DEAR SIR,
  MY letters to you last winter, on the subject  of a well balanced national government for
  the United States, were the result of a free  enquiry; when I passed from that subject to
  enquiries relative to our commerce, revenues,  past administration, &c.
  I anticipated the anxieties I feel, on carefully  examining the plan of government proposed
  by the convention.
  It appears to be a plan retaining some federal  features; but to be the first important step,
  and to aim strongly at one consolidated government  of the United States.
  It leaves the powers of government, and the  representation of the people, so unnaturally
  divided between the general and state governments,  that the operations of our system must be
  very uncertain.
  My uniform federal attachments, and the interest  I have in the protection of property, and
  a steady execution of the laws, will convince  you, that, if I am under any bias at all,
  it is in favor of any general system which  shall promise those advantages.
  The instability of our laws increases my wishes  for firm and steady government; but then,
  I can consent to no government, which, in  my opinion, is not calculated equally to preserve
  the rights of all orders of men in the community.
  My object has been to join with those who  have endeavored to supply the defects in the
  forms of our governments by a steady and proper  administration of them.
  Though I have long apprehended that fraudulent  debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one hand,
  and men, on the other, unfriendly to republican  equality, would produce an uneasiness among
  the people, and prepare the way, not for cool  and deliberate reforms in the governments,
  but for changes calculated to promote the  interests of particular orders of men.
  Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the formation  of the new system; I shall be satisfied with
  seeing, if it shall be adopted with a prudent  administration.
  Indeed I am so much convinced of the truth  of Pope's maxim, that "That which is best
  administered is best," that I am much inclined  to subscribe to it from experience.
  I am not disposed to unreasonably contend  about forms.
  I know our situation is critical, and it behooves  us to make the best of it.
  A federal government of some sort is necessary.
  We have suffered the present to languish;  and whether the confederation was capable
  or not originally of answering any valuable  purposes, it is now but of little importance.
  I will pass by the men, and states, who have  been particularly instrumental in preparing
  the way for a change, and perhaps, for governments  not very favorable to the people at large.
  A constitution is now presented which we may  reject, or which we may accept with or without
  amendments, and to which point we ought to  direct our exertions is the question.
  To determine this question with propriety;  we must attentively examine the system itself,
  and the probable consequences of either step.
  This I shall endeavor to do, so far as I am  able, with candor and fairness; and leave
  you to decide upon the propriety of my opinions,  the weight of my reasons, and how far my conclusions
  are well drawn.
  Whatever may be the conduct of others, on  the present occasion, I do not mean hastily
  and positively to decide on the merits of  the constitution proposed.
  I shall be open to conviction and always disposed  to adopt that which, all things considered,
  shall appear to me to be most for the happiness  of the community.
  It must be granted, that if men hastily and  blindly adopt a system of government, they
  will as hastily and as blindly be led to alter  or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one
  after another, till the peaceable and better  part of the community will grow weary with
  changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed  to accept any government however despotic,
  that shall promise stability and firmness.
  The first principal question that occurs,  is, Whether, considering our situation, we
  ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed  constitution?
  If we remain cool and temperate, we are in  no immediate danger of any commotions; we
  are in a state of perfect peace, and in no  danger of invasions; the state governments
  are in the full exercise of their powers;  and our governments answer all present exigencies,
  except the regulation of trade, securing credit,  in some cases, and providing for the interest,
  in some instances, of the public debts; and  whether we adopt a change three or nine months
  hence, can make but little odds with the private  circumstances of individuals; their happiness
  and prosperity, after all, depend principally  upon their own exertions.
  We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing  war: The farmers, fishermen, &c. have not
  fully repaired the waste made by it.
  Industry and frugality are again assuming  their proper station.
  Private debts are lessened, and public debts  incurred by the war have been, by various
  ways, diminished; and the public lands have  now become a productive source for diminishing
  them much more.
  I know uneasy men, who with very much to precipitate,  do not admit all these facts; but they are
  facts well known to all men who are thoroughly  informed in the affairs of this country.
  It must, however, be admitted, that our federal  system is defective, and that some of the
  state governments are not well administered;  but, then, we impute to the defects in our
  governments many evils and embarrassments  which are most clearly the result of the late
  war.
  We must allow men to conduct on the present  occasion, as on all similar one's.
  They will urge a thousand pretenses to answer  their purposes on both sides.
  When we want a man to change his condition,  we describe it as wretched, miserable, and
  despised; and draw a pleasing picture of that  which we would have him assume.
  And when we wish the contrary, we reverse  our descriptions.
  Whenever a clamor is raised, and idle men  get to work, it is highly necessary to examine
  facts carefully, and without unreasonably  suspecting men of falsehood, to examine, and
  enquire attentively, under what impressions  they act.
  It is too often the case in political concerns  that men state facts not as they are, but
  as they wish them to be; and almost every  man, by calling to mind past scenes, will
  find this to be true.
  Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient,  or disorderly men, I conceive, will plunge
  us into commotions, if time should be taken  fully to examine and consider the system proposed.
  Men who feel easy in their circumstances,  and such as are not sanguine in their expectations
  relative to the consequences of the proposed  change, will remain quiet under the existing
  governments.
  Many commercial and monied men, who are uneasy,  not without just cause, ought to be respected;
  and by no means, unreasonably disappointed  in their expectations and hopes; but as to
  those who expect employments under the new  constitution; as to those weak and ardent
  men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions,  and whose lot it generally is to get out of
  one difficulty into another, they are very  little to be regarded; and as to those who
  designedly avail themselves of this weakness  and ardor, they are to be despised.
  It is natural for men, who wish to hasten  the adoption of a measure, to tell us, now
  is the crisis-now is the critical moment which  must be seized or all will be lost; and to
  shut the door against free enquiry, whenever  conscious the thing presented has defects
  in it, which time and investigation will probably  discover.
  This has been the custom of tyrants, and their  dependents in all ages.
  If it is true, what has been so often said,  that the people of this country cannot change
  their condition for the worse, I presume it  still behooves them to endeavor deliberately
  to change it for the better.
  The fickle and ardent, in any community are  the proper tools for establishing despotic
  government.
  But it is deliberate and thinking men, who  must establish and secure governments on free
  principles.
  Before they decide on the plan proposed, they  will enquire whether it will probably be a
  blessing or a curse to this people.
  The present moment discovers a new face in  our affairs.
  Our object has been all along, to reform our  federal system and to strengthen our governments-to
  establish peace, order and justice in the  community-but a new object now presents.
  The plan of government now proposed is evidently  calculated totally to change, in time, our
  condition as a people.
  Instead of being thirteen republics, under  a federal head, it is clearly designed to
  make us one consolidated government.
  Of this, I think, I shall fully convince you,  in my following letters on this subject.
  This consolidation of the states has been  the object of several men in this country
  for some time past.
  Whether such a change can ever be effected,  in any manner; whether it can be effected
  without convulsions and civil wars; whether  such a change will not totally destroy the
  liberties of this country-time only can determine.
  To have a just idea of the government before  us, and to show that a consolidated one is
  the object in view, it is necessary not only  to examine the plan, but also its history,
  and the politics of its particular friends.
  The confederation was formed when great confidence  was placed in the voluntary exertions of individuals,
  and of the respective states; and the framers  of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited,
  and checked the powers, that, in many respects,  they are inadequate to the exigencies of the
  union.
  We find, therefore, members of congress urging  alterations in the federal system almost as
  soon as it was adopted.
  It was early proposed to vest congress with  powers to levy an impost, to regulate trade,
  &c. but such was known to be the caution of  the states in parting with power, that the
  vestment even of these, was proposed to be  under several checks and limitations.
  During the war, the general confusion, and  the introduction of paper money, infused in
  the minds of people vague ideas respecting  government and credit.
  We expected too much from the return of peace,  and of course we have been disappointed.
  Our governments have been new and unsettled;  and several legislatures, by making tender,
  suspension, and paper money laws, have given  just cause of uneasiness to creditors.
  By these and other causes, several orders  of men in the community have been prepared,
  by degrees, for a change of government; and  this very abuse of power in the legislatures,
  which in some cases has been charged upon  the democratic part of the community, has
  furnished aristocratical men with those very  weapons, and those very means, with which,
  in great measure, they are rapidly effecting  their favorite object.
  And should an oppressive government be the  consequence of the proposed change, prosperity
  may reproach not only a few overbearing, unprincipled  men, but those parties in the states which
  have misused their powers.
  The conduct of several legislatures, touching  paper money, and tender laws, has prepared
  many honest men for changes in government,  which otherwise they would not have thought
  of-when by the evils, on the one hand, and  by the secret instigations of artful men,
  on the other, the minds of men were become  sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was taken,
  which is usually followed by a revolution,  or a civil war.
  A general convention for mere commercial purposes  was moved for-the authors of this measure
  saw that the people's attention was turned  solely to the amendment of the federal system;
  and that, had the idea of a total change been  started, probably no state would have appointed
  members to the convention.
  The idea of destroying ultimately, the state  government, and forming one consolidated system,
  could not have been admitted-a convention,  therefore, merely for vesting in congress
  power to regulate trade was proposed.
  This was pleasing to the commercial towns;  and the landed people had little or no concern
  about it.
  September, 1786, a few men from the middle  states met at Annapolis, and hastily proposed
  a convention to be held in May, 1787, for  the purpose, generally, of amending the confederation-this
  was done before the delegates of Massachusetts,  and of the other states arrived-still not
  a word was said about destroying the old constitution,  and making a new one.The states still unsuspecting,
  and not aware that they were passing the Rubicon,  appointed members to the new convention, for
  the sole and express purpose of revising and  amending the confederation-and, probably,
  not one man in ten thousand in the United  States, till within these ten or twelve days,
  had an idea that the old ship was to be destroyed,  and he put to the alternative of embarking
  in the new ship presented, or of being left  in danger of sinking.The States, I believe,
  universally supposed the convention would  report alterations in the confederation, which
  would pass an examination in congress, and  after being agreed to there, would be confirmed
  by all the legislatures, or be rejected.
  Virginia made a very respectable appointment,  and placed at the head of it the first man
  in America.
  In this appointment there was a mixture of  political characters; but Pennsylvania appointed
  principally those men who are esteemed aristocratical.
  Here the favorite moment for changing the  government was evidently discerned by a few
  men, who seized it with address.
  Ten other states appointed, and tho- they  chose men principally connected with commerce
  and the judicial department yet they appointed  many good republican characters-had they all
  attended we should now see, I am persuaded,  a better system presented.
  The non-attendance of eight or nine men, who  were appointed members of the convention,
  I shall ever consider as a very unfortunate  event to the United States.-Had they attended,
  I am pretty clear that the result of the convention  would not have had that strong tendency to
  aristocracy now discernable in every part  of the plan.
  There would not have been so great an accumulation  of powers, especially as to the internal police
  of this country in a few hands as the constitution  reported proposes to vest in them-the young
  visionary men, and the consolidating aristocracy,  would have been more restrained than they
  have been.
  Eleven states met in the convention, and after  four months close attention presented the
  new constitution, to be adopted or rejected  by the people.
  The uneasy and fickle part of the community  may be prepared to receive any form of government;
  but I presume the enlightened and substantial  part will give any constitution presented
  for their adoption a candid and thorough examination;  and silence those designing or empty men,
  who weakly and rashly attempt to precipitate  the adoption of a system of so much importance.
  We shall view the convention with proper respect-and,  at the same time, that we reflect there were
  men of abilities and integrity in it, we must  recollect how disproportionately the democratic
  and aristocratic parts of the community were  represented.Perhaps the judicious friends
  and opposers of the new constitution will  agree, that it is best to let it rely solely
  on its own merits, or be condemned for its  own defects.
  In the first place, I shall premise, that  the plan proposed is a plan of accommodation-and
  that it is in this way only, and by giving  up a part of our opinions, that we can ever
  expect to obtain a government founded in freedom  and compact.
  This circumstance candid men will always keep  in view, in the discussion of this subject.
  The plan proposed appears to be partly federal,  but principally however, calculated ultimately
  to make the states one consolidated government.
  The first interesting question, therefore  suggested, is, how far the states can be consolidated
  into one entire government on free principles.
  In considering this question extensive objects  are to be taken into view, and important changes
  in the forms of government to be carefully  attended to in all their consequences.
  The happiness of the people at large must  be the great object with every honest statesman,
  and he will direct every movement to this  point.
  If we are so situated as a people, as not  to be able to enjoy equal happiness and advantages
  under one government, the consolidation of  the states cannot be admitted.
  There are three different forms of free government  under which the United States may exist as
  one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time  to determine to which we will direct our views.
  1.
  Distinct republics connected under a federal  head.
  In this case the respective state governments  must be the principal guardians of the peoples
  rights, and exclusively regulate their internal  police; in them must rest the balance of government.
  The congress of the states, or federal head,  must consist of delegates amenable to, and
  removable by the respective states: This congress  must have general directing powers; powers
  to require men and monies of the states; to  make treaties; peace and war; to direct the
  operations of armies, &c.
  Under this federal modification of government,  the powers of congress would be rather advisory
  or recommendatory than coercive.
  2.
  We may do away the federal state governments,  and form or consolidate all the states into
  one entire government, with one executive,  one judiciary, and one legislature, consisting
  of senators and representatives collected  from all parts of the union: In this case
  there would be a complete consolidation of  the states.
  3.
  We may consolidate the states as to certain  national objects, and leave them severally
  distinct independent republics, as to internal  police generally.
  Let the general government consist of an executive,  a judiciary, and balanced legislature, and
  its powers extend exclusively to all foreign  concerns, causes arising on the seas to commerce,
  imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace  and war, and to a few internal concerns of
  the community; to the coin, post offices,  weights and measures, a general plan for the
  militia, to naturalization, and, perhaps to  bankruptcies, leaving the internal police
  of the community, in other respects, exclusively  to the state governments; as the administration
  of justice in all causes arising internally,  the laying and collecting of internal taxes,
  and the forming of the militia according to  a general plan prescribed.
  In this case there would be a complete consolidation,  quoad certain objects only.
  Touching the first, or federal plan, I do  not think much can be said in its favor: The
  sovereignty of the nation, without coercive  and efficient powers to collect the strength
  of it, cannot always be depended on to answer  the purposes of government; and in a congress
  of representatives of foreign states, there  must necessarily be an unreasonable mixture
  of powers in the same hands.
  As to the second, or complete consolidating  plan, it deserves to be carefully considered
  at this time by every American: If it be impracticable,  it is a fatal error to model our governments,
  directing our views ultimately to it.
  The third plan, or partial consolidation,  is, in my opinion, the only one that can secure
  the freedom and happiness of this people.
  I once had some general ideas that the second  plan was practicable, but from long attention,
  and the proceedings of the convention, I am  fully satisfied, that this third plan is the
  only one we can with safety and propriety  proceed upon.
  Making this the standard to point out, with  candor and fairness, the parts of the new
  constitution which appear to be improper,  is my object.
  The convention appears to have proposed the  partial consolidation evidently with a view
  to collect all powers ultimately, in the United  States into one entire government; and from
  its views in this respect, and from the tenacity  of the small states to have an equal vote
  in the senate, probably originated the greatest  defects in the proposed plan.
  Independent of the opinions of many great  authors, that a free elective government cannot
  be extended over large territories, a few  reflections must evince, that one government
  and general legislation alone never can extend  equal benefits to all parts of the United
  States: Different laws, customs, and opinions  exist in the different states, which by a
  uniform system of laws would be unreasonably  invaded.
  The United States contain about a million  of square miles, and in half a century will,
  probably, contain ten millions of people;  and from the center to the extremes is about
  800 miles.
  Before we do away the state governments or  adopt measures that will tend to abolish them,
  and to consolidate the states into one entire  government several principles should be considered
  and facts ascertained:-These, and my examination  into the essential parts of the proposed plan,
  I shall pursue in my next.
  Your's, &c.
  THE FEDERAL FARMER.
  
        
      
 
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