economies in the globalization market

produce more,

some states cannot maintain their standard of living

simply because they have no

resources to respond to the demand they face.

China has overtaken Japan as an economic power

because Japan lacked the human resources due to low birth rates.

Due to globalization in Japan,

many aspect of Japan's culture originality

had been lost.

For example,

western countries are not used to the taste of an Asian country.

Hence, Japanese kitchen are being modified

to suit their taste.

And the traditional clothes worn by Japanese

in the past are not seen wearing today

by locals mainly because they are

being influenced by fashion by other parts

of the world like America and France.

Globalization is a means to an end.

The end is to create and sustain a self-reinforcing

cycle of profit growth and value creation,

access to a richer asset and talent pool

and a more compelling value proposition

for employees and investors.

Getting there will be difficult.

So I hope Japan continues to be the one

of the "mostly free" economies.

For more infomation >> Globalization in Japan - Documentary | Subtitles | (EN | 1080p) - Duration: 6:42.

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Reporter Ke Betuke Sawal Par Kuch Aisa Tha "Shahrukh Khan" Ka Reaction | Zero Trailer - Duration: 1:45.

Reporter Ke Betuke Sawal Par Kuch Aisa Tha "Shahrukh Khan" Ka Reaction | Zero Trailer

For more infomation >> Reporter Ke Betuke Sawal Par Kuch Aisa Tha "Shahrukh Khan" Ka Reaction | Zero Trailer - Duration: 1:45.

-------------------------------------------

Chị Muối xin từ chối nhận giường của nhà hảo tâm vì phòng quá chật - Duration: 21:36.

For more infomation >> Chị Muối xin từ chối nhận giường của nhà hảo tâm vì phòng quá chật - Duration: 21:36.

-------------------------------------------

Γιάννης Μακρής: Πότε και που θα γίνει η κηδεία του 46χρονου επιχειρηματία | News | fthis.gr - Duration: 1:02.

 Τις έρευνες για τον άνδρα με το τζόκεϊ ο οποίος εκτέλεσε το βράδυ της Τετάρτης τον Γιάννη Μακρή, έξω από το σπίτι του στο Πανόραμα της Βούλας, συνεχίζουν οι αστυνομικές αρχές

 Όσο για την κηδεία του 46χρονου επιχειρηματία και συζύγου της Βικτώριας Καρύδα;  Όπως αποκάλυψε το δελτίο ειδήσεων του Alpha, πρόκειται να τελεστεί την Κυριακή στις 13:30 μμ στον Ιερό Ναό του Αγίου Νεκταρίου στη Βούλα

Η σορός του Γιάννη Μακρή θα μεταφερθεί ωστόσο στην Αυστραλία για να ταφεί εκεί.  Δείτε παραπάνω το χαρακτηριστικό απόσπασμα

For more infomation >> Γιάννης Μακρής: Πότε και που θα γίνει η κηδεία του 46χρονου επιχειρηματία | News | fthis.gr - Duration: 1:02.

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[CS198.2x Week 5] Deanonymization - Duration: 5:51.

So the big concern about decentralization that we look at in regards to deanonymization

is that now, we can go back in the blockchain's history to reveal information about a particular

pseudonym.

So that's the goal of deanonymization, or linking

One way we can achieve this – which we alluded to earlier – is by transaction graph analysis,

which is simply just inspecting the transaction history in the blockchain to derive useful

information.

Particularly, we can construct transaction graphs, like you can see on the right side

of the screen.

On a transaction graph, each node is a pseudonym, and each edge is a transaction conducted between

pseudonyms.

From a transaction graph, you might be able to see some pseudonyms make transactions more

than others, or are paid more than others, or perhaps make certain transactions with

certain other pseudonyms.

One way of analyzing the transaction graph is

by clustering, or attributing a cluster of addresses or pseudonyms to the same real world

entity.

Taking what we know so far, we can identify two main heuristics in associating addresses

together.

The first is the merging of transaction outputs, and that occurs when there are multiple inputs

to a transaction.

For example, consider Bob, who wants to buy a coffee that costs 0.05 BTC, and has two

outputs, one with 0.02 BTC and the other with 0.03 BTC.

He merges the two outputs into one that's 0.05 BTC, enough to pay for his coffee.

This is a fairly reasonable heuristic because it's often the case that outputs are merged

by the same entity.

Rarely do people conduct joint payments.

Another heuristic is that of change addresses.

Say Bob wants to buy the same 0.05 BTC coffee the next day, but only has an output worth

1 whole BTC.

Bob would send 0.05 BTC to the coffee shop, and the rest of the 0.95 BTC to himself at

a change address.

This is fairly reasonable because in looking at Bob's transaction history, one of his

two outputs must have been to a change address, unless he had purchased two items at the same

time.

And also, we could also look at whether addresses have been associated with any previous transactions.

As per best practice, change addresses are usually newly generated, so when Bob makes

the transaction to buy coffee, he would be sending his change back to an address never

before seen on the blockchain – something that we can easily identify.

In both cases, of merging transaction outputs or of change addresses, if we know that Bob

owns one address, we can guess with high confidence that Bob owns the other associated address.

So we use these two heuristics to link all these addresses to one single person.

So through this way, we could identify clusters.

We talked about heuristics.

Now we'll go over several techniques for identifying which cluster is who – linking

clusters with their real world identities.

Businesses – at least those that accept cryptocurrency payments – are outwards facing

and consumer centric, making it easy to go to an online service (such as Coinbase) and

make a transaction with them.

Since we know our own public addresses, we could simply wait for the transaction we made

to show up within a cluster, or be merged into a cluster, and that cluster would likely

be that of the business.

This tactic is called tagging by transacting.

On the other hand, there's a much more passive approach.

We could just look at the graph and infer by looking at transaction activity.

In 2013, Mt. Gox was a large part of the entire Bitcoin ecosystem, and composed much of the

entire transaction volume.

The graph to the right shows the Bitcoin transaction graph from 2013, and the purple dot towards

the right of the graph is Mt. Gox.

Similarly, SatoshiDice was a gambling site that allowed users to gamble with small denominations

of Bitcoin.

This made for many transactions, though the total transaction volume wasn't nearly comparable

to that of Mt. Gox.

So, the dot represented by SatoshiDice on the graph is very small.

However, there were a lot of transactions, so in the graph, it's easy to see that though

the transaction volume is small, the transaction frequency was quite high.

And this is true for any business or identity for which you can leverage some pre-existing

knowledge of.

If you have some leads on transaction volume or frequency or timing, then you could look

at transaction graphs and make solid linking inferences.

As for identifying individuals, there are similar ways to deanonymize them.

An easy way is to send them Bitcoin.

If you can manage to get them to reveal their address, it's not that difficult to track

them from there.

This may require some social engineering if the other party is suspicious or particularly

cautious.

Another way is to watch online activity, particularly forums.

It's possible that an individual might post their address on a forum for convenience carelessly

in order to get donations from general people or even provide services.

Anyone who is watching, however, can now link that pseudonym with any other activity.

Finally, several service providers, such as Coinalytics, offer services to deanonymize

funds obtained through illicit means, using data analytics to discover your real identity.

Taint analysis is one way of easily tracing the movement of funds through the Bitcoin

network.

Taint analysis allows one to tag a "bad" address and trace its associated activity.

It was this type of strategy that ruined Ross Ulbricht's defense by demonstrating that

a majority of his funds originated from suspicious origins.

As seen in the diagram, each of the red circles at the top represents an address with 100%

taint, meaning that it has either been denoted as a dirty address or has received all its

funds from dirty addresses.

Any other address in the Bitcoin space will have a certain amount of taint depending on

what proportion of its funds came from a dirty address.

One might think that they can circumvent getting caught by sending their tokens to a bunch

of random addresses.

However, by design of taint analysis, that won't work at all.

For more infomation >> [CS198.2x Week 5] Deanonymization - Duration: 5:51.

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PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN HAVE DIFFERENT TASTES OF BANANAS!! - Duration: 11:50.

Good morning.

We came to the Legazpi Sunday Market.

We are so hungry that we're gonna eat something.

They're rice balls.

It's Okonomiyaki.

Take a look at bean sprouts.

They're completely different from them in Japan.

They're thin.

That's amazing.

Do you want to eat Filipino food?

Taya: I'd love to.

Taya: It's good.

Fumiya: It's great.

Fumiya: Do you like it?

Fumiya: There is a big dog over there.

Taya: What a big dog.

Fumiya: It is bigger than me.

Fumiya: Which do you want to buy?

Fumiya: You should choose one.

Taya: I'll get it.

Fumiya: You can take it a banana from a bunch of bananas by hand.

Taya: Really?

Taya: It's good.

Fumiya: I don't understand because I don't like bananas.

But, I heard from Japanese that bananas in the Philippines are much more delicious than them in Japan.

So, I'm going to have Taya eat a banana today.

Taya: I have to eat it because of him😂

Fumiya: That's why, we bought a banana.

But we're eating lunch before he eats a banana.

It's the first time to eat Filipino food since I came to the Philippines this time.

It's hot.

Taya: What?

Itadakimasu.

Fumiya: It's so good.

It's super delicious.

Taya: I like it.

Fumiya: It's a bit salty, though.

Taya: Is soy sauce into it?

Fumiya: Yeah.

Taya: I didn't know that.

Fumiya: It seems like it's a Japanese food.

Taya: Right.

Fumiya: I always feel like adobo tastes like Japanese traditional dishes.

I think most Japanese people like it.

It tastes like nuts.

Kaldereta I've eaten in japan is quite different from this.

Taya: I think so too.

Taya: Shut up😂

Taya: It's good.

Fumiya: I love Adobo.

Taya: I feel like I'd keep on eating rice forever.

Fumiya: The rice is really great, isn't it?

Fumiya: I guess most of Japanese don't like rice in the Philippines because of dry.

But, I like it very much.

Taya: Really? I think Japanese also like it.

Fumiya: I've thought that Japanese are not a big fan of Thai rice.

Taya: Do you always cook rice hard?

Fumiya: That's right.

Taya: If so, you must like it.

Fumiya: I always cook rice hard like this and eat in Japan.

That's why, I love it.

Fumiya: But, Japanese rice is more beautiful.

Taya: For sure.

Taya: It tastes like very Japanese. What was this?

Fumiya: Adobo is one of the most famous traditional Filipino foods.

Do you like it?

This is a pork Adobo, but you can eat a chicken Adobo here.

I want to make Adobo at home.

Fumiya: Which do you like better Adobo or Kaldereta?

Taya: It's tough for me to choose one, but I like Adobo better.

It tastes like a Japanese food, so I'm familiar with such a taste.

Taya: I'm a bit scared to eat a banana.

Fumiya: Why?

Taya: Because how to sell bananas in the Philippines was totally different from in Japan.

Fumiya: True.

Taya: Bananas are in plastic bags at Japanese super markets.

I was surprised that bananas were on the desk directly.

That's why I'm scared.

Fumiya: But bananas are one of the most famous stuffs in the Philippines.

Taya: Yeah. In addition, we've eaten bananas from the Philippines even in Japan.

Fumiya: In fact, most of bananas which we can buy in Japan are from the Philippines.

I'm sure it's better to eat bananas here.

I've never eaten them, though😂

You should try.

Taya: It's so yellow, isn't it?

Fumiya: I'm curious about what it's like.

It looks good, but I can't try it because I don't like bananas.

So, if you eat it, I'll know whether it's good or not.

Taya: Itadakimasu.

It smells awesome.

It's really great!

Fumiya: Really?

Taya: It's excellent.

I love it.

Fumiya: Seriously?

Taya: It's the best banana I've ever eaten.

Fumiya: Is it really that good?

Taya: Yeah.

Fumiya: Is it different from Japanese one?

Taya: Basically, it's the same.

Fumiya: What's the difference?

Taya: It's softer than Japanese one.

Fumiya: It's ripe, isn't it?

Taya: It seems like it hasn't been a long time since they picked the bananas.

This is the difference between here and in Japan.

Fumiya: Bananas in the Philippines can grow well thanks to the sunlight.

Taya: Yeah. That's why, it's ripe perfectly.

Fumiya: Its color is really different from bananas we can see in Japan.

Taya: Do you want to eat?

Fumiya: No thanks.

Taya: Why?

Fumiya: I don't want it.

Taya: I think people who are not fond of bananas like you can eat it.

Fumiya: I don't think so because it's just a banana.

No way.

Taya: Its taste is really different from bananas you ate before in Japan.

Fumiya: I definitely can't eat it.

Taya: Why?

Fumiya: It's an authentic banana.

Taya: Do you mean it tastes stronger?

Fumiya: Exactly.

Taya: Well, you should have a bite.

Fumiya: No thanks.

Taya: Why not?

Taya: It tastes really great.

Fumiya: It tastes not good😂

Taya: Don't you feel it's good?

Fumiya: It tastes strong.

And it's soft.

Fumiya: I don't want anymore.

Fumiya: I don't like some fruits, so please give me a break.

Taya: I love it.

Fumiya: I'm willing to eat Balut, but I don't want to eat fruits.

He finished eating all.

Taya: Gochisosamadesita.

Fumiya: We had a great time.

Fumiya: How was it? Do you like the banana?

Taya: The taste still lingers on my tongue.

Fumiya: It's a rich banana taste, isn't it?

Taya: Yeah.

Fumiya: We're gonna go to some places in the Philippines after this.

We want to eat some foods and experience many cultures.

I'm sure you'll like the Philippines.

For more infomation >> PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN HAVE DIFFERENT TASTES OF BANANAS!! - Duration: 11:50.

-------------------------------------------

你想像不到的印尼...【就是這樣拍】 - Duration: 9:31.

Chang-Yong: good morning

Chang-Yong: we just slept for one and half hours yesterday

Chang-Yong: now we are waiting for the bus

Chang-Yong: can you see the bus behind me? can you? can you?

Chang-Yong: we will get to the top of the mountain and see the sunrise later

Shu-Sen: it's really weary

Chang-Yong: being spiritual and young

Shu-Sen: we are going to climb now

Shu-Sen: for approximately thirty minutes

Shu-Sen: ah, very nice

Chang-Yong: everybody, I didn't think of that we have to climb

Chang-Yong: we are exhausted

Shu-Sen: we've climbed within five minutes

Chang-Yong: slope

Chang-Yong: see the behind

Chang-Yong: they run the store so early

Chang-Yong: Selamat pagi (good morning)

Clerk: good morning, do you want some coffee?

Chang-Yong: ok, next time, next time

Chang-Yong: thank you

Chang-Yong: this is just the entrance

Chang-Yong: we have to climb up to the mountain from here

Chang-Yong: actually I am thinking that whether there's someone else or not

Chang-Yong: the result is there are tons of people than my expectation

Chang-Yong: Pei Yong, Chen

Shu-Sen: he will scold on you

Chang-Yong: I come from the mountain, with two knives

Chang-Yong: there are tons of stairs

Chang-Yong: I forgot to tell you that

Chang-Yong: there are not only us travelling

Chang-Yong: we travel with Singaporean, Australian and Indonesian

Chang-Yong: so there are four sets of people travelling together

Chang-Yong: see here?

Chang-Yong: I don't know what the conception is

Chang-Yong: it's like a horrible gate

Chang-Yong: but actually those are umbrellas, do you know that?

Shu-Sen: we are here!

Chang-Yong: take a look, they are umbrellas

Chang-Yong: we are finally here

Chang-Yong: then it's earlier than 5 a.m. now

Chang-Yong: there are people taking pictures here

Chang-Yong: they even bring tripod

Chang-Yong: it's a tourist attraction for watching sunrise especially

Chang-Yong: usually I should sleep at home now

Chang-Yong: actually this mountain is only four hundred meters tall

Chang-Yong: it's not tall enough, but not short as well

Chang-Yong: then we are just waiting for the sunrise

Chang-Yong: we will use this angle later

Chang-Yong: because photos won't include other people and will be more beautiful

Chang-Yong: yeah, the sky is getting lighter

Chang-Yong: but there's no sign of sunrise still

Chang-Yong: and it's so early now

Chang-Yong: there are lots of people here

Chang-Yong: one, two, three

Chang-Yong: sun's going to rise, are you excited or not?

Shu-Sen: excited

Chang-Yong: you just slept for an hour, are you excited or not?

Shu-Sen: so excited!

Chang-Yong: Chang-Yong helps you to take pictures, are you excited or not?

Shu-Sen: so e-x-c-i-t-e-d.

Chang-Yong: unfortunately, everybody

Chang-Yong: sunrise here, won't show up everyday

Chang-Yong: so no one can guarantee that you can see sunrise here everyday

Chang-Yong: today!

fortunately,

we didn't see the sunrise

Chang-Yong: because there are lots of clouds

Chang-Yong: so we just take a photo

Chang-Yong: this photo is without sunrise, but still beautiful

Chang-Yong: then I find out that there's a more beautiful attraction

Chang-Yong: let's head to there now

Chang-Yong: actually there are many places for taking pictures

Chang-Yong: you see that like strange spots or swing and so on

Chang-Yong: behind me, there's a cliff simulation (what's cliff simulation..)

Chang-Yong: then I think the background is pretty beautiful

Chang-Yong: with lots of mountains

Chang-Yong: lots of clouds

Chang-Yong: lots of trees

Chang-Yong: there will be a handsome guy later

Shu-Sen: directly see there

Shu-Sen: there are clouds layer by layer

Shu-Sen: super beautiful

She-Sen: but you have to see it directly

Chang-Yong: it's not tall enough, but not short as well

Chang-Yong: it's kinda scary

Chang-Yong: let's take photos

Chang-Yong: everybody, it's really tall here

Chang-Yong: wow, super high

Shu-Sen: we are going to take pictures here

Shu-Sen: feels like it's pretty good

Chang-Yong: Is it good, Shu-Sen?

Shu-Sen: it's still terrifying, I think

Chang-Yong: everybody, it's more beautiful

Chang-Yong: because there are more clouds behind

Shu-Sen: fake smile

Shu-Sen: big smile

Shu-Sen: you have to be exaggerated, super exaggerated

Shu-Sen: see,

Shu-Sen: he's really fake

Chang-Yong: what?

Chang-Yong: great, we finished taking photos here

Chang-Yong: yeah, everybody

Shu-Sen: easily recognize that it's the voice of just waking up

Chang-Yong: we just slept for an hour

Chang-Yong: now we are going to Borobudur Temple

Shu-Sen: my armpit feels hot, all my body feels hot as well

Chang-Yong: the girls who have purple hairs and yellow pants

Chang-Yong: they are from Singapore

Girl: why, hey~

Chang-Yong: yeah, we arrive at the entrance

Chang-Yong: now we have to climb up to the mountains

Chang-Yong: Shu-Sen fighting!

Chang-Yong: Hanggini from Indonesia

Chang-Yong: ok, get out, get out

Chang-Yong: tour guide said that it's the most appropriate place for taking pictures

Chang-Yong: although I think it's not good enough

Chang-Yong: but we can still hear from others' opinions

Chang-Yong: let's try to take some pictures

Chang-Yong: then there are people everywhere

Chang-Yong: I have no ideas how to remove them

Chang-Yong: as the picture

Chang-Yong: the pictures you see are beautiful, people behind are pretty small

Chang-Yong: but

Chang-Yong: there are too many tourists

Shu-Sen: I think if you want to be more obvious than tourists

Shu-Sen: you have to wear brighter clothes

Chang-Yong: but it's ok, I will do my utmost to photoshop

Chang-Yong: now we are gotta find some places that not so many tourists there

Chang-Yong: the Borobudur Temple we are right now

Chang-Yong: is the biggest temple throughout the world

Chang-Yong: then, it's pretty old

Chang-Yong: and how many years exactly, should be pretty long

Shu-Sen: what the.. what are you talking about

Chang-Yong: oh my god, so many people here

Chang-Yong: the stairs are so oblique

Shu-Sen: see that? these rocks

Shu-Sen: ancient people with those poultry cattle

Shu-Sen: slowly moved the rock one by one

Chang-Yong: I finally get the answer

Chang-Yong: I just asked the tour guide

Chang-Yong: this temple has over 1300 years history

equals to how many of Chang-Yong

Chang-Yong: let's count, 1300 years

Chang-Yong: ok, fine, I can't count

Chang-Yong: all in all, it's been a long time

Shu-Sen: it's like you've been to hell for many times

Shu-Sen: I think it's good-looking, you see

Shu-Sen: its grains are very delicate, let's try to take a picture

Shu-Sen: it's really great, right?

Shu-Sen: it's really unfortunate that I wear black clothes today

Chang-Yong: everybody

Chang-Yong: I think that

Chang-Yong: taking pictures from the bottom of stairs

Chang-Yong: actually it's great as well

Chang-Yong: let's try to take a picture

Chang-Yong: because it's really sunny now

Chang-Yong: then we have to take photos

Chang-Yong: also have to block the sun, here's the most appropriate

Chang-Yong: is that beautiful to take pictures here?

Chang-Yong: no matter where it is, if it's one thousand and three hundred year-old rock, the photos must be perfect

Shu-Sen: the stairs here are really oblique, can you understand?

Shu-Sen: it's not according to the size

Chang-Yong: it's really oblique, you see

Chang-Yong: if you fall down, you will be at the bottom of the mountain

Chang-Yong: wow, we are going to arrive at the top

Chang-Yong: I have to remind you guys that

Chang-Yong: if you come here, you have to wear sunscreen

Shu-Sen: the sunlight shoots directly, and there's no Shields

Shu-Sen: we are at the top of the Borobudur temple

Shu-Sen: then you can make wishes or anything else

Shu-Sen: let's turn around

Shu-Sen: we finished, do you find that there are lots of people here

Shu-Sen: we are at the top, it's hard to take photos of its beauty

Shu-Sen: so I think it's the best place to take photos

Shu-Sen: just the photos that we just took

Shu-Sen: by doing so, you won't take photos of many people

Chang-Yong: now we are leaving the Borobudur temple

Chang-Yong: we are going to the next spot

Chang-Yong: we are really in a rush

Chang-Yong: but it's fine

Chang-Yong: I've done my utmost to take the best photos for you

Chang-Yong: actually when our bus stopped, I saw somewhere would make photos perfect

Chang-Yong: if it wouldn't, I will castrate myself

Shu-Sen: alright, you can castrate yourself, no matter what, I will say it's not perfect

Chang-Yong: I don't want to say

Chang-Yong: but there are sands everywhere

Chang-Yong: photos must be perfect

Chang-Yong: or I will leave my pen*s here

Chang-Yong: like the scenes in many MVs

Chang-Yong: do you see the swing in front of us?

Chang-Yong: it's the place where I think will make photos perfect

there are mountains and sky behind

how can it not be pretty?

Chang-Yong: it's not like my expectation

Chang-Yong: seems like I have to leave my pen*s in Indonesia

Chang-Yong: the photo isn't like what we see

Chang-Yong: but we will try out utmost to make it the best

Chang-Yong: let's take the photo first

Chang-Yong: all in all

Chang-Yong: it's not bad to take photos here

Chang-Yong: yeah, I can keep my pen*s

Chang-Yong: because there's a swing on this beach

so there's a feeling that something different

Shu-Sen: what the ..

Chang-Yong: ah, it's really hurt

Chang-Yong: ah

Shu-Sen: you deserve it

we just bought some Batik products

Chang-Yong: we immediately changed our clothes

Chang-Yong: then the place we are now

Chang-Yong: I'm lazy to pronounce the name

Chang-Yong: you can just take a look

Chang-Yong: it's a place that you can take photos and check in

Chang-Yong: we will take a series of photos here

Chang-Yong: actually I was worried about there would be lots of people

Chang-Yong: because I searched on the Internet

Chang-Yong: I saw others' photos, there were many people

Chang-Yong: it's fortunate that there are not so many people here

Chang-Yong: I'm not really good at Malay

Chang-Yong: I know that 'Aman' means 'peace', 'Bersih' means 'clean'

Chang-Yong: 'Sejuk' means 'cold', 'Indah' means 'beautiful'

Chang-Yong: what's 'Raman'?

Chang-Yong: what's Kenangan'? I feel it's familiar

Shu-Sen: I think it will be beautiful if taking pictures from this intersection

Shu-Sen: trees in the middle

Chang-Yong: awesome, that's the photo

Chang-Yong: but I don't like the grass nearby

Chang-Yong: but there's no way

Chang-Yong: that's the intersection

Chang-Yong: then I see a special building in front of us

Chang-Yong: this is the building

Chang-Yong: it's really special

Chang-Yong: feels like it's the specialty of this mountain

Chang-Yong: let's go to take a photo

Chang-Yong: let's go

Chang-Yong: there's a tip of taking photos

Chang-Yong: just imitate how others taking photos

Chang-Yong: and change a little bit, then you can take photos

Chang-Yong: then we can try less angles

Chang-Yong: I just saw Grace standing outside

Chang-Yong: then we can just stand outside and take photos

Chang-Yong: everybody, because the color of this clothe is as same as the forest

Chang-Yong: so I plan to change my clothe, wearing Shu-Sen's

Chang-Yong: after taking photos from outside, I think Shu-Sen needs to take a photo as well

Shu-Sen: I want to sit

Shu-Sen: is it good?

Chang-Yong: everybody sees Shu-Sen's butt

Shu-Sen: tell you that it's Lin Xuan's pants

Shu-Sen: she won't blame on me

Chang-Yong: there's a tip of taking photos, just follow aunts

Chang-Yong: our auntie is up there, then we just follow her

auntie: hey, younger man, you have to be careful when you go up

auntie: you will fall down

Chang-Yong: ok, mommy

auntie: mommy almost falls down

Chang-Yong: if you fall down, you will die

Chang-Yong: the auntie from Singapore

Chang-Yong: they said that the scenery up there was not good

Chang-Yong: we will make it the best and show them

Chang-Yong: oh my god, everybody

Chang-Yong: actually it's really high here

Chang-Yong: you can see the entire forest here

Chang-Yong: so high

Chang-Yong: Shu-Sen, don't sit there

Chang-Yong: I feel so scared when I see this

Chang-Yong: you see, how tall it is

Shu-Sen: I think if you use a high angle, you can take photos of trees behind

Shu-Sen: like side by side with me, I think it will be awesome

Shu-Sen: everybody, just see he's afraid of losing

Shu-Sen: everybody, he's really afraid, just see him

Chang-Yong: then I have to be natural

Shu-Sen: you have to be professional, very..

Chang-Yong: ah, there's a sound

Chang-Yong: after take photos of this scary place

Chang-Yong: it's really high

Chang-Yong: you see my feet

Chang-Yong: watching down, my leg will be soft

Chang-Yong: everybody, everybody, we find a super high place

Chang-Yong: can see the whole Jogjakarta

Chang-Yong: wow, it's super high

Chang-Yong: I think we can just take a selfie here

Chang-Yong: we have to get on the bus now

Chang-Yong: then that's it for this place

For more infomation >> 你想像不到的印尼...【就是這樣拍】 - Duration: 9:31.

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A Blasfêmia contra o Espírito Santo - Duration: 1:53.

For more infomation >> A Blasfêmia contra o Espírito Santo - Duration: 1:53.

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墨鏡送你們...【常勇的日常】 - Duration: 14:37.

Chang-Yong: hello, guy

Chang-Yong: we've not taken a bath for over thirty hours

Chang-Yong: it's 12:31, we just arrived at the hotel

Chang-Yong: we really took the plane for the entire day

Chang-Yong: we are finally here, the hotel next to Borobudur, Indonesia

Chang-Yong: during the five days

Chang-Yong: Cai tour guide will show you the best places for fun in Indonesia

Chang-Yong: I will show you where you can take perfect photos in Indonesia

Chang-Yong: except taking photos, we also have some challenges

Chang-Yong: and what are the challenges exactly, you will know then

Chang-Yong: good night

Chang-Yong: it's unaccountable that after we got off the bus

Chang-Yong: we are going to take the carriage

Chang-Yong: hello

Chang-Yong: wow, taking the carriage

Chang-Yong: thank you for driving us

Chang-Yong: yeah, have local lunch

Chang-Yong: Shu-Sen, take more and more

Chang-Yong: now we are going to do a challenge

Chang-Yong: making the batik

Chang-Yong: so we just have to do coloring and design

Chang-Yong: let's start it right away

Chang-Yong: now you have to choose the design you want

Shu-Sen: the people like us who aren't good at drawing

Shu-Sen: have to choose this

Chang-Yong: this is our teacher today

Chang-Yong: she's going to teach us how to make batik

Chang-Yong: first step, you have to put a newspaper on your legs

Chang-Yong: actually you have to put the wax which I don't know what it is on these things

Chang-Yong: to help it make the outline clear

Chang-Yong: Shu-Sen, is it easy?

Shu-Sen: seems like it's easy, but it's really hard

Chang-Yong: make the outline clear x3

Chang-Yong: seems like this pen is kinda thick

Chang-Yong: then this is quite small

Shu-Sen: it's really ugly, why can you just write 'cy'

Chang-Yong: everybody, I finished

Chang-Yong: my Phoenix

Chang-Yong: I accidentally made the fast one (finishing the batik)

Chang-Yong: so they are like turtles

Chang-Yong: still making the outline clear

Chang-Yong: after it, we are going to do coloring

Chang-Yong: I choose blue

Chang-Yong: I finally know that why we have to make the outline clear

Chang-Yong: the whole cloth will become the color you choose

Chang-Yong: then the outline you make won't be dyed

Chang-Yong: so making the outline clear is really vital

Chang-Yong: the outline I make is really like a poop

Chang-Yong: but it's one of my characteristic

Chang-Yong: this is the final version Shu-Sen: it's very ugly

Chang-Yong: I'm considering that whether we should send it to the audience or not

who wants this, who wants this

Shu-Sen: this is trash, it will be littered Chang-Yong: welcome to commend below

Chang-Yong: do you want it? Shu-Sen: it will be littered after growing up

Chang-Yong: do you want it?

Chang-Yong: oh, she's thinking

do you want me to help you?

Singaporean: no, I know your level by seeing the chicken you drew

Chang-Yong: I'm such a kind person

Singaporean: it's a chicken without pimples

Chang-Yong: can you hurry up?

Chang-Yong: yeah, we are going to the next process, do the coloring

Chang-Yong: the trip of batik design

Chang-Yong: it's ended

Chang-Yong: because it's in the process

Chang-Yong: so this thing

Chang-Yong: we can't get it today

Chang-Yong: everybody, there's a very special activity today

Shu-Sen: you can't even say it Chang-Yong: just a boat floating on the river

Chang-Yong: we have to take the boat with aunties

Chang-Yong: hope they won't be seasick or anything else

Chang-Yong: do you take the pills for seasickness?

Singaporean: no

Chang-Yong: in the age like you, you should take it

Singaporean: you know that we are aunties, we've taken the pills for seasickness, menstruation and pregnancy

Chang-Yong: now we are going to choose the life jacket and hat

Chang-Yong: I'm so thin, I should take the small one

I want the blue one

Chang-Yong: I mentioned that she's during her period from yesterday

Chang-Yong: then she can't touch the water

Shu-Sen: this is thing I look forward to the most, but I can't play it in the end

Chang-Yong: hope that they can make me wet

Chang-Yong: so we are going to play on the boat in elo river

Shu-Sen: really silly

Chang-Yong: I'm ready

Shu-Sen: hurry up

Chang-Yong: finished

Chang-Yong: can you swim?

Singaporean: yep

Chang-Yong: great, you have to save me later, auntie

Chang-Yong: I can't swim Shu-Sen: he can't swim

Singaporean: if you call me auntie again, I won't rescue you later

Singaporean: what can you call me?

Chang-Yong: sister

Chang-Yong: for my safety

Chang-Yong: I have to lie first

Shu-Sen: so I have to take care of everyone's bag

Shu-Sen: I'm a locker

Shu-Sen: eh, you have to pay for lockers

Chang-Yong: bye, Shu-Sen

Chang-Yong: are you guys ready?

Chang-Yong: let's encourage for each other

Chang-Yong: Shu-Sen's not here, we have to hang on, one, two, three, fighting!

Chang-Yong: the river now is not turbulent now

Chang-Yong: It's not terrifying

Chang-Yong: are you guys ready?

Chang-Yong: we are ready

Chang-Yong: go, go, go

Chang-Yong: Sylvia, Sylvia

Chang-Yong: you are like taking the broom

Chang-Yong: everybody, we are going to aboard

Chang-Yong: I'm here

Chang-Yong: I think that we will be sitting inside

Chang-Yong: the answer is we have to sit here

Chang-Yong: let's start our journey on board

wow, so beautiful

Chang-Yong: the river now is dead

Chang-Yong: nothing happened

Chang-Yong: ok, come on, let's go

Singaporean: turn right, you have to row

Chang-Yong: go, go, go

Chang-Yong: it's soso x2

Chang-Yong: we are stuck

Chang-Yong: we are stuck

local person: if everybody swims, I swim

Chang-Yong: ugh.. I swim you swim

local person: together? Chang-Yong: yep, together

Chang-Yong: wow, it's deep

Singaporean: I tell you that, if I fall down in the river, I will hit you

Singaporean: I will hit you for sure

Chang-Yong: everybody, I played from rowing a boat to swimming

Chang-Yong: then this river is five meters deep (I said five meters tall, what the ..)

Chang-Yong: the river should be very dirty

Chang-Yong: I didn't see anything

Chang-Yong: eh, hurry up

Chang-Yong: I swim faster than you

Chang-Yong: it's hard to get on the boat

Singaporean: is your skin itchy?

Chang-Yong: we are stuck here

Chang-Yong: yeah, finally we can move

Chang-Yong: I'm going to the river again, everybody

Chang-Yong: why the river is so cold

Chang-Yong: you feel awesome on the boat

Chang-Yong: I don't know why we row for half

Chang-Yong: we have to get off the boat

Chang-Yong: right, Grace

Chang-Yong: have you seen the ducks?

Chang-Yong: hello

Chang-Yong: they all run away

Chang-Yong: REST AREA

Chang-Yong: the freshest coconut water

Chang-Yong: ah, awesome, awesome

Chang-Yong: now we are going to continue our journey

Chang-Yong: I'm going to fall

Singaporean: you do it on purpose

Chang-Yong: every time we run into something

Chang-Yong: I'm exhausted

Chang-Yong: we can finally leave

Chang-Yong: spray x3

Chang-Yong: I drink a lot

(FOCUS ON Slyvia)

Chang-Yong: so suddenly

Chang-Yong: why you don't fall down, damned it

Chang-Yong: yeah, we are finally here

Chang-Yong: finish ten kilometers

a trip for about two hours

Chang-Yong: we are now at Taman Gumuk Pasir

Chang-Yong: it's for sand boarding

Chang-Yong: what's sand boarding?

Chang-Yong: it's playing board on sands

Chang-Yong: it's a great explanation, I will give myself a big hand

Chang-Yong: now let's take our board

Chang-Yong: there are many sizes

Chang-Yong: which one is better?

Chang-Yong: OK, I will take this one

Chang-Yong: yeah, we got the board

Shu-Sen: you are shameful

Chang-Yong: it should be the problem of board, he changes one for me

Chang-Yong: oh, it's easy

Chang-Yong: what are you laughing?

Chang-Yong: what are you laughing?

Chang-Yong: it's really tired to climb up

Chang-Yong: so horrifying

Chang-Yong: Shu-Sen are you ready?

Shu-Sen: what the ..

Shu-Sen: I want to play again

Chang-Yong: why it won't go down

Chang-Yong: it's easy to play with bare feet

Chang-Yong: I'm weary

Chang-Yong: let's go, Shu-Sen

Shu-Sen: to show you that I'm better than you

Chang-Yong: because we are good at it now

Chang-Yong: so we can go to play a faster and higher place

Chang-Yong: wow, it's really high

Chang-Yong: What the

Chang-Yong: I think to run up

Chang-Yong: it's the most tired part

Chang-Yong: like the treadmill, you know?

Chang-Yong: There are three countries participating in the competition

Chang-Yong: This person is from Australia, this is from Malaysia and this is from Singapore

Chang-Yong: let's see who's the stablest one and get to the end

Chang-Yong: three, two, one, go

Chang-Yong: ok, all fail

Chang-Yong: Shu-Sen, why you fell down so fast?

Chang-Yong: ok, I shouldn't fall down again

Shu-Sen: wow, you almost succeed

Chang-Yong: almost!

Shu-Sen: now we are trying to sit

Shu-Sen: wait!

Shu-Sen: mommy~~~~

Shu-Sen: too scary

Chang-Yong: oh my god

F1, F1 (Formula 1)

Chang-Yong: are you ready?

Singaporean: I can't !

Singaporean: ah, I can't do this!

Singaporean: ah, no, no

Chang-Yong: the last time

Chang-Yong: ah, I stand until the end

Chang-Yong: so tired

Chang-Yong: I can only say that it's really fun, but too tired

Chang-Yong: taking the board and climbing up are the most tired part

Chang-Yong: we all play at the same time

Chang-Yong: finally

Chang-Yong: one, two, three

Chang-Yong: everybody, I'm going to challenge them

Chang-Yong: because they are acrobatic athletes, and they are awesome for sure

Chang-Yong: so I want to challenge them by back flip

Chang-Yong: Sam and Teagan

Chang-Yong: I want to challenge you two

Chang-Yong: can you guys do the back flip challenge?

Chang-Yong: they said that they can do it right now

Shu-Sen: thank you

Shu-Sen: in my opinion, I think their motions are beautiful than you

Shu-Sen: stop showing with swagger, alright?

Chang-Yong: today, we are at the most famous attraction in Yogyakarta

Chang-Yong: Malioboro street

Chang-Yong: there are lots of batiks here

Chang-Yong: because yesterday, October 2nd, is Nation Batik Day

Chang-Yong: so today we are here to buy batiks

Chang-Yong: there's a challenge here as well

Chang-Yong: they give us Rp fifty thousand respectively

Chang-Yong: each of us has to buy one batik

Chang-Yong: and it depends on our ability of bargain

Chang-Yong: and they said that

Chang-Yong: when you come to Yogyakarta

Chang-Yong: if you don't come to Malioboro Street

Chang-Yong: you can't say that you've been here

Chang-Yong: let's go to buy batik right away

Chang-Yong: let's go

Chang-Yong: why it's so expensive

Chang-Yong: it costs one hundred and seventy thousand

Chang-Yong: one hundred and twenty thousand

Chang-Yong: seventy thousand

Chang-Yong: there's no cheaper one? Ninety thousand

Chang-Yong: I think that if I take a batik which costs one hundred and seventy thousand, and asking the clerk to minus fifty thousand is impossible

Chang-Yong: you have to use your brain to bargain

so we should find one which costs seventy thousand or ninety thousand, and make it only cost fifty thousand

Chang-Yong: I finally understand that why they only give us fifty thousand to buy a batik

Chang-Yong: because the cheapest one I see costs seventy thousand

Chang-Yong: so we have to bargain

Chang-Yong: slowly choose, let you choose

Chang-Yong: do you find something you want, Shu-Sen?

Shu-Sen: No~

Chang-Yong: we leave that store

Chang-Yong: seems like it's superior

Chang-Yong: so the batiks inside are

Chang-Yong: super expensive

Chang-Yong: we have to find the cheap ones, so just continue to look for

Chang-Yong: eh, do you find the cheap ones?

Chang-Yong: ok, they buy batiks here, so let's follow them

Chang-Yong: this should be the cheap ones

Chang-Yong: let's go to next store

Chang-Yong: because the choices there are less

Chang-Yong: yeah, she gives me fifty thousand more

Chang-Yong: so it changes to each of us has to find a batik which costs about Rp seventy thousand

Chang-Yong: then it's ok

Chang-Yong: basically we just have to bargain a little

Chang-Yong: the batiks of this zone cost Rp 79900

Chang-Yong: we have to try to make it only cost Rp 75000

Chang-Yong: do you think this one is ok?

Shu-Sen: I think this one is kinda special

Chang-Yong: just see what I wear that you will know that I love blue

Chang-Yong: so I want to choose a blue one

Chang-Yong: due to the budget

Chang-Yong: so Shu-Sen gives up the batik which costs Rp 90000

Chang-Yong: I recommend her to buy the same one with me

Chang-Yong: what can we do, Shu-Sen? we can't bargain with the clerk

Chang-Yong: hurry up, utilizing your beauty

Shu-Sen: sister~

Shu-Sen: I dance for you~

Shu-Sen: can you offer me?

Shu-Sen: she insists, what can I do?

Shu-Sen: I can't find a way to get out of this

Chang-Yong: now we use the other way to bargain

Chang-Yong: we four buy together

Chang-Yong: because Slyvia and her friend

Chang-Yong: they have to buy more for videos

Chang-Yong: so we can seize the chance and get counts together

Chang-Yong: let's see how they bargain

Singaporean: what's this?

Chang-Yong: only Slyvia's still bargaining

Chang-Yong: because she's the oldest one

Chang-Yong: so she's supposed to be good at bargaining

Chang-Yong: actually I think up a way

Chang-Yong: my way is that

Chang-Yong: pay my own 10000 money to buy

Chang-Yong: because she insists there's no count

Chang-Yong: our bargain

Chang-Yong: Succeed!

Shu-Sen: succeed! yeah~

Chang-Yong: just give over 10000 more, succeed

Chang-Yong: that's it for Malioboro Street

Chang-Yong: yeah, we are in the airport of Yogyakarta

Chang-Yong: we will go back to Taiwan later

Chang-Yong: this is the last day in Indonesia

Chang-Yong: then the dinner yesterday

in our four countries, Singapore got the first prize

Chang-Yong: the rest of us just got the prize of comfort

Chang-Yong: now let you see what 's the prize of comfort

Chang-Yong: ok, actually this prize of comfort

Chang-Yong: there's hand-made batik inside

Chang-Yong: like other people spent couple of hours to make this to us

Chang-Yong: then everyone gets a souvenir in the end

Chang-Yong: it's s eco-friendly bag

Shu-Sen: this is a cup

Shu-Sen: where it is?

Chang-Yong: all in all, it's a cup

Chang-Yong: there's a clothe inside

Chang-Yong: it's like the memorial clothes I will buy when I go to other countries

Chang-Yong: basically, that's it

Shu-Sen: do you know what's the prize we get?

Host: the most funny team was Malaysia

Chang-Yong: in the end

Chang-Yong: thanks 'Wonderful Indonesia' arranging such a great journey for us

Chang-Yong: except this video

Chang-Yong: you can also see the behind-the-scene video in persona Indonesia's channel

Chang-Yong: like the scenes you won't see in this video

I will put the link in the description

Chang-Yong: participate in Wonderful Indonesia to win some prizes

Shu-Sen: yeah~ you can win the same prize like us

Chang-Yong: in the end~

Chang-Yong: do you still remember that we made the batiks?

Chang-Yong: we've got our own batiks

Shu-Sen: do you see that? It's mine

Chang-Yong: do you see that, everybody?

Chang-Yong: there are lots of chickenpox on my phoenix

Shu-Sen: but no one calls it phoenix, they call it chicken

Chang-Yong: I don't know why they mistook phoenix for chicken

Chang-Yong: we are going to send these two batiks to you

Chang-Yong: I don't know that whether there's someone who wants this

Shu-Sen: I think no one will want them

Chang-Yong: if you want this batik

Chang-Yong: remember to comment below

Chang-Yong: it's hand-made

Chang-Yong: no matter which country, we will send it to you, bye~

Shu-Sen: without paying for the stamp

For more infomation >> 墨鏡送你們...【常勇的日常】 - Duration: 14:37.

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21 TOP SECRET Style Tools - Are You Packing These Stylish Items? | RMRS Style Videos - Duration: 10:01.

Secret Style Tools Every Man Needs [0:00:00]

So, I need to ask, do you have the right security clearance?

Because in today's video, top secret style tools that every man needs to have in his

closet.

[Music] First up on my list, edge dressing.

So, you don't know what edge dressing is?

Okay.

You spend a lot of time shining cleaning up your boots, but the side of the boots right

here on the sole, it still looks bad.

It just got discoloration, happens over time.

You apply some edge dressing, all of a sudden it looks like new.

That is the power of edge dressing.

Next up, let's talk about sole protectors.

So, the way that I walk with my dress shoes when I put miles on, I start to basically

tear on the edge of the sole.

This could have been stopped this could have been prevented if I would have used a very

inexpensive sole protector.

Basically, they're going to tuck right in and they add a layer of protection so that

you don't have this happen to your expensive shoes and then you've got to get them resoled

and rebuilt.

Next up, let's talk about sole grips.

I love a leather sole, but I love the traction that I get with a rubber sole.

However, I have a lot of leather shoes and we get inclement weather here, I am going

to slip and fall unless you use something like a sole grip.

And that basically goes right here on the base of the shoe and gives you more traction.

But, it may not be enough for some of you guys, so know that actually you could take

a rubber sole and attach it to a leather sole using a cement added basically adhesive that's

made specifically for that and that could work and get you through a winter.

Next up, we've got the button extender and that's for that dress shirt that you haven't

worn for awhile.

When you go to button that top button to wear a necktie and you realize this thing has shrunk

in the collar.

No, you probably gained a little bit of weight, but in any case, you need half an inch.

A button extender is going to give you that extra half inch so you can button it and wear

that necktie.

Next, we've got the emergency sewing kit.

So, my hack here, every time I check into a hotel, I ask for the emergency sewing kit.

They've got ones that they're just going to give you.

You get to take it with you and what's nice here, you've got needles you've got thread

you've got buttons.

Everything you need to do an emergency sewing operation.

Colored shoelaces, it's a fun and easy way to add life into an old pair of shoes.

Next up, let's talk about a nice electronic razor that's compatible with wet shaving

so much better than dry shaving.

So, guys, if you've got an electric razor and it has that capability, give it a shot.

Next up, let's talk about neutral polish.

This is going to have no dye in it, it can be used on any color of shoes.

So, this is great when you're traveling and you've got black, maybe you've got

oxblood together or maybe you, you know, you like the light brown with the black, you actually

only have to take one polish with you to get the job done.

So, the next secret weapon in staying stylish, gentlemen, the shirt stay.

I've talked about this before, this company right here KKandJay, the paid sponsor of today's

video.

I have worked with them for a long time because they make an amazing tool, not only does it

keep your socks up, but it keeps your shirt tucked in all day.

It doesn't matter what you're – in fact, you want to see an example?

Check this out.

I could jump up and do a set of pull ups.

I know, I probably could have knocked out a hundred.

This is why I love KKandJay, whatever you're doing in the office doesn't matter, your

shirt is going to stay tucked in, it's going to stay looking good.

Guys, military and law enforcement have been using shirt stays for years to maintain a

professional appearance while they've got to move around.

So, if you're moving around the office and your shirt is coming untuck and you're tucking

it in multiple times a day, this is going to solve your problems.

Free shipping, free returns, handmade in the United States, and a satisfaction guarantee.

Guys, I'm linking to KKandJay down in the description of this video with the best deal

you're going to find out there.

Use it or lose it, guys.

I absolutely love this company, I know the founders, and I love what they stand for helping

you dress better and be more confident.

Next up, let's talk about sleeve garters.

A little bit old-fashioned, but they can be useful actually to roll up your sleeves and

if your sleeves are too long, they can help get rid of some of the excess material.

The next top secret tool for a well-dressed man, the right hanger for the right job.

So, a suit hanger, it's going to have a bar going across for your trousers and the

width right here is going to be perfect for your shoulders.

You do not want to go with a thin shirt hanger.

Why?

Because that's going to deform the shoulders on a suit and there's not bar to hang your

trousers.

This right here, it's a jacket hanger it's made out of plastic which is fine.

But, notice, it's got that right here, this is great for a leather jacket not so much

for a suit, it doesn't have the bar.

The next top secret tool, a steam-resistant shower mirror.

What's nice about this is if you're in a hurry, you've got to shave in the shower,

you're not going to miss any spots and you're less likely to cut yourself.

So, the next top secret tool, a good iron.

Now, this iron right here is pretty good, but this iron is amazing.

How can I tell the difference?

It's all about the base plate.

So, if you look at the base plate here, you're going to see a lot more holes than you're

going to see here.

This is all about the steam function and the quality.

Now, a good iron is sometimes going to cost three times more than an average iron, but

if it's something that you take care of your clothing, you want to make the investment.

[0:04:57] The next top secret tool of stylish men, they

invest in nice little cases that protect their other tools.

So, this protective case right here, protects a disposable razor.

It doesn't seem like much, but a disposable razor if the blades are bent, this can really

jack-up your face.

And, it's not just razors, whenever you go to buy something, make sure it comes with

a nice little case that protects it because whenever you drop it whenever you want you've

got things that you would lose, you keep them right in the case.

I think it's worth paying a little bit of extra for an item for a tool that comes with

its own protective case.

Next up, we've got liquid stitch and I'm going to throw in super glue as well.

So, whenever you've got a small tear, you've got a loose thread, you've got something

coming undone, you can use liquid stitch to stop it in its track.

Now, what's interesting is you can also do that on super glue and you can simply just,

again, that loose thread just put some super glue on it and all of a sudden, you don't

have to worry about it unthreading.

Mr. Clean Magic Eraser, this is great for any type of white shoe or sneaker.

So, use that Mr. Clean Magic Eraser and it basically is a bit of an abrasive and it's

going to go in there and it's going to get rid of any of those stains.

It does a great job.

There are also suede erasers.

So, if you've got suede shoes, you've got to get the tools which are going to protect

them and take care of them.

And let's talk about the top secret tool to protect your footwear.

What you want to find is a solution that you can put on your shoes that has hydrophobic.

Hydrophobic means that it's going to push away the water.

Now, anything with a wax base is going to be great is going to do a good job of keeping

and creating a layer of protection on the shoe.

But, what if you got shoes made from a lighter colored leather or maybe a leather that's

a bit more delicate.

In that case, always make sure to test whatever product you put on them on the tongue of the

shoes to see if it discolors at all.

And, silicone, those sprays are actually pretty good as long as you apply after every couple

of wears.

They do wear off very quickly.

Next up, let's talk about the shoetree.

Not only a top secret, but a tool that most men do not use and that's too bad because

when you use a shoetree, you actually maintain the shape of the shoe which you can lose its

shape after every wear.

But, all of a sudden you put that shoetree and it's going to maintain the shape of

the shoe and they're going to last a lot longer.

Next up, we've got the shoe horn.

The point of the shoe horn is when you put your shoes on, you do not damage this back

heel area.

This is just going to prematurely age your shoe, all of a sudden it's just, yeah, they're

going to look bad, they're going to start to get bend marks in here and I think it makes

the shoes a lot easier to put on in general.

Next up, we've got collar stays.

You're going to see two main types out there – plastic and metal.

The point of the collar stay is to give your collar some shape.

Now, here's the deal with plastic.

I like it over metal even though it's not as rigid, it really comes down to if you forget

they're in there and you wash them.

Plastic collar stays are not going to damage your shirt, metal collar stays can rip or

tear your shirt.

Stain removers, this is a top secret weapon that's so few guys utilize.

Okay.

So, they've got stain removal pens, they've got sprays, the key here, strategic placement

because a stain will set very quickly and it's about speed, it's about reaction.

So, whenever you spill that coffee on yourself or you open up your drawer you've got that

stain pen.

Guys, it's all about speed, it's all about taking action here.

So, on average men are taller than women, so whenever you meet a woman, she immediately

kind of looks up a bit and what does she notice?

Your nose hair coming right out.

No, you do not want that.

Guys, this is a nose hair trimmer, use it once a week make a part of your routine.

So, it's getting cool you pull out that great-looking sweater you bought last year

and all of a sudden you noticed you've got peeling all over that sweater.

Guys, make your sweaters look great.

Sweater shavers they work they're awesome.

Sweater stones, they work as well.

And if you don't want to even buy one of those, use a disposable razor, run it over

a sweater it will get rid of the peeling.

RFID shielding.

So, if you've got a credit card, it has a chip, you can actually have your information

accessed.

RFI shielding whether it'd be just a basic shield that goes over the credit cards or

if you actually look at clothing and they do have clothing, they've got wallets, they

have bags that are RFID shield so when you're traveling that information can't be swiped.

All right, guys, what do you think?

Did you learn something new?

Let me know down in the comments and if you want more, a hundred style tips in less than

seven minutes.

Yes, you read that right, guys.

This video, I blow through and I give you tons of other style tips.

And, don't forget go check out KKandJay.

I'm linking to them down in the description.

I absolutely love this company and they even got pairs that if you're not even going

to wear socks, guess what?

They still got you covered.

These will wrap around your ankle, so if you're going to, you know, you're in a hot area

you're wearing no-show socks and you still want to keep that shirt tucked in, they've

got you covered over at KKandJay.

[Bleeping sound] So, the question is can you actually shave

with a sweater shaver?

[Shaving sound] No, I'm – ooh, yeah.

It didn't cut me, did it?

That's good.

I should have had a mirror.

Where's my mirror?

I need to find that mirror.

[0:10:00] End of Audio