Dear sir,
In viewing the various governments instituted by mankind, we see their whole force reducible
to two principles — the important springs which alone move the machines, and give them
their intended influence and controul, are force and persuasion: by the former men are
compelled, by the latter they are drawn.
We denominate a government despotic or free, as the one or other principle prevails in
it.
Perhaps it is not possible for a government to be so despotic, as not to operate persuasively
on some of its subjects; nor is it, in the nature of things, I conceive, for a government
to be so free, or so supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel
obedience to the laws.
In despotic governments one man, or a few men, independant of the people, generally
make the laws, command obedience, and inforce it by the sword: one-fourth part of the people
are armed, and obliged to endure the fatigues of soldiers, to oppress the others and keep
them subject to the laws.
In free governments the people, or their representatives, make the laws; their execution is principally
the effect of voluntary consent and aid; the people respect the magistrate, follow their
private pursuits, and enjoy the fruits of their labour with very small deductions for
the public use.
The body of the people must evidently prefer the latter species of government; and it can
be only those few, who may be well paid for the part they take in enforcing despotism,
that can, for a moment, prefer the former.
Our true object is to give full efficacy to one principle, to arm persuasion on every
side, and to render force as little necessary as possible.
Persuasion is never dangerous not even in despotic governments; but military force,
if often applied internally, can never fail to destroy the love and confidence, and break
the spirits, of the people; and to render it totally impracticable and unnatural for
him or them who govern, and yield to this force against the people, to hold their places
by the peoples' elections.
I repeat my observation, that the plan proposed will have a doubtful operation between the
two principles; and whether it will preponderate towards persuasion or force is uncertain.
Government must exist — If the persuasive principle be feeble, force is infallibly the
next resort — The moment the laws of congress shall be disregarded they must languish, and
the whole system be convulsed — that moment we must have recourse to this next resort,
and all freedom vanish.
It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators,
and assign men to the different departments of the government.
In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people,
and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion.
In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended
to.
It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition
to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to
their circumstances and condition: it must afford security against interested combinations,
corruption and influence; it must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support
of the people.
I think these positions will not be controverted, nor the one I formerly advanced, that a fair
and equal representation is that in which the interests, feelings, opinions and views
of the people are collected, in such manner as they would be were the people all assembled.
Having made these general observations, I shall proceed to consider further my principal
position, viz. that there is no substantial representation of the people provided for
in a government, in which the most essential powers, even as to the internal police of
the country, are proposed to be lodged; and to propose certain amendments as to the representative
branch: 1st, That there ought to be an increase of the numbers of representatives: And, 2dly,
That the elections of them ought to be better secured.
The representation is unsubstantial and ought to be increased.
In matters where there is much room for opinion, you will not expect me to establish my positions
with mathematical certainty; you must only expect my observations to be candid, and such
as are well founded in the mind of the writer.
I am in a field where doctors disagree; and as to genuine representation, though no feature
in government can be more important, perhaps, no one has been less understood, and no one
that has received so imperfect a consideration by political writers.
The ephori in Sparta, and the tribunes in Rome, were but the shadow; the representation
in Great-Britain is unequal and insecure.
In America we have done more in establishing this important branch on its true principles,
than, perhaps, all the world besides: yet even here, I conceive, that very great improvements
in representation may be made.
In fixing this branch, the situation of the people must be surveyed, and the number of
representatives and forms of election apportioned to that situation.
When we find a numerous people settled in a fertile and extensive country, possessing
equality, and few or none of them oppressed with riches or wants, it ought to be the anxious
care of the constitution and laws, to arrest them from national depravity, and to preserve
them in their happy condition.
A virtuous people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous
people.
A virtuous and happy people by laws uncongenial to their characters, may easily be gradually
changed into servile and depraved creatures.
Where the people, or their representatives, make the laws, it is probable they will generally
be fitted to the national character and circumstances, unless the representation be partial, and
the imperfect substitute of the people.
However, the people may be electors, if the representation be so formed as to give one
or more of the natural classes of men in the society an undue ascendency over the others,
it is imperfect; the former will gradually become masters, and the latter slaves.
It is the first of all among the political balances, to preserve in its proper station
each of these classes.
We talk of balances in the legislature, and among the departments of government; we ought
to carry them to the body of the people.
Since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a community, in forming
a genuine representation, and seen that idea considered as chemerical, I have been sensibly
struck with a sentence in the marquis Beccaria's treatise: this sentence was quoted by congress
in 1774, and is as follows: — "In every society there is an effort continually tending
to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to
the extreme of weakness and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and
to diffuse their influence universally and equally."
Add to this Montesquieu's opinion, that "in a free state every man, who is supposed
to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government: therefore, the legislative
should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives."
It is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society,
which we call aristocratical, democratical, merchantile, mechanic, &c. and perceived the
efforts they are constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate
themselves and oppress others.
Each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently.
It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can chuse their legislators,
if they cannot, in the nature of things, chuse men from among themselves, and genuinely like
themselves.
I wish you to take another idea along with you; we are not only to balance these natural
efforts, but we are also to guard against accidental combinations; combinations founded
in the connections of offices and private interests, both evils which are increased
in proportion as the number of men, among which the elected must be, are decreased.
To set this matter in a proper point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions
of the different classes of men, as they may be divided by occupations and politically:
the first class is the aristocratical.
There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country — the first is a constitutional
one, which does not exist in the United States in our common acceptation of the word.
Montesquieu, it is true, observes, that where a part of the persons in a society, for want
of property, age, or moral character, are excluded any share in the government, the
others, who alone are the constitutional electors and elected, form this aristocracy; this according
to him, exists in each of the United States, where a considerable number of persons, as
all convicted of crimes, under age, or not possessed of certain property, are excluded
any share in the government; the second is an aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled
men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together and make
their object their private interests and aggrandizement; the existence of this description is merely
accidental, but particularly to be guarded against.
The third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order
of men, the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary; we
may place men on one side of this line, which others may place on the other, and in all
disputes between the few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves
on which side they are, or ought to be.
In my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or five
thousand men; and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of governors,
of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the principal officers of Congress,
of the army and militia, the superior judges, the most eminent professional men, &c. and
men of large property — the other persons and orders in the community form the natural
democracy; this includes in general the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and military,
the fishermen, mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional men.
It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the aristocratical, and democratical,
with views equally honest, have sentiments widely different, especially respecting public
and private expences, salaries, taxes, &c.
Men of the first class associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess abilities,
ambition, and general knowledge: men of the second class are not so much used to combining
great objects; they possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty: their dependence
is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard labour, while
that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates, and of the chief offices
of government.
Not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced, but other interests and
parties also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power, and for
fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually depend on each other; yet such
are their general views, that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favourable
to themselves and oppressive to the farmers, &c. the farmers alone would act on like principles;
the former would tax the land, the latter the trade.
The manufacturers are often disposed to contend for monopolies, buyers make every exertion
to lower prices, and sellers to raise them; men who live by fees and salaries endeavour
to raise them, and the part of the people who pay them, endeavour to lower them; the
public creditors to augment the taxes, and the people at large to lessen them.
Thus, in every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we see parties verifying
the observation made by the Marquis; and those classes which have not their centinels in
the government, in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly be ruined.
Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property; they contend for rank and distinctions;
all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies — Men, elevated
in society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often
agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy: the yeomanry possess a large share of
property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits — the mechanics
of towns are ardent and changeable, honest and credulous, they are inconsiderable for
numbers, weight and strength, not always sufficiently stable for the supporting free governments;
the fishing interest partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed, and
partly of the changeableness of the mechanic interest.
As to merchants and traders, they are our agents in almost all money transactions; give
activity to government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it.
It has been observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious merchants are generally
advocates for liberty.
It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce but few advocates
for republican forms of government; gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, &c. probably
form about a fourth part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal
to that of all the other descriptions of men; if we may judge from the appointments to Congress,
the legal characters will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the more
the representatives are encreased, the more of the farmers, merchants, &c. will be found
to be brought into the government.
These general observations will enable you to discern what I intend by different classes,
and the general scope of my ideas, when I contend for uniting and balancing their interests,
feelings, opinions, and views in the legislature; we may not only so unite and balance these
as to prevent a change in the government by the gradual exaltation of one part to the
depression of others, but we may derive many other advantages from the combination and
full representation; a small representation can never be well informed as to the circumstances
of the people, the members of it must be too far removed from the people, in general, to
sympathize with them, and too few to communicate with them: a representation must be extremely
imperfect where the representatives are not circumstanced to make the proper communications
to their constituents, and where the constituents in turn cannot, with tolerable convenience,
make known their wants, circumstances, and opinions, to their representatives; where
there is but one representative to 30,000, or 40,000 inhabitants, it appears to me, he
can only mix, and be acquainted with a few respectable characters among his constituents,
even double the federal representation, and then there must be a very great distance between
the representatives and the people in general represented.
On the proposed plan, the state of Delaware, the city of Philadelphia, the state of Rhode
Island, the province of Main[e], the county of Suffolk in Massachusetts, will have one
representative each; there can be but little personal knowledge, or but few communications,
between him and the people at large of either of those districts.
It has been observed, that mixing only with the respectable men, he will get the best
information and ideas from them; he will also receive impressions favourable to their purposes
particularly.
Many plausible shifts have been made to divert the mind from dwelling on this defective representation,
these I shall consider in another place."
Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts,
to raise some and oppress others, the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between
the representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will still remain, I mean the constant
liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations; the tyranny of the
one, or the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared
with the factions of the few.
It is a consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of representatives will
be liable to be formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of appointments
and offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how far the
people will have confidence in them.
To obviate difficulties on this head, as well as objections to the representative branch,
generally, several observations have been made — these I will now examine, and if
they shall appear to be unfounded, the objections must stand unanswered.
That the people are the electors, must elect good men, and attend to the administration.
It is said that the members of Congress, at stated periods, must return home, and that
they must be subject to the laws they may make, and to a share of the burdens they may
impose.
That the people possess the strong arm to overawe their rulers, and the best checks
in their national character against the abuses of power, that the supreme power will remain
in them.
That the state governments will form a part of, and a balance in the system.
That Congress will have only a few national objects to attend to, and the state governments
many and local ones.
That the new Congress will be more numerous than the present, and that any numerous body
is unwieldy and mobbish.
That the states only are represented in the present Congress, and that the people will
require a representation in the new one; that in fifty or an hundred years the representation
will be numerous.
That congress will have no temptation to do wrong; and that no system to enslave the people
is practicable.
That as long as the people are free they will preserve free governments; and that when they
shall become tired of freedom, arbitrary government must take place.
These observations I shall examine in the course of my letters; and, I think, not only
shew that they are not well founded, but point out the fallacy of some of them; and shew,
that others do not very well comport with the dignified and manly sentiments of a free
and enlightened people.
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